Urban Arena Wiki - User contributions [en]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-03-16T08:29:50Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact [https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/geography/people/professor-loretta-lees-1| Lorreta Lee] for more information.

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== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in the Roman district of Trastevere (Italy). The district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification, which applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely by “staying put” (AGAPE_01: 1).
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods by tenants' unions and individual squatters occupying buildings. Anti-eviction platforms voice these claims at the district level in Trastevere. Multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The Trastevere district is facing gentrification resulting from a roll-back of state protection of housing stock and privatized public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased, which led to a severe housing crisis and to police-led evictions. In this context, anti-gentrification resistance emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenants' request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This ongoing process started in the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5). Specifically, the AGAPE project focuses on resistance from 2014 (when the project started) until present.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law), which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy their housing at moderate prices.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions. They are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority and perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent Romany people) are excluded from this intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (recalling the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are thus not represented.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups that frame themselves by neighbourhoods. However, the neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) without being altruistic or supportive of other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fascist pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups (i.e. migrants, Romany) potentially breaks down solidarity among activists. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistance since only long-time local inhabitants who share this “working class” narrative may benefit while neglected social groups are even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity after the 2008 crisis. This reinforced the ongoing housing shortages that began in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neoliberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens' resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, December 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to better provide and manage decent housing for the working-class (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants, protecting them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, September 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of December 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of 50 to 75 percent of public property (AGAPE_02: 12). Incentivized from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

Both citizens and public actors have ambivalent views on the regulatory framework of the intervention. On the one hand, while citizens and local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are responsive to some extent to citizens' claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Narratives from public actors pose obstacles to legitimacy. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts to the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatization of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, even at moderate prices, only middle class tenants can afford to buy their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion breaks down solidarity among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very dubious about the rental-homeownership conversion. As S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso recall, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” in cities (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put") in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detrimental effects of privatizing public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organized in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analyzed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples included “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists, and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them with concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project to “provide the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project, including fieldwork, theoretical research, and practical tools against gentrification processes, addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-03-16T08:29:40Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact [https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/geography/people/professor-loretta-lees-1 | Lorreta Lee] for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in the Roman district of Trastevere (Italy). The district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification, which applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely by “staying put” (AGAPE_01: 1).
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods by tenants' unions and individual squatters occupying buildings. Anti-eviction platforms voice these claims at the district level in Trastevere. Multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The Trastevere district is facing gentrification resulting from a roll-back of state protection of housing stock and privatized public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased, which led to a severe housing crisis and to police-led evictions. In this context, anti-gentrification resistance emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenants' request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This ongoing process started in the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5). Specifically, the AGAPE project focuses on resistance from 2014 (when the project started) until present.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law), which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy their housing at moderate prices.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions. They are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority and perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent Romany people) are excluded from this intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (recalling the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are thus not represented.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups that frame themselves by neighbourhoods. However, the neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) without being altruistic or supportive of other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fascist pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups (i.e. migrants, Romany) potentially breaks down solidarity among activists. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistance since only long-time local inhabitants who share this “working class” narrative may benefit while neglected social groups are even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity after the 2008 crisis. This reinforced the ongoing housing shortages that began in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neoliberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens' resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, December 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to better provide and manage decent housing for the working-class (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants, protecting them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, September 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of December 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of 50 to 75 percent of public property (AGAPE_02: 12). Incentivized from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

Both citizens and public actors have ambivalent views on the regulatory framework of the intervention. On the one hand, while citizens and local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are responsive to some extent to citizens' claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Narratives from public actors pose obstacles to legitimacy. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts to the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatization of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, even at moderate prices, only middle class tenants can afford to buy their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion breaks down solidarity among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very dubious about the rental-homeownership conversion. As S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso recall, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” in cities (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put") in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detrimental effects of privatizing public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organized in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analyzed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples included “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists, and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them with concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project to “provide the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project, including fieldwork, theoretical research, and practical tools against gentrification processes, addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam

2021-03-16T08:28:35Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact [https://drift.eur.nl/people/frank-van-steenbergen/| Franck van Steenbergen] for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

This intervention is called the “Veerkracht Carnisse” or “Resilience Lab” and refers to an urban regeneration experiment within a deprived urban neighborhood. Specifically, iIt takes place in the neighborhood of Carnisse, in the south of Rotterdam (Netherlands).<ref>Resilience Lab website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.veerkrachtcarnisse.nl/.</ref>

The intervention consists of the creation and implementation of an Urban Living Lab, which focuses on different projects (education, greening, local democracy) to engage residents, professionals, and policymakers in regenerating this city district. It aims to collectively address the social problems the neighborhood is facing and reinvent the way in which neighborhoods could be redeveloped and regenerated.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

This intervention is primarily implemented in the sector of urban regeneration.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The intervention seeks to address both sustainability and social justice issues. On the one hand, the intervention “focused on empowering the local community” (i.e. in a “most disadvantaged neighborhood” of Rotterdam) (GUST_05: 1049). On the other hand, it aimed to “foster(ing) urban sustainability and resilience”.

Transition challenges were primarily tied to social justice, that is to say focused on “social cohesion, equity, community engagement/empowerment, and democratic legitimacy” (GUST_06: 202). Classical ecological issues were not really addressed by participants; sustainability was rather framed as “something that is durable, as a desire for consistency over a long period of time” (i.e. it refers to social sustainability and to social networks) (GUST_06: 202). The intervention is driven by the idea of reinventing the ways in which urban regeneration projects are developed and implemented and to make them more inclusive and responsive to the populations’ needs and wishes (interview with F.).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The Resilience Lab started with a period of concept development and scoping in 2009. It officially started in September 2011 and concluded in September 2015 (4 years) (GUST_05: 1049).

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a hybrid governance mode that includes the partners of the Resilience Lab (civil society organization, research institute), the municipality, and the local citizens.

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This is a relevant example of governance intervention that addresses the second order of learning, i.e. aiming to structurally change the governance arrangements in urban regeneration projects (interview with F.).

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam
*add to GUST_(InContext) Wittmayer and al. Transition Management in Urban Neighborhood
*Interview with F., researcher, (16.06.20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed and primarily funded by the Dutch Ministry within the framework of a national program aiming to regenerate deprived neighborhoods in the south of Rotterdam. The project was developed by a consortium of four partners (see Q. 10). One of them, the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) related the intervention to the EU-funded project InContext (2010-13) (not included in UrbanA WP4 database). Incontext investigates the conditions for creating sustainability transitions at the local and individual levels. Carnisse neighborhood was the 1st pilot project of InContext.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/
.</ref>

In addition, the GUST project (2014-17 - Governance for Urban Sustainability Transitions)<ref>GUST website. Last view on 26/06/20: http://www.urbanlivinglabs.net/.</ref> enabled this same partner to conduct an impact assessment and an evaluation of all the activities done in the Resilience Lab. As as a part of the Joint Programming Instrument Urban Europe, GUST aimed to examine, inform, and advance the governance of sustainability transitions through Urban Living Labs (ULLs). ULLs serve as a means for testing innovations (in buildings, transport and energy systems) and for providing economic stability and social cohesion while achieving urban sustainability.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Experimentation labs]] approach. The overall project - GUST - is explicitly mentioned in the database: “The GUST project offers a number of illustrative examples where urban living labs of collaboration and innovation have been formed”. However, the intervention itself is not mentioned.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Five project deliverables have been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4 including GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam (available in the Zotero library) that refers to the intervention.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Carnisse neighborhood is known for being among one of the forty “disadvantaged neighborhoods” in the Netherlands (according to the Ministry of Housing 2007) (GUST_05: 1048). The neighborhood is poorly scored in terms of safety, social cohesion, and housing (according to different municipal indexes). The partners involved in the intervention (see Q.10) “identified and encountered (in the neighborhood) persistent problems in different societal systems (e.g. education, welfare, healthcare and food)” (GUST_05: 1049).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of social justice is implicitly a major motivation behind the intervention. Even though the terms of “social justice” is not mentioned, the “Resilience Lab” explicitly focused on activity related to “poverty reduction, the upbringing of children, and democratic reform for local development programs” (GUST_05: 1049). In addition, the intervention aims to develop non-tokenistic participatory processes that are related to social justice (interview with F.).

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was initiated by a consortium of four project partners including the Rotterdam Vakmanstad, Creatief Beheer, Bureau Frontlijn, and the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT). The first three are local civil society organizations/associations involved in community building projects in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam. The fourth is a “research institute where several action researchers were active in Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1049). This consortium developed the Resilience Lab as a whole and each partner was responsible for one “interactive field” within it, including “improving residents’ home situation”, “education at school” and “greening the public space" (interview with F.).

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The direct benefits of the intervention are the residents of the district. Indeed the “target groups of the Resilience Lab included primarily children (aged 4–12 years), their families, schools (board, teachers, and parents), and residents or volunteers actively involved in community life”. Also included were the networks in Carnisse and Charlois consisting of professionals, civil servants, social workers, and entrepreneurs” (GUST_05: 1050).

Scaling up, the intervention aims to benefit the municipality of Rotterdam because it consists of experimenting with a new form of transition management in an urban regeneration context that can be later transferred to other neighborhoods (upscaling).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
| X
| (initiator/project leaders) DRIFT
researchers and associated

|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| (indicators/project leaders) Bureau Frontlijn, Creatief Beheer, Rotterdam Vakmanstad
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
| X
| a foundation responsible for the ‘re-opened’ community-center.
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The municipality of Rotterdam
different sub-department of the Municipality of Rotterdam

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| (co-funders) the Dutch government
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| Welfare organizations
Housing associations

|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was made possible by the freedom given by the municipality to the consortium to implement the project. In a context of turbulences in local institutional settings (regarding municipal structures and competences), the consortium was given a “carte blanche” for developing and experimenting the Resilience Lab. Whereas most funded projects are predefined and have to follow a pre-established framework, the freedom given to the consortium partners enabled them to progressively develop and adapt their methodology to the local context. This freedom was crucial to the success of the Reliance Lab.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The citizens (i.e. actors including residents as well as other people working or connected to the district) engaged with the intervention by developing a vision or “narrative of place” about transition pathways for the future of the district; by establishing an agenda for transformative and experimental actions (GUST_5: 1053); or by participating directly in the activities of the Resilience Lab.

These two levels of citizens’ engagement i.e. deliberating about the vision of the neighborhood and joining the activities of the Resilience Lab were complementary.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

The consortium partners of the Resilience Lab were the drivers of the project. They first framed the intervention and proposed tools for engaging citizens (i.e. community areas, activities). The citizens engaged in the Resilience Lab by developing the vision of the neighborhood as well as participating in activities. In other words, the four partners were the drivers and facilitators of the projects, while the citizens participated in shaping the intervention and orienting its outcomes. Over time, citizens' roles and responsibilities grew bigger since the project developed according to their wishes and needs. For instance, citizens were the drivers of the creation of the community gardens and the community center (GUST_05: 1054).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

The methodology and activities for the transition management approach were focused on abstract discussion and meta-level questions about the vision of the neighborhood. Thus it targeted people who were more accustomed to such deliberative settings. In addition, the methodology for the visioning aspect of the Resilience Lab works with selective participation and targets 20 to 30 front runners of the neighborhood (interview with F.). In that sense, it was rather exclusive to people who were not familiar with such settings, including people facing language barriers, newcomers, and young people (below 20 years old (GUST_06: 193). Some did try to participate the deliberative arena but attended only in a few workshops and acted mostly as observers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

To balance this exclusivity, the consortium partner tried to engage people in practical activities which proved to be more inclusive than discussing the neighborhood. Indeed people joining the activities in the community center or garden were more diverse in terms of ethnicity, languages, and age difference. This "hands on" mentality proved to be very rewarding for the people who live and work in Carnisse (interview with F.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===
The Carnisse neighborhood had been identified as an area that needed to be regenerated (due to persistent social problems). Whereas typical regeneration strategies include demolishing aged public housing and a top-down re-development approach, the municipality agreed on experimenting new forms of urban regeneration in the neighborhood. The Resilience Lab - suggested by the consortium partners (see Q.10) - was a “test bed for new methodologies and innovative practices” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, overall design of the project (i.e. participatory, involving the local community) matches with the context of a new national neighborhood approach in which “citizens should be more active in addressing and solving problems in their living environment” (GUST_05: 1048). Thus, it was favorably appreciated by the local government to give lots of freedom to the leading partners for implementing the Resilience Lab.

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The current neighborhood approach of the ministry of Internal Affairs in the Netherlands reconceptualizes the role of inhabitants and citizens to be responsible in a far greater extent for addressing issues related to their living environment: “a revised role for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the 40-Neighbourhood-Programme. They describe this change as follows: “from active financial commitment linked with targets to a more facilitative role, acting on request in relation to what others do” (Ministerie BZK 2014: 2)” (GUST_06: 1880).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was developed in a context of changing institutional settings including the municipal centralization of sub-municipal departments (which were dismantled) and at the same time the decentralization of national policies of social welfare to local municipalities (interview with F.). It means that the municipality of Rotterdam was in charge of extra tasks related to the welfare and well-being of Rotterdam citizens.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The project material points out that a new trend of the political culture, emphasizing the role of citizens in addressing local issues, influenced the intervention. Indeed, the Resilience Lab took place in the context of withdrawal of the state welfare structures and financial support by redirecting the responsibility to the local inhabitants and citizens. In that sense, the Resilience Lab is a solution given the context of a required “participatory society” (GUST_06: 188).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The main transition management in Carnisse’s neighborhood was funded by the Dutch Ministry under a national program for urban regeneration in Rotterdam-South (GUST_06: 190)n. The development of the transition methodology by DRIFT (one partner) was funded by the EU-project InContext, and the assessment and evaluation of the overall intervention that DRIFT conducted was funded by the EU-project GUST (see Q. 8.a).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

The institutional settings were very turbulent over the course of the intervention and the governmental policies and constitutional settings detailed above(see Q.18 -Q.19) were progressively set-up at that time.

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Turbulences and changes in the institutional settings (i.e. regarding the competences of the municipality and welfare structures) were an obstacle to implementing the intervention (GUST_05: 1050). While the sub-municipality to which Carnisse belonged was dismantled and budget cuts were made to social support, the project partners navigated without grasping these new settings. The consortium did not manage to establish a durable relationship with other actors, from the municipality to housing associations and welfare organizations, because the contact people changed every year (interview with F.)

The constantly changing institutional settings created a lot of ambiguity and insecurity about future processes. It constrained people in engaging in a participatory process while not being sure on how everything would be arranged in the following years (interview with F.).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The intervention faced obstacles prior to its implementation. Before it started, the project faced distrust from some residents towards these kinds of projects which have the “tendency to portray the neighborhood as a disadvantage, an image which frustrated many locals and in which they did not recognize themselves” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, another challenge was the relative skepticism from both the residents and the municipality about the “relative openness of both the process and the outcomes” of the living lab. They were doubting the urban living lab could effectively address the problems the neighborhood was facing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

There is high residential mobility and turnover in Carnisse, as it is considered as an “arrival” neighborhood. Many newcomers, especially young and less educated workers, move in as they arrive in the city and move out as soon as they can afford to live in a better district (InContext). As a consequence, the short-term residents are not necessarily aware about the local projects.

*'''d. Finances'''

It was challenging to start the intervention because it took place in a context of “budget cuts” from the municipality and general public subsidies for social intervention (i.e. the context of the erosion of old welfare structure) (GUST_05: 1050).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The participatory and deliberative aspect of the resilience Lab were not very inclusive (see Q. 16).

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Turbulences in institutional settings
| To overcome these turbulences, the consortium partners tried to work qui autonomously from these formal institutions. This found to be quite fruitful for the success of the Resilience Lab, as they could experiment with activities on the ground and really engage with the people of Carnisse free from institutional constraints. However, this autonomy hammered the more durable impact of the Resilience Lab in the municipal agenda (see Q. 36).
|-
| Skepticism of the residents and the municipality
| The project leaders. To address the skepticism of the residents and the municipality about the process and the outcomes of the project (is it worth it or not?), the Resilience Lab had to “prove [...] the benefits from being involved in it”, “this required a deep study of the dynamics of the neighborhood, building networks based on reciprocity and gaining trust over time by showing results that benefited the local community” (GUST_05: 1050).
|-
| Budget cuts in social welfare
| The consortium partner DRIFT used other fundings including two Eu-projects Incontext and Gust.
|-
| Lack of inclusivity
| The “practical” and “hands on” activities of the Resilience Lab allowed more diverse people to engage in the project and made it more inclusive (see Q. 16).
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

The outcomes of the intervention are:
*New social relations established within the neighborhood between citizens and some policy makers, and also between residents themselves. The participatory activities and tools used in the framework of the Resilience Lab increased interaction between different social groups (GUST_05: 1059). It enhanced trust and contributed to community building (although one of the problems in the district was the lack of community).
*Opening of the neighborhood: people living outside of the neighborhood took part in the Resilience Lab, thus increasing its openness and enhancing networks and relationships outside of the administrative boundaries of Carnisse (GUST_05: 1052).
*Citizens empowerment: the narrative “blossoming Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1053) developed in the deliberative workshops and empowered citizens because it gave them the opportunity to express their aspirations (what to they want for their neighborhood) and express their legitimate criticisms to the current dynamic of the place (e.g. the severe budget cuts that let to the closure of public facilities, such as two community centers and an educational garden). Over time, the citizens became almost fully responsible for the community center and the community garden.
*The identification of the residents/citizens with their neighborhood (i.e. the creation of a symbolic “sense of place”) although prior to the Resilience Lab, many did not feel connected to the neighborhood in terms of “shared meaning and experience” (GUST_05: 1053).
*the success of the “collaborative governance” (i.e. between policy makers and citizens). This demonstrates that reciprocity and institutional connection are key for escaping stigmatization of the place and its people (GUST_05: 1053).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The four consortium partners “had been involved and worked in their respective domains (i.e. social work, education) in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam south” (add to GUST: 190). Thus, the partners have brought their own experience and set of approaches and activities to the framework of the Resilience Lab.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Not reportedly. However, one of the consortium partners, DRIFT, had previously experienced some transition management strategies in the sectors of housing and mobility in other urban contexts, which have been translated to the neighborhood scale for Carnisse (interview with F.).

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

The Resilience Lab is is experimental and not explicitly built upon another intervention.
However, the methodology developed for transition management was influenced by previous work carried out by the consortium partners. The project started with a vision translated into a set of principles to be developed in practice (interview with F.). This methodology was the overarching umbrella under which the activities were created. The partners have already experimented some of these activities in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam-South (GUST_05: 1049) but adapted them to the local context e.g. in the sector of education or greening the public space.

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The partner DRIFT had already experienced transition management strategies in the energy or mobility sector. The methodology they had previously developed was translated and adapted to urban regeneration at the scale of a neighborhood (Interview with F.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Since the Resilience Lab was incorporated into other EU-projects on transition management, especially Incontext, some learning may have been disseminated, especially based in the case of the other pilot projects, such as the city of Wolfhagen, Germany, and the village of Finkenstein in Austria.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 06/05/20): : https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/pilots.html.</ref>

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

The intervention started from an abstract vision, a methodology, and a set of activities already experienced in other contexts. The practical dimension of the intervention was not set in stone and developed over the course of the project to make it context specific (i.e. depending on the need, wishes of the residents as well as facing local constraints). To sum up, it is an intervention that learnt from itself in the process of implementing it.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

Overcoming obstacles contributed to the learning process, especially in regards the exclusive dimension of the project. The consortium partner found out that engaging citizens in a deliberation process can be quite exclusive whereas “hands on” and practical activities (i.e. in the community center or the community gardens) are far more inclusive. This learning allowed them to combine these two aspects of the participation (Interview with F.)

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

*Guidance tool for self-organization developed by DRIFT
*In the framework of InContext: “Community Arena” for transition management include the processes of envisioning, backcasting, experimenting, self-reflection, and learning

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The project aims to be transferable. The idea was to identify, “new ways of neighborhood development” (GUST_05: 1055) and reinvent integrative methods for neighborhood redevelopment that could be adapted to different contexts. The overarching umbrella and set of principles for transition management would remain while the different activities within the Resilience Lab would be context specific (interview with F.).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The principles and methodology for neighborhood transition management (i.e. the Resilience Lab as a whole) can be transferred to any other context. However the activities within it should not be pre-determined and have to be adapted to the local context. It means that vision and basic principles of the Resilience Lab can be transferred but the actual implementation would differ in every neighborhood. (interview with F.).

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Researchers and project managers.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

The limit to transferability would not take the Resilience Lab as an integrative project, rather to replicate the different activities within it e.g. related to education, green space etc.. Lacking an overarching and integrated vision of neighborhood transition management would limit the success of such intervention (Interview with F.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The project has been disseminated.

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

The Resilience Lab as a whole has not been replicated in other contexts. However, the different activities developed by the consortium partners (including educational tools for schools or arrangement of the public space) have been transferred and implemented in other districts in Rotterdam and in cities in the Netherlands. The residents also replicated some activities such as the community garden after the first one has been closed by the municipality (interview with F.).

Based on the experience of Carnisse, the notion of "self-sustained community center" is also being replicated by the municipality in some other neighborhoods in Rotterdam under the name "Houses for the neighborhood” (interview with F.) . In 2013-14, a local policy established that every neighborhood should have a community center in which the desires and needs of citizens are central and where the community takes an active role in sustaining the center. These “Houses for the neighborhood” are a sort of replication of the community center in Carnisse, but are mainly led by municipality structures together with welfare organizations. Some are developed elsewhere in the Netherlands.

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

Yes, the project was mainly aimed at restructuring the governance arrangements. Whereas the municipality and other dominant stakeholders like the housing associations or welfare organizations were very dominant in the previous years, the Resilience Lab was explicitly aimed at breaking the dominant structure and actors who governed neighborhood development. The Resilience Lab tried to work instead in more in a co-creative manner and meaningfully involve residents and all kind resident groups in impacting- their neighborhood. Changing the governance arrangements was a really strong ambition of the intervention (interview with F.).

However, this ambition faced two obstacles and turned out to be quite limited. First, in the context of institutional turbulences, the consortium partners decided to develop the project quite autonomously from the municipality (see Q. 24). As a consequence, they could not really connect with the municipality and share the learning from that intervention. Whereas some civil servants learnt from the intervention, they did it at a personal level and not at the structural level of the institution. Second, the fragmented replication of Resilience Lab (see Q.33) rather than its integrated vision rather hampered impact in structurally changing the governance settings (interview with F.).

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

The biggest takeaway from such a Resilience Lab or neighborhood redevelopment is to aim to the autonomy and sovereignty of the residents and the people involved. Such interventions have to be context specific, have a sense of freedom in developing your activities in practices to support learning by doing (interview with F.).

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam

2021-03-16T08:28:23Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact [https://drift.eur.nl/people/frank-van-steenbergen/ |Franck van Steenbergen] for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

This intervention is called the “Veerkracht Carnisse” or “Resilience Lab” and refers to an urban regeneration experiment within a deprived urban neighborhood. Specifically, iIt takes place in the neighborhood of Carnisse, in the south of Rotterdam (Netherlands).<ref>Resilience Lab website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.veerkrachtcarnisse.nl/.</ref>

The intervention consists of the creation and implementation of an Urban Living Lab, which focuses on different projects (education, greening, local democracy) to engage residents, professionals, and policymakers in regenerating this city district. It aims to collectively address the social problems the neighborhood is facing and reinvent the way in which neighborhoods could be redeveloped and regenerated.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

This intervention is primarily implemented in the sector of urban regeneration.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The intervention seeks to address both sustainability and social justice issues. On the one hand, the intervention “focused on empowering the local community” (i.e. in a “most disadvantaged neighborhood” of Rotterdam) (GUST_05: 1049). On the other hand, it aimed to “foster(ing) urban sustainability and resilience”.

Transition challenges were primarily tied to social justice, that is to say focused on “social cohesion, equity, community engagement/empowerment, and democratic legitimacy” (GUST_06: 202). Classical ecological issues were not really addressed by participants; sustainability was rather framed as “something that is durable, as a desire for consistency over a long period of time” (i.e. it refers to social sustainability and to social networks) (GUST_06: 202). The intervention is driven by the idea of reinventing the ways in which urban regeneration projects are developed and implemented and to make them more inclusive and responsive to the populations’ needs and wishes (interview with F.).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The Resilience Lab started with a period of concept development and scoping in 2009. It officially started in September 2011 and concluded in September 2015 (4 years) (GUST_05: 1049).

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a hybrid governance mode that includes the partners of the Resilience Lab (civil society organization, research institute), the municipality, and the local citizens.

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This is a relevant example of governance intervention that addresses the second order of learning, i.e. aiming to structurally change the governance arrangements in urban regeneration projects (interview with F.).

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam
*add to GUST_(InContext) Wittmayer and al. Transition Management in Urban Neighborhood
*Interview with F., researcher, (16.06.20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed and primarily funded by the Dutch Ministry within the framework of a national program aiming to regenerate deprived neighborhoods in the south of Rotterdam. The project was developed by a consortium of four partners (see Q. 10). One of them, the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) related the intervention to the EU-funded project InContext (2010-13) (not included in UrbanA WP4 database). Incontext investigates the conditions for creating sustainability transitions at the local and individual levels. Carnisse neighborhood was the 1st pilot project of InContext.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/
.</ref>

In addition, the GUST project (2014-17 - Governance for Urban Sustainability Transitions)<ref>GUST website. Last view on 26/06/20: http://www.urbanlivinglabs.net/.</ref> enabled this same partner to conduct an impact assessment and an evaluation of all the activities done in the Resilience Lab. As as a part of the Joint Programming Instrument Urban Europe, GUST aimed to examine, inform, and advance the governance of sustainability transitions through Urban Living Labs (ULLs). ULLs serve as a means for testing innovations (in buildings, transport and energy systems) and for providing economic stability and social cohesion while achieving urban sustainability.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Experimentation labs]] approach. The overall project - GUST - is explicitly mentioned in the database: “The GUST project offers a number of illustrative examples where urban living labs of collaboration and innovation have been formed”. However, the intervention itself is not mentioned.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Five project deliverables have been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4 including GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam (available in the Zotero library) that refers to the intervention.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Carnisse neighborhood is known for being among one of the forty “disadvantaged neighborhoods” in the Netherlands (according to the Ministry of Housing 2007) (GUST_05: 1048). The neighborhood is poorly scored in terms of safety, social cohesion, and housing (according to different municipal indexes). The partners involved in the intervention (see Q.10) “identified and encountered (in the neighborhood) persistent problems in different societal systems (e.g. education, welfare, healthcare and food)” (GUST_05: 1049).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of social justice is implicitly a major motivation behind the intervention. Even though the terms of “social justice” is not mentioned, the “Resilience Lab” explicitly focused on activity related to “poverty reduction, the upbringing of children, and democratic reform for local development programs” (GUST_05: 1049). In addition, the intervention aims to develop non-tokenistic participatory processes that are related to social justice (interview with F.).

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was initiated by a consortium of four project partners including the Rotterdam Vakmanstad, Creatief Beheer, Bureau Frontlijn, and the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT). The first three are local civil society organizations/associations involved in community building projects in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam. The fourth is a “research institute where several action researchers were active in Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1049). This consortium developed the Resilience Lab as a whole and each partner was responsible for one “interactive field” within it, including “improving residents’ home situation”, “education at school” and “greening the public space" (interview with F.).

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The direct benefits of the intervention are the residents of the district. Indeed the “target groups of the Resilience Lab included primarily children (aged 4–12 years), their families, schools (board, teachers, and parents), and residents or volunteers actively involved in community life”. Also included were the networks in Carnisse and Charlois consisting of professionals, civil servants, social workers, and entrepreneurs” (GUST_05: 1050).

Scaling up, the intervention aims to benefit the municipality of Rotterdam because it consists of experimenting with a new form of transition management in an urban regeneration context that can be later transferred to other neighborhoods (upscaling).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
| X
| (initiator/project leaders) DRIFT
researchers and associated

|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| (indicators/project leaders) Bureau Frontlijn, Creatief Beheer, Rotterdam Vakmanstad
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
| X
| a foundation responsible for the ‘re-opened’ community-center.
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The municipality of Rotterdam
different sub-department of the Municipality of Rotterdam

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| (co-funders) the Dutch government
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| Welfare organizations
Housing associations

|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was made possible by the freedom given by the municipality to the consortium to implement the project. In a context of turbulences in local institutional settings (regarding municipal structures and competences), the consortium was given a “carte blanche” for developing and experimenting the Resilience Lab. Whereas most funded projects are predefined and have to follow a pre-established framework, the freedom given to the consortium partners enabled them to progressively develop and adapt their methodology to the local context. This freedom was crucial to the success of the Reliance Lab.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The citizens (i.e. actors including residents as well as other people working or connected to the district) engaged with the intervention by developing a vision or “narrative of place” about transition pathways for the future of the district; by establishing an agenda for transformative and experimental actions (GUST_5: 1053); or by participating directly in the activities of the Resilience Lab.

These two levels of citizens’ engagement i.e. deliberating about the vision of the neighborhood and joining the activities of the Resilience Lab were complementary.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

The consortium partners of the Resilience Lab were the drivers of the project. They first framed the intervention and proposed tools for engaging citizens (i.e. community areas, activities). The citizens engaged in the Resilience Lab by developing the vision of the neighborhood as well as participating in activities. In other words, the four partners were the drivers and facilitators of the projects, while the citizens participated in shaping the intervention and orienting its outcomes. Over time, citizens' roles and responsibilities grew bigger since the project developed according to their wishes and needs. For instance, citizens were the drivers of the creation of the community gardens and the community center (GUST_05: 1054).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

The methodology and activities for the transition management approach were focused on abstract discussion and meta-level questions about the vision of the neighborhood. Thus it targeted people who were more accustomed to such deliberative settings. In addition, the methodology for the visioning aspect of the Resilience Lab works with selective participation and targets 20 to 30 front runners of the neighborhood (interview with F.). In that sense, it was rather exclusive to people who were not familiar with such settings, including people facing language barriers, newcomers, and young people (below 20 years old (GUST_06: 193). Some did try to participate the deliberative arena but attended only in a few workshops and acted mostly as observers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

To balance this exclusivity, the consortium partner tried to engage people in practical activities which proved to be more inclusive than discussing the neighborhood. Indeed people joining the activities in the community center or garden were more diverse in terms of ethnicity, languages, and age difference. This "hands on" mentality proved to be very rewarding for the people who live and work in Carnisse (interview with F.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===
The Carnisse neighborhood had been identified as an area that needed to be regenerated (due to persistent social problems). Whereas typical regeneration strategies include demolishing aged public housing and a top-down re-development approach, the municipality agreed on experimenting new forms of urban regeneration in the neighborhood. The Resilience Lab - suggested by the consortium partners (see Q.10) - was a “test bed for new methodologies and innovative practices” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, overall design of the project (i.e. participatory, involving the local community) matches with the context of a new national neighborhood approach in which “citizens should be more active in addressing and solving problems in their living environment” (GUST_05: 1048). Thus, it was favorably appreciated by the local government to give lots of freedom to the leading partners for implementing the Resilience Lab.

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The current neighborhood approach of the ministry of Internal Affairs in the Netherlands reconceptualizes the role of inhabitants and citizens to be responsible in a far greater extent for addressing issues related to their living environment: “a revised role for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the 40-Neighbourhood-Programme. They describe this change as follows: “from active financial commitment linked with targets to a more facilitative role, acting on request in relation to what others do” (Ministerie BZK 2014: 2)” (GUST_06: 1880).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was developed in a context of changing institutional settings including the municipal centralization of sub-municipal departments (which were dismantled) and at the same time the decentralization of national policies of social welfare to local municipalities (interview with F.). It means that the municipality of Rotterdam was in charge of extra tasks related to the welfare and well-being of Rotterdam citizens.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The project material points out that a new trend of the political culture, emphasizing the role of citizens in addressing local issues, influenced the intervention. Indeed, the Resilience Lab took place in the context of withdrawal of the state welfare structures and financial support by redirecting the responsibility to the local inhabitants and citizens. In that sense, the Resilience Lab is a solution given the context of a required “participatory society” (GUST_06: 188).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The main transition management in Carnisse’s neighborhood was funded by the Dutch Ministry under a national program for urban regeneration in Rotterdam-South (GUST_06: 190)n. The development of the transition methodology by DRIFT (one partner) was funded by the EU-project InContext, and the assessment and evaluation of the overall intervention that DRIFT conducted was funded by the EU-project GUST (see Q. 8.a).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

The institutional settings were very turbulent over the course of the intervention and the governmental policies and constitutional settings detailed above(see Q.18 -Q.19) were progressively set-up at that time.

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Turbulences and changes in the institutional settings (i.e. regarding the competences of the municipality and welfare structures) were an obstacle to implementing the intervention (GUST_05: 1050). While the sub-municipality to which Carnisse belonged was dismantled and budget cuts were made to social support, the project partners navigated without grasping these new settings. The consortium did not manage to establish a durable relationship with other actors, from the municipality to housing associations and welfare organizations, because the contact people changed every year (interview with F.)

The constantly changing institutional settings created a lot of ambiguity and insecurity about future processes. It constrained people in engaging in a participatory process while not being sure on how everything would be arranged in the following years (interview with F.).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The intervention faced obstacles prior to its implementation. Before it started, the project faced distrust from some residents towards these kinds of projects which have the “tendency to portray the neighborhood as a disadvantage, an image which frustrated many locals and in which they did not recognize themselves” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, another challenge was the relative skepticism from both the residents and the municipality about the “relative openness of both the process and the outcomes” of the living lab. They were doubting the urban living lab could effectively address the problems the neighborhood was facing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

There is high residential mobility and turnover in Carnisse, as it is considered as an “arrival” neighborhood. Many newcomers, especially young and less educated workers, move in as they arrive in the city and move out as soon as they can afford to live in a better district (InContext). As a consequence, the short-term residents are not necessarily aware about the local projects.

*'''d. Finances'''

It was challenging to start the intervention because it took place in a context of “budget cuts” from the municipality and general public subsidies for social intervention (i.e. the context of the erosion of old welfare structure) (GUST_05: 1050).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The participatory and deliberative aspect of the resilience Lab were not very inclusive (see Q. 16).

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Turbulences in institutional settings
| To overcome these turbulences, the consortium partners tried to work qui autonomously from these formal institutions. This found to be quite fruitful for the success of the Resilience Lab, as they could experiment with activities on the ground and really engage with the people of Carnisse free from institutional constraints. However, this autonomy hammered the more durable impact of the Resilience Lab in the municipal agenda (see Q. 36).
|-
| Skepticism of the residents and the municipality
| The project leaders. To address the skepticism of the residents and the municipality about the process and the outcomes of the project (is it worth it or not?), the Resilience Lab had to “prove [...] the benefits from being involved in it”, “this required a deep study of the dynamics of the neighborhood, building networks based on reciprocity and gaining trust over time by showing results that benefited the local community” (GUST_05: 1050).
|-
| Budget cuts in social welfare
| The consortium partner DRIFT used other fundings including two Eu-projects Incontext and Gust.
|-
| Lack of inclusivity
| The “practical” and “hands on” activities of the Resilience Lab allowed more diverse people to engage in the project and made it more inclusive (see Q. 16).
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

The outcomes of the intervention are:
*New social relations established within the neighborhood between citizens and some policy makers, and also between residents themselves. The participatory activities and tools used in the framework of the Resilience Lab increased interaction between different social groups (GUST_05: 1059). It enhanced trust and contributed to community building (although one of the problems in the district was the lack of community).
*Opening of the neighborhood: people living outside of the neighborhood took part in the Resilience Lab, thus increasing its openness and enhancing networks and relationships outside of the administrative boundaries of Carnisse (GUST_05: 1052).
*Citizens empowerment: the narrative “blossoming Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1053) developed in the deliberative workshops and empowered citizens because it gave them the opportunity to express their aspirations (what to they want for their neighborhood) and express their legitimate criticisms to the current dynamic of the place (e.g. the severe budget cuts that let to the closure of public facilities, such as two community centers and an educational garden). Over time, the citizens became almost fully responsible for the community center and the community garden.
*The identification of the residents/citizens with their neighborhood (i.e. the creation of a symbolic “sense of place”) although prior to the Resilience Lab, many did not feel connected to the neighborhood in terms of “shared meaning and experience” (GUST_05: 1053).
*the success of the “collaborative governance” (i.e. between policy makers and citizens). This demonstrates that reciprocity and institutional connection are key for escaping stigmatization of the place and its people (GUST_05: 1053).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The four consortium partners “had been involved and worked in their respective domains (i.e. social work, education) in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam south” (add to GUST: 190). Thus, the partners have brought their own experience and set of approaches and activities to the framework of the Resilience Lab.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Not reportedly. However, one of the consortium partners, DRIFT, had previously experienced some transition management strategies in the sectors of housing and mobility in other urban contexts, which have been translated to the neighborhood scale for Carnisse (interview with F.).

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

The Resilience Lab is is experimental and not explicitly built upon another intervention.
However, the methodology developed for transition management was influenced by previous work carried out by the consortium partners. The project started with a vision translated into a set of principles to be developed in practice (interview with F.). This methodology was the overarching umbrella under which the activities were created. The partners have already experimented some of these activities in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam-South (GUST_05: 1049) but adapted them to the local context e.g. in the sector of education or greening the public space.

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The partner DRIFT had already experienced transition management strategies in the energy or mobility sector. The methodology they had previously developed was translated and adapted to urban regeneration at the scale of a neighborhood (Interview with F.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Since the Resilience Lab was incorporated into other EU-projects on transition management, especially Incontext, some learning may have been disseminated, especially based in the case of the other pilot projects, such as the city of Wolfhagen, Germany, and the village of Finkenstein in Austria.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 06/05/20): : https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/pilots.html.</ref>

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

The intervention started from an abstract vision, a methodology, and a set of activities already experienced in other contexts. The practical dimension of the intervention was not set in stone and developed over the course of the project to make it context specific (i.e. depending on the need, wishes of the residents as well as facing local constraints). To sum up, it is an intervention that learnt from itself in the process of implementing it.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

Overcoming obstacles contributed to the learning process, especially in regards the exclusive dimension of the project. The consortium partner found out that engaging citizens in a deliberation process can be quite exclusive whereas “hands on” and practical activities (i.e. in the community center or the community gardens) are far more inclusive. This learning allowed them to combine these two aspects of the participation (Interview with F.)

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

*Guidance tool for self-organization developed by DRIFT
*In the framework of InContext: “Community Arena” for transition management include the processes of envisioning, backcasting, experimenting, self-reflection, and learning

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The project aims to be transferable. The idea was to identify, “new ways of neighborhood development” (GUST_05: 1055) and reinvent integrative methods for neighborhood redevelopment that could be adapted to different contexts. The overarching umbrella and set of principles for transition management would remain while the different activities within the Resilience Lab would be context specific (interview with F.).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The principles and methodology for neighborhood transition management (i.e. the Resilience Lab as a whole) can be transferred to any other context. However the activities within it should not be pre-determined and have to be adapted to the local context. It means that vision and basic principles of the Resilience Lab can be transferred but the actual implementation would differ in every neighborhood. (interview with F.).

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Researchers and project managers.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

The limit to transferability would not take the Resilience Lab as an integrative project, rather to replicate the different activities within it e.g. related to education, green space etc.. Lacking an overarching and integrated vision of neighborhood transition management would limit the success of such intervention (Interview with F.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The project has been disseminated.

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

The Resilience Lab as a whole has not been replicated in other contexts. However, the different activities developed by the consortium partners (including educational tools for schools or arrangement of the public space) have been transferred and implemented in other districts in Rotterdam and in cities in the Netherlands. The residents also replicated some activities such as the community garden after the first one has been closed by the municipality (interview with F.).

Based on the experience of Carnisse, the notion of "self-sustained community center" is also being replicated by the municipality in some other neighborhoods in Rotterdam under the name "Houses for the neighborhood” (interview with F.) . In 2013-14, a local policy established that every neighborhood should have a community center in which the desires and needs of citizens are central and where the community takes an active role in sustaining the center. These “Houses for the neighborhood” are a sort of replication of the community center in Carnisse, but are mainly led by municipality structures together with welfare organizations. Some are developed elsewhere in the Netherlands.

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

Yes, the project was mainly aimed at restructuring the governance arrangements. Whereas the municipality and other dominant stakeholders like the housing associations or welfare organizations were very dominant in the previous years, the Resilience Lab was explicitly aimed at breaking the dominant structure and actors who governed neighborhood development. The Resilience Lab tried to work instead in more in a co-creative manner and meaningfully involve residents and all kind resident groups in impacting- their neighborhood. Changing the governance arrangements was a really strong ambition of the intervention (interview with F.).

However, this ambition faced two obstacles and turned out to be quite limited. First, in the context of institutional turbulences, the consortium partners decided to develop the project quite autonomously from the municipality (see Q. 24). As a consequence, they could not really connect with the municipality and share the learning from that intervention. Whereas some civil servants learnt from the intervention, they did it at a personal level and not at the structural level of the institution. Second, the fragmented replication of Resilience Lab (see Q.33) rather than its integrated vision rather hampered impact in structurally changing the governance settings (interview with F.).

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

The biggest takeaway from such a Resilience Lab or neighborhood redevelopment is to aim to the autonomy and sovereignty of the residents and the people involved. Such interventions have to be context specific, have a sense of freedom in developing your activities in practices to support learning by doing (interview with F.).

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-03-16T08:27:30Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing]]

You read this description and want to hear more about his case? Get in touch! Contact [https://www.wur.nl/en/Persons/Oona-O-Oona-Morrow-PhD.htm | Oona Morrow] for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food that is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints introduced in 2017 (see below), many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of a non-government led intervention based on the members’ self-governance, which works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) that are done collectively. The Sharecity100 database maps food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. Foodsharing.de is a case study for this project, though the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among the local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. Most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and provide space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are thus self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Each position entails specific responsibilities that help maintain trust between activists in the organization and ensure the smooth functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

Registered through the online platform, "food sharers” can take food from public dispensers and through the process get better acquainted with the project and other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It requires the successful completion of an online quiz about food policies, their ideological stance, and organizational rules in addition to attendance at local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport,” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking up food. This status entails a high level of commitment and additional responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators," who manage food savers’ coordination with the partner stores, and “ambassadors,” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It is notable that the rules, including those regarding food safety and sharing, are enforced by the membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation," such as being late for a pick-up, carelessness with sharing food, or poor maintenance of public fridges, are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers' privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. blame or “trust bananas” to reward positive behaviour). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by their online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most public fridges are located in community centers, their access may depend on their stigma or that of their users (e.g. a community center having certain connotations or a specific cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer entails a very exclusive procedure, including a quiz testing your abilities and commitment. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideology (written and detailed in the wiki) and the quiz are only written in German. This quiz thus excludes non-German speakers and greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to Foodsharing's hierarchical structure. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a certain extent (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, etc.) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are sometimes people who have already collected food for the community and are willing to volunteer time or energy that people in need may not be able/willing to commit.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and collection, much of which the quiz already covers (including values and knowledge). If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

Foodsharing and their public fridges were created as a response to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, this community-based initiative developed to find a solution that would alleviate and raise awareness about this issue. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues and the development of other forms of sharing economies, including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility, and energy (interview O.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The intervention has been framed by regulatory legislation (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) that address food risk, safety, and waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the food chain “from farm to fork” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies outline food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and are adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food waste. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterized by a certain continuity and degree of organization. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding the need for compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to facilitate interventions in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space, and to address disfunction in the food system. Citizens are political actors giving themselves agency for political action, indicating a strong democratic culture (interview O.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin, which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA brought the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices in opposition to foodsharing.de. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin must be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This would require food savers to record every single food item which is saved and to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing opposes food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior to and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors such as food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough human resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsharing communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, Foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods” and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). In doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges to Foodsharing members. In addition, Foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community centers hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine. Put at financial risk, many organizations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Regarding their sustainability goals, Foodsharing.de has prevented an enormous amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles posed by the Berlin Senate and the rules enforced by the FSA reduced the impact of public fridges. Their closing and the restricted access of those remaining few jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative, which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

Other kinds of food sharing initiatives developed in Berlin, including community gardens, food banks, and meal saving. Other forms of sharing economies focus on sectors like clothing, services, mobility etc.. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in other sharing initiatives, which informs how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of similar interventions. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing started in Cologne (Germany)and regional branches of the organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin initiated the creation of public fridges. This was spurred from experiences members had had from working in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organization is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Foodsharing and public fridges successfully took hold in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context. Berlin has an active subculture and appropriate urban infrastructure to facilitate strong sharing-based economies.

First, there are a lot of people in Berlin with the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture with a politic attached to it that made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) and the infrastructure to help the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc.) (SHARECITY_14). Because much of the food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected. Thus, short distances and facilitated access matter.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The members of Foodsharing Berlin confronted with these obstacles learned how to navigate political and administrative channels. They got used to making public statements and press releases and participated in meetings with local authorities and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition its movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing are actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands, where some public fridges are now located in Amsterdam and Wageningen (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> originates from the Foodsharing movement and is developing tools and software for enabling other people in multiple contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistics tools to start foodsharing. The idea is to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the original movement (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments), as well as the obstacles to be overcome in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs, making it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space, and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from Berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to adopt liability for donated or saved food, which greatly hampers saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, such as the Good Samaritan Laws in the US, would allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation that requires that someone is always responsible for food, thus creating a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food bank to do this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared meals, shared bread etc.. These initiatives have not been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures.

Since Foodsharing is a loose and open network, everyone has their own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize everyone's aims. Whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less waste. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offers everyone to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing to allow initiatives to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social spheres where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers and tackle food regulations, ICT-mediated food sharing constructs new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices that are established by the interaction – conflicting or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs, and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing should be further inquired (SHARECITY_06).

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fair way.

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-03-16T08:27:07Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing]]

You read this description and want to hear more about his case? Get in touch! Contact [https://www.wur.nl/en/Persons/Oona-O-Oona-Morrow-PhD.htm| Oona Morrow] for more information.

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== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food that is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints introduced in 2017 (see below), many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of a non-government led intervention based on the members’ self-governance, which works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) that are done collectively. The Sharecity100 database maps food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. Foodsharing.de is a case study for this project, though the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among the local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. Most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and provide space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are thus self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Each position entails specific responsibilities that help maintain trust between activists in the organization and ensure the smooth functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

Registered through the online platform, "food sharers” can take food from public dispensers and through the process get better acquainted with the project and other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It requires the successful completion of an online quiz about food policies, their ideological stance, and organizational rules in addition to attendance at local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport,” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking up food. This status entails a high level of commitment and additional responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators," who manage food savers’ coordination with the partner stores, and “ambassadors,” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It is notable that the rules, including those regarding food safety and sharing, are enforced by the membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation," such as being late for a pick-up, carelessness with sharing food, or poor maintenance of public fridges, are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers' privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. blame or “trust bananas” to reward positive behaviour). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by their online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most public fridges are located in community centers, their access may depend on their stigma or that of their users (e.g. a community center having certain connotations or a specific cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer entails a very exclusive procedure, including a quiz testing your abilities and commitment. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideology (written and detailed in the wiki) and the quiz are only written in German. This quiz thus excludes non-German speakers and greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to Foodsharing's hierarchical structure. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a certain extent (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, etc.) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are sometimes people who have already collected food for the community and are willing to volunteer time or energy that people in need may not be able/willing to commit.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and collection, much of which the quiz already covers (including values and knowledge). If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

Foodsharing and their public fridges were created as a response to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, this community-based initiative developed to find a solution that would alleviate and raise awareness about this issue. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues and the development of other forms of sharing economies, including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility, and energy (interview O.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The intervention has been framed by regulatory legislation (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) that address food risk, safety, and waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the food chain “from farm to fork” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies outline food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and are adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food waste. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterized by a certain continuity and degree of organization. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding the need for compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to facilitate interventions in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space, and to address disfunction in the food system. Citizens are political actors giving themselves agency for political action, indicating a strong democratic culture (interview O.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin, which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA brought the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices in opposition to foodsharing.de. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin must be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This would require food savers to record every single food item which is saved and to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing opposes food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior to and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors such as food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough human resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsharing communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, Foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods” and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). In doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges to Foodsharing members. In addition, Foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community centers hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine. Put at financial risk, many organizations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Regarding their sustainability goals, Foodsharing.de has prevented an enormous amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles posed by the Berlin Senate and the rules enforced by the FSA reduced the impact of public fridges. Their closing and the restricted access of those remaining few jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative, which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

Other kinds of food sharing initiatives developed in Berlin, including community gardens, food banks, and meal saving. Other forms of sharing economies focus on sectors like clothing, services, mobility etc.. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in other sharing initiatives, which informs how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of similar interventions. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing started in Cologne (Germany)and regional branches of the organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin initiated the creation of public fridges. This was spurred from experiences members had had from working in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organization is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Foodsharing and public fridges successfully took hold in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context. Berlin has an active subculture and appropriate urban infrastructure to facilitate strong sharing-based economies.

First, there are a lot of people in Berlin with the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture with a politic attached to it that made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) and the infrastructure to help the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc.) (SHARECITY_14). Because much of the food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected. Thus, short distances and facilitated access matter.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The members of Foodsharing Berlin confronted with these obstacles learned how to navigate political and administrative channels. They got used to making public statements and press releases and participated in meetings with local authorities and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition its movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing are actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands, where some public fridges are now located in Amsterdam and Wageningen (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> originates from the Foodsharing movement and is developing tools and software for enabling other people in multiple contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistics tools to start foodsharing. The idea is to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the original movement (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments), as well as the obstacles to be overcome in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs, making it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space, and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from Berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to adopt liability for donated or saved food, which greatly hampers saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, such as the Good Samaritan Laws in the US, would allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation that requires that someone is always responsible for food, thus creating a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food bank to do this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared meals, shared bread etc.. These initiatives have not been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures.

Since Foodsharing is a loose and open network, everyone has their own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize everyone's aims. Whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less waste. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offers everyone to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing to allow initiatives to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social spheres where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers and tackle food regulations, ICT-mediated food sharing constructs new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices that are established by the interaction – conflicting or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs, and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing should be further inquired (SHARECITY_06).

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fair way.

'''Have questions or comments? Contact information regarding this case can be found at the top of this page!'''

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg

2021-03-04T13:18:34Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Philipp Späth for more information.
{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The intervention addresses the eco-district of Vauban in the city of Freiburg, Germany, with a particular focus on its co-housing projects. It has been developed at the scale of a neighborhood or city district within a regional hub (Freibrug has 220.000 inhabitants).

The intervention aimed to co-create and design a sustainable neighborhood, which would provide inclusive and affordable housing that was adapted to the needs and the will of the local population.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

This intervention is primarily implemented in the sectors of housing and urban development (i.e. building/establishing a new district).

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The intervention (co-housing in Vauban and Genova’s case) aimed to establish a sustainable, eco-district while implementing participatory planning and cooperative ownership (TRANSIT_01: 5). Social objectives of inclusiveness and affordable housing, as well as ecological goals such as walkable pathways, car-free zones, green areas, and low-energy buildings are embedded in the project (TRANSIT_01: 6).

“social and ecological goals and standards have been set from the beginning as part of the official guidelines by the City of Freiburg: compulsory low energy standard for new buildings, connection to the tram network until 2006, rain infiltration on the very territory, socially mixed inhabitant structure and a priority of giving away land to private builder-owners and collective building projects (Life-Projekt)" (TRANSIT_16).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The creation of this new district started after the withdrawal of the French military troops from the Vauban military facilities in 1992. In 1994, the city became the owner of the land and launched the project. At the same time, citizens interested in engaging in the project created organizations such as the Forum Vauban and the Independent Housing Project - SUSI. Housing cooperatives began to form in 1997, namely the Genova housing cooperative. The first tenants moved into Genova I in 1999 and in Genova II in 2001 (Table 5.1. Timeline and development of Vauban_TRANSIT_01: 8). Other projects have since developed. In 2009, the construction phases were completed.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a hybrid-governance mode.

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This intervention provides an interesting example of negotiated governance between a grassroots initiatives and the municipality, thereby reaching across institutional boundaries.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*TRANSIT_01_cohousing: the eco-district of Vauban and the co-housing project GENOVA (02)
*TRANSIT_02_Social Innovation Research project: http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/
*Interview with A., a project proponent (10.07.20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

Yes, the intervention has been studied in the context of the EU-funded project TRANSIT (2014-2017).<ref>TRANSIT website. Last view on 29/06/20: http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/ .</ref> The project aims to develop a new theory on Transformative Social Innovation (TSI) which refers to “a process of changes in social relations, involving the challenging, altering and/or replacing of dominant institutions and structures”. The project aims to draft a manifesto for TSI that sheds light on initiatives and emerging movements for TSI in hopes of inspiring policy makers, social entrepreneurs, academics, and other stakeholders.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Co-living, co-housing & intentional communities]] approach. The TRANSIT project is explicitly mentioned in the database. In addition, the intervention addresses the [[Governance and participation processes]] approach and the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons]] approach.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes, the project has been coded in the framework of WP4 but not the intervention itself.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Inequality and exclusion has been problematized both by the (prospective) residents of the district (in the framework of citizens organizations including Forum Vauban, SUSI, other citizen groups or cooperatives...) and by the municipality of Freiburg in view of creating an inclusive and affordable eco-district.

Specifically, to make GENOVA co-housing more inclusive, the cooperative is regulating the pricing structure, reducing house rents for targeted groups i.e. “elderly people and long-term members, as well as persons with the right to social housing, so called Wohnberechtigungsschein” (TRANSIT_01: 36).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention by focusing on affordable housing and citizens' self-planning and management: “(Vauban) is an ecological, sustainable district which has consciously set itself social objectives such as inclusiveness and affordable housing, as well as short distances” (TRANSIT_01: 6) ; “affordable housing, planned and managed by its residents” (TRANSIT_01: 16) ; “the goal of which was to create ecological living space based on the principles of social justice and self-organization” (TRANSIT_01: 24).

In addition, “The City of Freiburg as the owner of the territory of Vauban is responsible for its planning and opening up for development. In the course of this, social and ecological goals and standards have been set from the beginning as part of the official guidelines by the City of Freiburg: compulsory low energy standard for new buildings, connection to the tram network until 2006, rain infiltration on the very territory, socially mixed inhabitant structure and a priority of giving away land to private builder-owners and collective building projects (Life-Projekt)" (TRANSIT_01: 16).

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The intervention was co-initiated by citizens, primarily the citizen-led initiative Forum Vauban and the Independent Housing Projects -SUSI, and the municipality of Freiburg, in order to build a new district:

“After the departure of the military (1992), the Vauban district was designed and rebuilt anew during a unique citizen-involvement process – for which it has been awarded several times – by the City of Freiburg together with the citizen-lead association ‘Forum Vauban’ as a bottom-up actor with a mandate in the Vauban city planning council (TRANSIT_01: 5).

“When the City of Freiburg decided to build the new district in 1993, the citizen-led initiative of Forum Vauban had already been active in setting up their plans and visions about how to build the district in a “green”, sustainable and participatory way” (Transit_01: 24).

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of the intervention are the (prospective) residents of Vauban, especially the owners of housing cooperatives (interview with A.), and more broadly, the residents of Freiburg who could potentially move into affordable and ecological housing. The municipality of Freiburg also benefits from the district's widespread reputation, using it as a “green flag” in urban marketing strategies to enhance the attractiveness of the city (TRANSIT_01: 27).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
|
*Forum Vauban (citizen-led organization)
*Co-housing cooperatives (e.g. SUSI ; Genova e.g. ; Vaubanaise e.g….).
*Baugruppen (e.g. Wohnen&Arbeiten ; Woge e.V. etc…) (Table 5.2: co-housing and other important projects in Vauban_TRANSIT_01: 13)
*Other initiatives, e.g.: Autofreies Wohnen e.V. (organizes car-free mobility in Vauban); Quartierladen e.G. (a cooperative supermarket for local organic food supply); Kinderabenteurh of Freiburg e.V. (an associative kindergarten); Villaban with Restaurant Kantine (a restaurant organizing joint cooking events)
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Freiburg
*The local parliament
*The “Vauban city planning council (GRAG)” is a consultative committee within the city council (including members of the administration, of the local parliament and of Forum Vauban), which was created to plan the new district of Vauban alongside citizen groups (TRANSIT_01: 33).
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
|
|
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The converging vision of the citizens and the municipality for building a new district was crucial. Whereas the municipality intended to plan a new district to meet the extremely high demand for living space in Freiburg, Forum Vauban had envisaged an ecological, socially just, and self-organized city quarter with lots of green space and affordable housing (TRANSIT_01: 16). Specifically, citizens represented by Forum Vauban benefited from direct access to discussion with parliamentarians and municipal actors in the “Vauban City Policy Council” GRAG (see Q.15). The support from local parliamentarians was therefore critical in enabling the citizens' plans and visions to be implemented (interview with A.).

In addition, the city dedicated additional public money to set-up the project in a participatory way and officially mandated Forum Vauban to mediate the process and provide assistance (e.g. with the distribution of building lots) (TRANSIT_01: 23).

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

Citizens, especially Forum Vauban, were the drivers of the co-housing projects. Citizens engaged in visioning and planning the distinct as well as in the physical building it (e.g. with the Baugruppen) (TRANSIT_01: 16).

When the project of rebuilding a new district arose (1992-1994), self-organized citizens were invited to share their vision of the district: “The Forum Vauban (working as an open forum) invited, organized, and coordinated professional expertise around planning, ecological housing, funding and forms of ownership brought in by interested citizens” ; “This could be realized because the city of Freiburg agreed and provided a frame and organizational innovations to cooperate with the citizen-lead Forum Vauban. From this platform emerged various building groups, some of which came up with the idea of cooperative building" (TRANSIT_01: 17).

In addition, students of architecture - on a voluntary basis - initiated and facilitated the process of developing utilization plans. (TRANSIT_01: 17).

Finally, “the citizen-initiative was the driving force in establishing participatory planning and “learning while planning” methods” (TRANSIT_01: 18).

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Both civil-society and governmental actors participated in creating the eco-district of Vauban. “On the one hand, it was built in a bottom-up process through self-organized housing initiatives of cooperatives and privately organized building groups (Baugruppen). On the other hand, the overall planning of the infrastructure, the selling of land property, and the ecological building laws were set-up and coordinated by the government of the City of Freiburg including participatory planning processes with the future residents” (TRANSIT_01: 42). Citizens groups provided visions for the district and participated in the planning and building process, while the administration of the City of Freiburg, as the owner of the land, had the responsibility to decide on planning and selling land slots (TRANSIT_01: 33).

In addition, a mix-consultative council called “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” was established, which included seven parliamentarians, twenty members of the municipality administration and one member of Forum Vauban. This council was responsible for “creating the necessary infrastructure, taking over a coordinating role, doing the marketing of the territories” (TRANSIT_01: 33). The GRAG was separated from the usual municipal hierarchies and was instead assigned to the head of the construction department, which opened up possibilities for the representatives of the citizenry to directly contribute to the work of this group (TRANSIT_01: 18). The council was therefore a forum for discussion between different actors and facilitated the bridging of institutional logics.

The municipality also designed and implemented the principle of “Planning that Learns," meaning that pilot initiatives would be experimented before being widely enforced. A prime example of this principle is the mobility concept of Vauban, which was first operated in one third of the district before being implemented in the whole neighborhood (interview with A.).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Direct exclusion of social groups is not reported. However, indirect exclusions have been controversial. First, the car-free mobility concept of the district was found exclusive and dissuasive for car-owners. Second, housing was primarily accessible to home owners rather than to tenants. Indeed, about 76% of the district is dedicated to home owners (including cooperatives). However, becoming an owner is not accessible to everyone because it entails very high entry costs. Additionally, building one's own house takes a lot of time (at least 5 years), which not everybody can afford (interview with A.).

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

There are not reported indications about the triggers of these indirect exclusions. Concerning the car-free mobility concept, a solution was found by creating dedicated parking lots and establishing a system that meets the needs of both car-owners and of those who do not have a car. In regards to the housing system, the primacy given to home owners is a political decision that has not been amended (interview with A.).

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

The circumstances which have reportedly triggered the interventions are :

*The housing crisis in Freiburg (and co-housing alternative as a response to it).
“Because of its attractiveness (geographical, cultural, economic hub, and university), Freiburg is one of the most expensive cities in Germany in view of the housing price. As a result of the high pressure on the housing market, creative forms of alternative living developed like trailer home communities developed as well as ongoing urban planning activities of the municipality, trying to explore and build new areas and quarters” (TRASIT_01: 7).

*The ecologically-minded citizens and local policy makers.
This is related to the historical background of the city, including its tradition of critical thinkers at the University (e.g. H. Heidegger, H. Arendt), the social movement against the nuclear power plant of Wyhl, and leftwing policy makers (TRANSIT_01: 7).

*The opportunity to build a new district from scratch after the departure of the French troops from Vauban in 1992.
“The well-educated, collegiate and ecological milieu of Freiburg was in need of housing. The expected liberation of the French Vauban barracks at a central location in Freiburg generated desires and creative ideas. The time span until the sale to the Federal Republic was settled could be used for establishing a professional forum, the Forum Vauban, from within the citizenry from 1994 on. This forum started to develop serious urban planning concepts.”(TRANSIT_01: 8).

*The capacities and resources of Forum Vauban to engage in the project.
Forum Vauban included a core group of four people working almost full time on the project (who were being professionalized), along with several working groups. Those working groups were responsible for developing visions and for implementing projects in the sectors of energy, mobility, social cohesion, and social infrastructures (interview with A.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

Regarding the participatory process, the municipality conceptualized a legal framework - namely the “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” and the principle of “Planning that Learns” - which allowed citizens to participate in urban development.

More broadly, cooperative housing in Germany is regulated by the CooperativesAct, first adopted in 1889 and reformed in 2006. It determines the cooperatives’ organizational rules and their business conduct (TRANSIT_01: 6). The Rent Regulation Act outlines the responsibilities of all landlords of rental dwellings, including housing cooperatives, and specifications about rent increases (ICA) (Enkeleda 2011, TRANSIT_01: 6). Cooperatives are framed by regulatory policies from the national level and enforced locally.

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

In Germany, the municipality is responsible for urban planning within the lines of the national regulations (i.e. the urban planning laws and codes). The municipality together with the federal state can thus allow citizens to participate in urban planning; in this case, the Baden-Württemberg Development Agency gave Forum Vauban extended governance and financial responsibilities to mediate the participation process. This means that citizen participation in urban planning depends on specific and local regulatory policies.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

Freiburg has a culture of ecologically and politically engaged citizens, which has manifested in various protests (i.e. against Wyhl nuclear power plant) and broad participation in national and local political issues. Freiburg was the first city in Germany to vote for a green political majority. Self-organized groups have been recognized since squatters successfully built vivid communities (80s).

Concerning the development of Vauban, there were enough people trusting the eco-left millieu to positively influence the district development, thereby invested money in Baugruppen and proving that their trust was justified.

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The intervention was financially supported by two means:

*Funds raised and gathered by the citizens.
“It consisted first of all in voluntary work for planning the private houses and furthermore working on concepts for the whole district. Furthermore, Forum Vauban could fundraise several projects because of its special model character, sometimes in cooperation with the city or other official institutions” (TRANSIT_01: .40). Between 1996 and 2002, about EUR 200, 000 were received from the German Federal Foundation for the Environment, and from 1997-1999 about EUR 700, 000 from the EU Life Environmental Program. Memberships, donations, and other fees account for the overall budget of Forum Vauban, which was managing a budget of 2 million Euro from 1995-2001 (TRANSIT_01: 40).
In addition, “on the level of private housing subsidies, the house builders and cooperatives could make use of the so-called Eigenheimzulage, a state subsidy for builder-owners” (TRANSIT_01: 40).

*Financial support from the city development budget.
Financial support was provided to for the city administration by the Federal State of Germany or the regular process of building a new district. As an urban development project, the Vauban has a specific status and budget (EUR 85,000,000) according to German building law. The city invested in total 95 million Euros in the district and provided an additional EUR 200, 000 for the participation process (TRANSIT_01: 41).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Citizen participation was consolidated throughout the project as Forum Vauban earned the trust of institutional actors (interview with A.). The milestones of this progressive recognition are:
*the invitation for Forum Vauban to join the “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” as well as the financial support of 30, 000 marks per year given by the municipality (spring 1995)
*the financial support of the Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt as well as *the participation of Forum Vauban to the United Nations Organization Habitat Conference in Istanbul (summer 1996)
*the implementation of the mobility concept according to the principle of “Planning that Learns” (summer 1996).
*the grant from the Baden-Württemberg Development Agency (Landesentwicklunggesellschaft LEG) to Forum Vauban for participating in the development of the district (1998).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Disputes over the destruction of old military barracks occurred between activists/former squatters and the opposing municipality. For instance, a joint initiative of SUSI- and GENOVA-stakeholders - called Drei5Viertel i.G aimed to renovate three additional barrack buildings but failed because of the regulatory framework. The stakeholders failed to meet the (tight) municipal deadline for proposing a financing concept (TRANSIT_01: 14) and the barracks were demolished.

In addition, the timeframe of the project, due to administrative procedures (about 5 years at least to build the first houses), may have discouraged citizens to engage in the project. Besides, the uncertainty about its outcomes, i.e. whether the project would be accepted by the municipality and a grant given, was also an obstacle to implementing the intervention (interview with A.)

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The collaboration between citizens and the municipality was not always easy because each group had to adapt to the institutional logic of the others. For instance, when the GRAG invited a representative of Forum Vauban to take over a permanent seat in a consulting role, “Forum Vauban welcomed this decision of the city as a step towards them. Nevertheless they were not always satisfied, because the citizens were expected to adapt to the logic of urban planning which already existed in the city bureaucracy” (TRANSIT_01: 25).

From the perspective of many inhabitants of Vauban, an unjust treatment by the City persists throughout the history of the quarter. For instance, the city benefits from tourism in Vauban and from the image of Freiburg being a “Green City," due in large part to Forum Vauban and its civic activities, without the latter being recognized and appreciated sufficiently (TRANSIT_01: 27).

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

The entry cost to become a housing owner is very high and prevents many people from engaging in such projects (interview with A.). The financial obstacle is a driver of exclusion for working-class people.

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

*Contrasting visions of the district development between project proponents.
“While some followed a radical path of squatting houses and initially moved their trailer homes illegally onto the free area left behind by the military. –, others wanted to maintain good contacts with the city council” (TRANSIT_01: 16). Specifically, squatters and trailer home owners had some confrontations with Forum Vauban. Whereas squatters already living in the military barracks were reluctant to plans proposed by Forum Vauban, the latter felt that squatters were jeopardizing the project by undermining citizens' actions toward municipal actors (interview with A.)

*Gradual disengagement of the residents.
“When the majority of the houses were built and residents moved in, as ‘normal’ life started, the engagement for the quarter started to diminish” (TRANSIT_01: 23).

*The liquidation of Forum Vauban
Forum Vauban became bankrupt in 2004 after a lawsuit from the European Commission. It was replaced by the new ‘Stadtteil Verein Vauban e.V.’ (city district association) based on resident members.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Controversies over the destruction of old military barracks by the municipality
|by the activists, occupations of the barracks and protests.
by the municipality, continued the demolitions.
|-
| Liquidation of Forum Vauban
| by the residents/activists, establishment of “Stadtteilverein” district association (as follow-up organization of Forum Vauban).
|-
| Dissensus among project proponents
| by the civil society organizations, “The different groups involved in the design and development of Vauban managed to cooperate in a productive way to realize this district project due to a great balancing act between innovative visions and the reality of existing city planning laws. The diversity of the district map (including housing cooperatives, groups of private house builders and construction companies) mirrors the different interests and groups and their ‘areas’”(TRANSIT_01: 16).
|-
| Gradual disengagement of residents
| after the completion of building the district, residents spread out to a large variety of projects both inside the district (including “hosting space” for supporting refugees with rooms for German lessons), and outside of the district with the creation of various interest groups with relevance for the entire city and beyond (TRANSIT_01:24).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Sustainability challenges addressed in Vauban district include:
*Car-reduced living (including specific external parking lots managed by a “car-free living association”).
*Energy-efficient housing and low-carbon buildings. “The municipality of Freiburg introduced a low energy housing standard for all buildings, namely a maximum of 65kWh/a of the primary energy consumption” (TRANSIT_01: 20).
*Lots of green areas and amenities

Apply to GENOVA cooperative : “One of the accomplishments of GENOVA in view of affordable living space is the fixing of rental prices for 10 apartments supported by GENOVA by means of the social building program for 10 years. However, after some efforts to choose the beneficiaries itself, GENOVA decided that applicants should have an official document proving their eligibility to receive low cost housing issued by city institutions. After 10 years, they can then receive support for paying their rent by a special social fund created by GENOVA” (TRANSIT_01: 28).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The intervention is built upon the development of another district in Freiburg called Rieselfeld. Located on a former leach field, the creation of this new district in 1992 is a pioneer in terms of citizens' participation in urban development projects in Freiburg. Specifically, the “City Planning Council” (see Q.15) that includes parliamentarians, municipal actors and citizen organizations was first established for Rieselfeld. Civil society partners actively involved in the urban development project included, among others the Protestant social welfare organization Diakonie, as well as a car-free living organization that conceptualized a new mobility vision for the district (Interview with A.).

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

The cooperative movement in Germany has inspired the intervention. The movement is rooted in the 19th-century history and the leading figures of Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch. Cooperative models developed in different sectors (housing, farming, energy) and spread across Europe and especially in Germany during the late 19th and 20th centuries. These examples of housing cooperatives in Germany (especially in the the German Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg and Lower Saxony) are traditionally large housing cooperatives more strongly integrated into the urban planning process, and have reportedly been inspirational for the instigators of the intervention (TRANSIT_01: 6).

However, the old housing cooperatives had a rather distinct vision of the social organization of housing (e.g. environmental standards or cooperative rules). Vauban proponents moved away from the old cooperative model to experiment with innovative approaches (e.g. carpooling) (interview with A.).

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

The experience of Rieselfeld was inspirational for Vauban’s proponents, especially for Forum Vauban, which attempted to develop a more comprehensive approach to citizen participation. Forum Vauban lobbied to have a stronger influence on politicians as well as to directly engage in visioning, planning and especially building the district. Whereas welfare or mobility organizations partnered with the municipality for the development of Rieselfeld, local citizens represented by Forum Vauban were the driving forces of the urban development process.

In addition, the car-free living concept of Vauban is reportedly built upon the vision for Rieselfeld (interview with A.).

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The intervention acquired knowledge from other housing cooperative experiences in Germany. Specifically, according to German regulation, every cooperative has to become a member of a cooperative confederation “in order to be advised, supervised and observed” (TRANSIT_01: 37). GENOVA and Quartiersladen are both members of “Prüfungsverband der kleinen und mittelständischen Genossenschaften e.V.“ (PkmG). This unit audits cooperatives, provides support in matters of economy, law and tax policy, and advises on questions of organization management. This audit was deemed very useful for the creation of GENOVA (interview with A.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

On its website, Forum Vauban states: “Learning about participatory planning processes was a key topic in the Vauban process. The principle of “Planning that learns” and the extended citizen participation with Forum Vauban set new standards of communication, interaction and integration” (TRANSIT_01: 37

Through the participatory planning process, the intervention was adapted to manifest houses and infrastructure where some people could spend the rest of their lives. The aspect of community building in the early phase with the future neighbours is seen as centrally important: (TRANSIT_01: 38).

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The conflicts that posed the municipality in opposition to the residents/activists (e.g. over the demolition of old barracks or over the modalities of the citizens participation) were overcome and enhanced transparency and mutual trust between both actors, allowing for further cooperation.

“The sense of responsibility of the citizens had been strengthened and the disenchantment with politics reduced. Despite occasional conflicts the City of Freiburg and the citizenry see the participatory and cooperative approach as a great gain of the quality and further development of the city quarter of Vauban” (TRANSIT_01: 25).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

*for activists (especially at the beginning of the intervention): face-to-face meetings, location where people met (e.g. the student broad office at the university), a print media for information and exchanges, namely the “Vauban actuel” district magazine
*for citizens and municipality cooperation, the “Vauban City Planning Council” and the implementation of the participatory principles like “planning that leans". They included workshops *for co-creating the design of streets and open green spaces as well as excursions mediated by Forum Vauban.
*About 10 events (including district festivals, international conferences “UrbanVisions” as a pre-event of the UN ‘urban 21”) were co-organized with the City of Freiburg, mainly addressing future home owners, architects, craftsmen, the building industry and financial institutes (TRANSIT_01: 37).

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

"Vauban district and the co-housing projects are internationally known and the model “has inspired all over the world in view of sustainable planning especially with regard to citizen involvement” (TRANSIT_01: .6).

“Vauban’s widespread reputation as a model ecodistrict (e.g. through exhibition at World Expo Shanghai) attracts hordes of visitors from all over the world. A number of organizations offer guided tours to Freiburg’s green city with a special part of Vauban. About 25,000 such technical visitors are counted by the municipal Green City Office each year, most of them from South Korea, France and Italy, many of them politicians or (municipal) technical staff, but many also school children" (TRANSIT_01: 38).

“The growing worldwide recognition and dissemination of Vauban as a model-eco district has led to an unexpected phenomenon: more and more interested persons from all over the world have started studying, and visiting Vauban in order to learn more about the details of the district’s development – academia, politicians, technical experts, and even pupils and ordinary persons who just want to add a “green sight” to the standard visiting tour of Freiburg. Admittedly, after digesting first impressions, some of them have also voiced the possibility of “transplanting” the ideas behind the model of Vauban to other places (Interview VB2)" (TRANSIT_01: .30).

The success of the Vauban eco-district offers lessons for urban planners and mayors all over the world to learn from the example of this experimental district (TRANSIT_01: 6).

The experiences made with GENOVA e.G. have inspired the setting up of Vaubanaise e.G., also built in Vauban, and are currently informing the establishment of Esche e.G. (i.Gr.) for building about 70 housing units in another part of Freiburg in the coming years.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The intervention can be possibly transferred to other urban contexts. The Vauban model has been looked at and visited by experts from all over the world.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Activists from Forum Vauban, the municipality which supports the replication of the intervention and promotes it, and researchers from the TRANSIT project.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

“The concept of Vauban was never entirely repeated in any other new district of Freiburg except for the low energy standard for housing which has been introduced as obligatory in Freiburg since then. Unfortunately this regulation has influenced a negative effect on affordable housing, because the standard has increased the prices. In this sense, this case reveals a danger of extracting single innovations from the overall concept or case they are embedded in. If the social innovation of citizen-lead planning and ownership – for instance in the form of housing cooperatives – was combined more often with the technical innovations of ecological building laws, affordable housing in low-energy houses could be realized on a broader basis" (TRANSIT_01: 44).

In Freiburg, the mobility concept of Vauban was never replicated because of some shortcomings that have undermined its legitimacy. While the residents of Vauban who own a car have to declare and pay for it, some free-riders did not declare it and parked in the surrounding neighborhoods. The strong criticism that arose resulted in the municipality rejecting to transfer this mobility concept to the new district of Gutleutmatten district. However, the possibility of implementing a car-free living concept in the district of Dietenbach in Freiburg is currently discussed (interview with A.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The framework of TRANSIT project the learning process related to Vauban’s co-housing project has been record in a reflexive way, giving special attention to the section “5.1.16 Social learning through Vauban” (TRANSIT_01: 37) of a deliverable of the WP4.

There are about 25,000 visits per year in Vauban from people from all over the world, including “academia, politicians, technical experts, pupils and ordinary persons” in order to learn more about the details of the district’s development. This interest was triggered by the exhibition of the Vauban model at the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.

Facing a growing number of inquiries about the model eco-district, the City’s planning department called for private expert agencies to provide guided tours:, “a network of professional guides hosts tours around the quarter for political and international guests” (TRANSIT_01: 30).

“At the same time, the City of Freiburg intensified its PR work to present Vauban to the interested public: a website with six subpages, online and printed brochures in six different languages, as well as imagery and presentations are available.”

The growing attention to Freiburg as a “Green City” in general and the sustainability awards it has received led the municipality to establish a designated “Green City Office." This is located in the Department of International Relations and coordinates and answers to inquiries. “The office has signed Memorandums of Understanding with four designated “Green City”- agencies to organize study visits and seminars, meeting the visitors’ interests” (TRANSIT_01: 31).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Since its presentation at the HABITAT exhibition in 1996, Vauban has been looked at as an example of urban planning projects involving citizen participation, car-reduction, and sustainable living. Specifically , the creation of living spaces free of cars was inspirational for the development of several laws in Germany. The two options for choosing – either payments for a parking lot or a contribution for the association “Autofreies Wohnen” (car-free living) has “resulted in a legal amendment on the level of the State of Baden-Württemberg allowing more freedom to create diverse forms of parking lots, for instance for bikes instead for cars only” (TRANSIT_01: 29).

“Most of these visitors claim they are taking inspiration from the innovations of Vauban, but there is no monitoring or evaluation and little feedback as to where and how these inspirations have led to real changes in other places. Nevertheless, many examples show the dissemination of Vauban’s experiences. For instance, after several visits and exchanges with Vauban citizens, the nearby rural Municipality of Teningen, with which Vauban has developed a partnership, is now planning to invest in solar installations as well (VB1)” (TRANSIT_01: 39).

In addition, in “December 2015 Vauban started a city partnership with the French town Eybens, which approached Vauban to learn from its experiences as a sustainable city district” (TRANSIT_01: 36).

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

In Freiburg, the co-creation process, the application of the principle of “Planning that learns”, as well as the creation of “City Planning Councils” set new standards for citizens participation (TRANSIT_01: 37). Building on the experience of Vauban, the city has developed a planning method able to react to new developments quickly and flexibly, allowing “enlarged” citizen participation that goes far beyond the usual demands of the construction law (TRANSIT_01: 18). For instance, a “City Planning Council” was implemented for the development of the new Dietenbach district in Freiburg. However, unlike in Vauban, the council for Dietenbach included experts (in mobility, housing), members of the municipality administration, and local parliamentarians rather than a citizen forum.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

“The main aspect of Vaubans’ innovation is the negotiation process between the urban planning office of the municipality and the strong citizen initiative of Forum Vauban with its diverse aims of a socially just, ecological district” (TRANSIT_01: 42).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-03-04T13:18:05Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing]]

You read this description and want to hear more about his case? Get in touch! Contact Oona Morrow for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food that is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints introduced in 2017 (see below), many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of a non-government led intervention based on the members’ self-governance, which works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) that are done collectively. The Sharecity100 database maps food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. Foodsharing.de is a case study for this project, though the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among the local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. Most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and provide space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are thus self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Each position entails specific responsibilities that help maintain trust between activists in the organization and ensure the smooth functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

Registered through the online platform, "food sharers” can take food from public dispensers and through the process get better acquainted with the project and other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It requires the successful completion of an online quiz about food policies, their ideological stance, and organizational rules in addition to attendance at local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport,” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking up food. This status entails a high level of commitment and additional responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators," who manage food savers’ coordination with the partner stores, and “ambassadors,” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It is notable that the rules, including those regarding food safety and sharing, are enforced by the membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation," such as being late for a pick-up, carelessness with sharing food, or poor maintenance of public fridges, are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers' privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. blame or “trust bananas” to reward positive behaviour). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by their online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most public fridges are located in community centers, their access may depend on their stigma or that of their users (e.g. a community center having certain connotations or a specific cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer entails a very exclusive procedure, including a quiz testing your abilities and commitment. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideology (written and detailed in the wiki) and the quiz are only written in German. This quiz thus excludes non-German speakers and greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to Foodsharing's hierarchical structure. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a certain extent (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, etc.) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are sometimes people who have already collected food for the community and are willing to volunteer time or energy that people in need may not be able/willing to commit.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and collection, much of which the quiz already covers (including values and knowledge). If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

Foodsharing and their public fridges were created as a response to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, this community-based initiative developed to find a solution that would alleviate and raise awareness about this issue. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues and the development of other forms of sharing economies, including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility, and energy (interview O.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The intervention has been framed by regulatory legislation (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) that address food risk, safety, and waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the food chain “from farm to fork” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies outline food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and are adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food waste. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterized by a certain continuity and degree of organization. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding the need for compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to facilitate interventions in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space, and to address disfunction in the food system. Citizens are political actors giving themselves agency for political action, indicating a strong democratic culture (interview O.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin, which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA brought the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices in opposition to foodsharing.de. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin must be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This would require food savers to record every single food item which is saved and to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing opposes food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior to and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors such as food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough human resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsharing communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, Foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods” and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). In doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges to Foodsharing members. In addition, Foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community centers hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine. Put at financial risk, many organizations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Regarding their sustainability goals, Foodsharing.de has prevented an enormous amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles posed by the Berlin Senate and the rules enforced by the FSA reduced the impact of public fridges. Their closing and the restricted access of those remaining few jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative, which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

Other kinds of food sharing initiatives developed in Berlin, including community gardens, food banks, and meal saving. Other forms of sharing economies focus on sectors like clothing, services, mobility etc.. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in other sharing initiatives, which informs how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of similar interventions. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing started in Cologne (Germany)and regional branches of the organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin initiated the creation of public fridges. This was spurred from experiences members had had from working in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organization is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Foodsharing and public fridges successfully took hold in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context. Berlin has an active subculture and appropriate urban infrastructure to facilitate strong sharing-based economies.

First, there are a lot of people in Berlin with the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture with a politic attached to it that made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) and the infrastructure to help the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc.) (SHARECITY_14). Because much of the food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected. Thus, short distances and facilitated access matter.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The members of Foodsharing Berlin confronted with these obstacles learned how to navigate political and administrative channels. They got used to making public statements and press releases and participated in meetings with local authorities and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition its movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing are actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands, where some public fridges are now located in Amsterdam and Wageningen (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> originates from the Foodsharing movement and is developing tools and software for enabling other people in multiple contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistics tools to start foodsharing. The idea is to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the original movement (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments), as well as the obstacles to be overcome in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs, making it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space, and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from Berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to adopt liability for donated or saved food, which greatly hampers saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, such as the Good Samaritan Laws in the US, would allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation that requires that someone is always responsible for food, thus creating a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food bank to do this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared meals, shared bread etc.. These initiatives have not been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures.

Since Foodsharing is a loose and open network, everyone has their own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize everyone's aims. Whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less waste. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offers everyone to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing to allow initiatives to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social spheres where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers and tackle food regulations, ICT-mediated food sharing constructs new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices that are established by the interaction – conflicting or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs, and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing should be further inquired (SHARECITY_06).

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fair way.

== l) For more information ==

Want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Send an email to BürgerEnergie Berlin eG at info(at)buerger-energie-berlin.de

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-03-04T13:17:44Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Lorreta Lee for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in the Roman district of Trastevere (Italy). The district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification, which applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely by “staying put” (AGAPE_01: 1).
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods by tenants' unions and individual squatters occupying buildings. Anti-eviction platforms voice these claims at the district level in Trastevere. Multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The Trastevere district is facing gentrification resulting from a roll-back of state protection of housing stock and privatized public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased, which led to a severe housing crisis and to police-led evictions. In this context, anti-gentrification resistance emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenants' request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This ongoing process started in the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5). Specifically, the AGAPE project focuses on resistance from 2014 (when the project started) until present.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law), which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy their housing at moderate prices.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions. They are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority and perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent Romany people) are excluded from this intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (recalling the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are thus not represented.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups that frame themselves by neighbourhoods. However, the neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) without being altruistic or supportive of other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fascist pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups (i.e. migrants, Romany) potentially breaks down solidarity among activists. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistance since only long-time local inhabitants who share this “working class” narrative may benefit while neglected social groups are even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity after the 2008 crisis. This reinforced the ongoing housing shortages that began in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neoliberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens' resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, December 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to better provide and manage decent housing for the working-class (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants, protecting them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, September 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of December 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of 50 to 75 percent of public property (AGAPE_02: 12). Incentivized from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

Both citizens and public actors have ambivalent views on the regulatory framework of the intervention. On the one hand, while citizens and local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are responsive to some extent to citizens' claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Narratives from public actors pose obstacles to legitimacy. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts to the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatization of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, even at moderate prices, only middle class tenants can afford to buy their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion breaks down solidarity among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very dubious about the rental-homeownership conversion. As S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso recall, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” in cities (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put") in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detrimental effects of privatizing public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organized in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analyzed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples included “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists, and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them with concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project to “provide the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project, including fieldwork, theoretical research, and practical tools against gentrification processes, addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens

2021-03-04T13:17:22Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take look at [[Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Panagiota Kotsila for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The intervention refers to the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center (SNFCC) and takes place in the city of Athens, Greece. The cultural center is an urban regeneration project established in the framework of a private-public partnership. It hosts two major cultural institutions and includes a park. The overall infrastructure is sustainable and based on nature based solutions.

The intervention has been developed at the scale of a neighborhood in a capital city (Athens).

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention has been developed for the urban development policy field as well as cultural development.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The project addresses both issues of social justice and sustainability. However, social justice is not directly mentioned but is rather framed as broader access to cultural facilities and environmental amenities. The first refers to the access to the two cultural institutions hosted in the center i.e. the Greek National Library and the Greek Opera. In addition, the SNFCC offers a free set of activities such as yoga classes or music workshops: “the project is committed to a range of educational and cultural activities, which have been provided for free” (Naturvation’s webpage). Environmental amenities refers to the large park, which contributes to the health and the well-being of the local population.

From the perspective of the SNFCC, the intervention addresses social justice by being inclusive. Inclusiveness includes the access to the facilities for mobility-reduced visitors and the activities free-of-charge. The intervention also aims at improving the quality of life of the local community “with clean air, exercise facilities and twice as much green space” (Naturvation_04: 2).

Sustainability achievements refer to the sustainable construction and design of the SNFCC, which is LEED (i.e. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certified (an internationally recognized certification). The building has a recycled water system, a green roof, and solar panels. The park is designed in a way that is conservative with water usage and adapted to the local climate (i.e. with Mediterranean plants for instance). The expected impacts include “sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12)” as well as “green space, habitat and biodiversity (SDG 15)" (Naturvation’s webpage). At the scale of the neighborhood, the intervention addresses environmental health issues, as it was built on a formerly degraded area (interview with P.). Scaling up, the intervention is a response major sustainability challenges in Athens, namely high rates of air pollution due to the heat island effect and limited green spaces, as Athens has the lowest per capita green space among the EU cities (Naturvation_05: 2).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The project started in 2009 and was finalized in 2016.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a co-governance of hybrid governance model (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors), between private actors (i.e. the SNF) and public actors (i.e. the Greek State).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ===

This intervention is interesting because it shows an example of public-private partnership (PPP) adapted to a very particular context i.e. a period of economical crisis and austerity (which obviously raises concerns about sustainability and social justice). This governance intervention was radically shaped by this context.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*SNFCC’s case in Naturavtion’s Atlas: https://naturvation.eu/nbs/athens/stavros-niarchos-foundation-cultural-center-snfcc
*Snapshot - Athens: Stavros Niarchos Cultural center. Coded in Zotero (Naturvation_05)
*SNFCC Impact Study (from the SNFCC). Coded in Zotero (Naturvation_04)
*Interview with Panagiota Kotsila (UAB team) on 06/04/20.

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied in the framework of a EU-funded project called NATURVATION (2016-20).<ref>Naturvation website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://naturvation.eu/.</ref> The project focuses on nature-based solutions (NBS) that are applied and implemented in urban contexts and aims at identifying how NSB governance and innovation can address urban sustainability challenges.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Nature-based solutions | Nature-based solutions]] approach. However, only the overall project (i.e. Naturvation) is mentioned, not the intervention itself.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Some deliverables of Naturvation’s project have been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4. However, none of these deliverables refer to SNFCC’s case.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

From the perspective of the SNF, inequality and exclusion has been problematized in terms of:
*Inclusion and accessibility . The SNFCC offers very low entry fees (compared to other cultural attractions) and free-of-charge activities (Naturvation_04: 13). The SNFCC is accessible for people with special needs (disabilities).
*Improving the quality of life for the local community. This includes: improving the appearance and attractiveness of the areas, increasing the access to green amenities, enhancing local businesses, providing health benefits (cleaner air and offering opportunities for exercise), making the neighborhood safer (Naturvation_04: 35-41).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

From the perspective of the SNF, justice is understood in terms of citizens’ well-being and welfare. In that sense, it is one motivation among others behind the intervention.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The intervention was initiated by a private actor, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF), who came to the Greek State and proposed to build the cultural center. The SNF is a nonprofit foundation held by a very rich family of ship owners in Greece (the foundation does mainly charity works and operates in Greece and internationally). However, this project has a longer history that involves various actors (see Q. 17)

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of the intervention are: the public sector institution (e.g. school or hospital); non-government organization/civil society ; private sector/corporate/company; citizens or community groups (based on the list provided in Naturavation webpage).

It seems more generally that the intervention will benefit Athenian visitors, because of the cultural activities offered by the center. To some extent, the intervention also benefits the Greek population. At a time when the country was facing a financial and austerity crisis that deteriorated its international image, the center can be a source of national pride and international recognition (i.e. the cultural center seek to be a “global role model of environmental sustainability and also to contribute to the valorization of Greek culture and heritage).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
|
|
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| The Stravos Niarchos company (SNF CC SA)
the Greek National Opera (public)

|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| Maires of municipalities surrounding the area
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| the Greek State (i.e. represented by the ministries of education, of cultural and of the economy)
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| (nonprofit) the Greek National Library (Public)
(nonprofit) the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) (private)

|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention could emerge successfully because the SNF came to the state with a project already set-up (i.e. the configuration, the design, and also the PPP), to which the Greek State only had to agree. The State - weakened by the crisis at this time - did not call for tender but was offered a predefined project. In that sense, the intervention emerged because it was one-sided. In addition, the SNF benefited from the support of the National Opera and the National Library that requested the foundation for help to relocate. Thus, the SNF came to the Greek State with a strong proposal and offered a lot of money at a time when the Greek state was sorely lacking it.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The SNFCC is a top-down intervention since “the conceptualization, design, type of uses and technical execution of the whole SNFCC project were top-down” and driven by the SNF (Naturvation’s webpage). There was no kind of participatory process that included citizens in the decisionmaking. From the SNF’s perspective, a sort of participation was conceptualized ex-ante. Visitors or citizens could individually raise some claims by writing an email to the foundation on a dedicated platform. In addition, information days were organized during the construction where people could come and get informed about what was happening there.

A public committee - composed of the maires representatives of the state as well as the ministers of culture, education and finances - was held from the beginning towards the end of the project to discuss what was happening. However, the role of the committee was only consultative, rather than contributing signficantly to the decision-making.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

The SNF was the main decision-maker of the project. It conceptualized the whole approach while the Greek State had only to agree on that project and to sign the law that enforced this Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The SNF was responsible for the whole vision and decision-making of the conceptualisation, design, and technical execution of the cultural center. In addition, the SNF pre-decided a list of companies that were to be contracted to build and further maintain the center after its completion. Then, the cultural center was donated to the Greek State which under the supervision of the Ministry of Finances (Naturvation’s webpage) undertook full responsibility.

The cultural center is composed of three organizations. Two of them are hosted there, the National Library and the National Opera, and the third is a management company called the SNFCC SA that was created by the foundation and donated to the State. It belongs now to the Ministry of Finances,
although the executive team (circa 40 employees) works as if it was under private supervision of the SNFCC.

Decision-making power is centralized by the SNF. The State and the two national institutions hosted there lost a significant part of their autonomy because they are bound to the law (i.e. the PPP) that gave great powers to the SNF. They do not have the agency to choose how to manage the place nor to choose the companies they will hire or choose how to spend their money. If the State and the public institution do not comply with these rules, the foundation will legally withdraw the amount of money they donated (under-conditions of compliance with these rules) and the State will have to pay it all back (interview with P.).

It appears that despite the public-private nature of the project (due to the co-ownership between the Greek state and the SNF), the cultural center is rather privately managed, which prevents any kind of “bottom-up or self-managed activities” (Naturvation_05: 4).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Exclusion occurred during the conceptualization of the project and after its completion. First, the shaping of the intervention was centralized by the SNF and excluded citizens (there were no participatory process nor public consultation) as well as a set of companies that could have engaged with the project (in the conceptualization phase, the construction, or the maintenance). Since the SNF decided its collaborators in advance, lots of public and private actors (i.e. architecture, construction, maintenance companies) were excluded: “ there has been no active consultation and engagement involving end-users in defining the project and subsequently monitoring service quality” (Naturvation_05: 4).

Second, exclusions occurred after the completion of the center and targets visitors of the center.
*Exclusion in terms of accessibility: because it is not located in the city center of Athens and is not connected to it with a metro line, the center is not so easy to access, especially for people without a vehicle (i.e. students, elderly) (there is a parking lot but not free of charges).
*Class-based/financial exclusion. The Opera had increased the price of its ticket (to cover the cost of the rent due to the foundation). This also raised the question of who is able to pay for going to Opera in Greece at a moment of crisis? The cafés and restaurants of the cultural center have been contracted by the SNF and are a bit pricier than any kind of neighborhood cafés. In addition, a membership card, for which one pays a certain fee, gives members the possibility to have cheaper parking rates, to reserve places for the free activities, and thus to enjoy more activities offered by the center.
*Public/private indirect exclusion. The cultural center and the park are public but are privately managed i.e. private guards are surveilling the park rather than municipal officers. This means that visitors do not know who defines the rules in those premises. This is a form of indirect exclusion (interview with P.)

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

Some measures have been taken to involve more citizens. Since 2013, this included the possibility for citizens “to view the construction site and learn about the SNFCC scope, organization and future plan”. However, this is only information and has not to be mistaken with effective public participation. The document underlines that “public participation and citizen engagement for transparency and promotion of the public interest are hard to achieve in privately initiated NBS” (Naturavation_05: 4).

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

The context of the financial crisis, resulting austerity measures, and project development shaped the intervention. First, the project is built on a long history related to the place where it is set-up. The area was formerly a horse racing track, which then hosted the Olympic Games in 2004 and was abandoned afterwards. Local inhabitants asked the municipalities to turn it into a public green space. Before the crisis hit, the State promised that a public park would be created in that area, but after 2008-09 the project failed. At this time, the National Opera and the National Library requested SNF for support for their facilities, even for relocation. Then, the SNF came to the state with a project that would somehow meet both the residents' requests (i.e. to do something with this abandoned place and to provide green amenities) and the request of the two institutions.

In addition, the context of economic crisis, austerity, and environmental challenges (air pollution, degraded area), and with intention to restore the Greek image through cultural valorization (Naturvation’s website), the creation of a sustainable and innovative center hosting two major cultural institutions was positively welcomed by citizens. The project developed under the circumstances in which the Greek State, weakened by the economical crisis and austerity, was not able to pay for any alternative project or even to be proactive to make a call for tenders. The intervention only became possible by the establishment of a public-private partnership (PPP) designed by the SNF.

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The establishment of a public-private partnership (PPP) made possible the intervention to emerge. The scheme - as a kind of a loop - is the following: "the state provides the land, the private entity makes the construction and the state manages its functioning” (Naturvation_05: 3). This PPP was formalized in a signed agreement - a law - between the Greek State and the SNFCC foundation, which has been ratified by the Greek parliament (Law 3785-2009) (Naturvation’s webpage). The agreement entails that the state has to fulfill the agreed upon terms and conditions (i.e. especially regarding the selected collaborators) or the donor has the right to withdraw its donation. The two institutions hosted by the SNFCC remained autonomous but endorsed new financial responsibilities and did not have the agency to manage the building facilities.

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

The law defining the PPP is a presidential decree that has been ratified by the Greek parliament. Practically, the PPP has been conceptualized by the legal team of the foundation and submitted to the Greek government who accordingly issued a decree.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The intervention occurred at a moment of despair, mistrust, and disillusionment from the citizens towards the Greek State. Local inhabitants had been waiting for a long time for something to be done with this degraded area and the State had not had the capacity to do anything. The donors appeared, proposing to pay for building something for the people. It undertook a providential figure, which matches the philanthropic and well-known image of the Niarchos family and foundation: “Ok so the State is not able to do anything so we need some rich man to come and save us.” (Interview with P.)

“I think it can cut people, and the state as well and the government as well, in a weak moment where it's like, somebody is willing to give us money actually when everybody wants to take money away from us. Because at that moment with the debt, everybody was losing their salaries, their retirements. Then a big donator comes and says: 'ok, I'm going to throw millions of euros to make something for you'" (interview with P.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The financial agreement is the following; the state provided the land (public property), the SNFCC foundation covered the all the cost for designing and building the center (private funds) and then donated it (under conditions) to the state, which controls its functioning and management by the complex SNFCC SA (publicly run). However, the viability of the project depends on the capacity of the state to cover the high running cost of the structure. The money comes respectively from “the parking lot and the renting of cafés and restaurants, and of other spaces for events” as well as the fees (rent or/and “management fees") paid to the SNFCC SA by the Greek National Library and the Greek National Opera for being hosted by the center (only the the latter is a profit-organization) (Naturvation_05: 3).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The potential obstacle could have been the legal framework because this particular PPP is a form of “donation under-condition," which is quite specific and might oppose some juridical principle (regarding State autonomy for instance). However, the legal team of the foundation conceptualized this legal agreement and dealt with any potential obstacles related to its complexity.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

n/a

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

n/a

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

n/a

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| The complexity of the legal agreement (the PPP)
| The legal team of the foundation established the agreement and submitted ready-made to the State
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

The positive outcomes are:
*The new facilities for the National Library and the National Opera
*The park that provides green amenities, especially for local residents
*Overall, the cultural center is quite busy and people come to it

However, the project raised concerns about:
*Lost autonomy of the State and the two institutions that are hosted there. They have no agency to choose how to manage the building and have to comply with the terms set-up by the foundation.
*“Cultural appropriation” (interview with P.). The way that the place is promoted and marketed tends to symbolically privatize public properties and institutions. For instance, many Athenians say that they go to the Niarchos Center or Niarchos Library although the National Library is a cultural heritage that belongs to the State and does not belong to the Niarchos family and foundation.
*Gentrification. Just after the project was announced, speculation started in the area and the prices in the neighboring municipalities have arisen to 20% in the last five years, which is one of the highest percentages in Athens. This gentrification is related to culture and green amenities.
*Financial risk for the state. The State is taking financial risk from the moment it undertook the responsibility of running the center after it's completion. The center was extremely expensive to build (sustainable and innovative design and huge area covered) but is also very expensive to maintain because the selected companies contracted by the SNF are mostly above the market prices. At the same time, the State is bound to the agreement signed with the foundation and is responsible for the financial viability of the project. In case of economic fail or bankruptcy, it would be the State debt and taxpayer money that will pay for it.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

n/a

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The foundation is an international foundation that has experience in the management of different kinds of PPP. The legal team most likely has some experience in establishing some sorts of PPP.

Concerning the construction of the building, Renzo Piano, the architect hired by the foundation, is one of the top names in sustainable construction. The SNFCC was inspired by other international large-scale certificated LEED Platinum (including the Water+Life Museum, USA; Clinton Presidential Library, USA; Vestas Technology Center, Denmark; Taipei 101, Taiwan; Park Ventures, Thailand) (Naturvation_04: 46). The intervention is then a matter of elite expertise and know-how, though it did happen as a closed process.

Overall, both regarding the PPP procedure and the construction, it seems that the foundation operated on its own with its own resources and knowledge without necessarily involving the municipality: “I don't think there was a lot of back and forth with the local authorities” (Interview with P.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Nothing about governance arrangements.

However, regarding sustainable construction, the infrastructure has been adapted to the local context i.e. a Mediterranean environment. For instance, the park is landscaped with plants specifically adapted to the Mediterranean climate (e.g. do not require a lot of water) (interview with p.).

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

There was not really a learning process since the potential obstacle (i.e. the legal complexity of the PPP agreement) was overcome internally by the foundation.

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

Importing knowledge by employing people specifically qualified and recognized in the field (of sustainable construction).

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The potential of the project is to launch a dynamic of innovation in the area and to pledge local actors to consider the PPP.

From the perspective of the SNF, the SNFCC is “a role model of environmental sustainability across 3 dimensions: environmentally friendly design and construction, environmentally friendly operations, biodiversity & local ecosystem enhancement” and achieved a LEED Platinum certification (i.e. a sustainable label (Naturvation_04: 44). However, nothing is mentioned about transferability of the project. What is a “global role model”? Is that only inspirational?

Replicability however is mentioned in relation with the type of PPP: “SNFCC can serve as a model for future cooperation between public & private initiative in similar projects” (Naturvation_04: 65).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The context is not specified. This could take place in any major city (capable of hosting such big cultural institutions).

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferring the model of PPP is made by the SNF.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

The prerequisite of establishing such a project (including the use of innovative techniques) is to find private funds (Naturvation_05: 4). However, the document highlights that “this prerequisite (generous funds from a private actor) is however not easily replicated in other projects”.

In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the risks and the loss of autonomy of the Greek State. It seem this kind of governance arrangement will not occur in a city or country having a robust or healthy financial situation because no public actor will accept the terms offered by the foundation: “I think that the fact that it happened in Greece in a moment of crisis was very key to the way things happen” (Interview with P.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> ===

n/a

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

“Neighbouring municipalities have started to explore ways of capitalizing on the new project (the SNFCC) to attract development funding” (Naturvation_05: 4).

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

For the researcher that studies the project, it is important to highlight that it is a donation under non-negotiable legal terms. It is a very special form of PPP: “it's like a kind of temporary or a donation but a final outcome of state responsibility” (interview with P.).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam

2021-03-04T13:16:20Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Franck van Steenbergen for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

This intervention is called the “Veerkracht Carnisse” or “Resilience Lab” and refers to an urban regeneration experiment within a deprived urban neighborhood. Specifically, iIt takes place in the neighborhood of Carnisse, in the south of Rotterdam (Netherlands).<ref>Resilience Lab website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.veerkrachtcarnisse.nl/.</ref>

The intervention consists of the creation and implementation of an Urban Living Lab, which focuses on different projects (education, greening, local democracy) to engage residents, professionals, and policymakers in regenerating this city district. It aims to collectively address the social problems the neighborhood is facing and reinvent the way in which neighborhoods could be redeveloped and regenerated.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

This intervention is primarily implemented in the sector of urban regeneration.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The intervention seeks to address both sustainability and social justice issues. On the one hand, the intervention “focused on empowering the local community” (i.e. in a “most disadvantaged neighborhood” of Rotterdam) (GUST_05: 1049). On the other hand, it aimed to “foster(ing) urban sustainability and resilience”.

Transition challenges were primarily tied to social justice, that is to say focused on “social cohesion, equity, community engagement/empowerment, and democratic legitimacy” (GUST_06: 202). Classical ecological issues were not really addressed by participants; sustainability was rather framed as “something that is durable, as a desire for consistency over a long period of time” (i.e. it refers to social sustainability and to social networks) (GUST_06: 202). The intervention is driven by the idea of reinventing the ways in which urban regeneration projects are developed and implemented and to make them more inclusive and responsive to the populations’ needs and wishes (interview with F.).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The Resilience Lab started with a period of concept development and scoping in 2009. It officially started in September 2011 and concluded in September 2015 (4 years) (GUST_05: 1049).

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a hybrid governance mode that includes the partners of the Resilience Lab (civil society organization, research institute), the municipality, and the local citizens.

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This is a relevant example of governance intervention that addresses the second order of learning, i.e. aiming to structurally change the governance arrangements in urban regeneration projects (interview with F.).

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam
*add to GUST_(InContext) Wittmayer and al. Transition Management in Urban Neighborhood
*Interview with F., researcher, (16.06.20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed and primarily funded by the Dutch Ministry within the framework of a national program aiming to regenerate deprived neighborhoods in the south of Rotterdam. The project was developed by a consortium of four partners (see Q. 10). One of them, the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT) related the intervention to the EU-funded project InContext (2010-13) (not included in UrbanA WP4 database). Incontext investigates the conditions for creating sustainability transitions at the local and individual levels. Carnisse neighborhood was the 1st pilot project of InContext.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/
.</ref>

In addition, the GUST project (2014-17 - Governance for Urban Sustainability Transitions)<ref>GUST website. Last view on 26/06/20: http://www.urbanlivinglabs.net/.</ref> enabled this same partner to conduct an impact assessment and an evaluation of all the activities done in the Resilience Lab. As as a part of the Joint Programming Instrument Urban Europe, GUST aimed to examine, inform, and advance the governance of sustainability transitions through Urban Living Labs (ULLs). ULLs serve as a means for testing innovations (in buildings, transport and energy systems) and for providing economic stability and social cohesion while achieving urban sustainability.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Experimentation labs]] approach. The overall project - GUST - is explicitly mentioned in the database: “The GUST project offers a number of illustrative examples where urban living labs of collaboration and innovation have been formed”. However, the intervention itself is not mentioned.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Five project deliverables have been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4 including GUST_05_Frantzeskaki_Lab Rotterdam (available in the Zotero library) that refers to the intervention.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Carnisse neighborhood is known for being among one of the forty “disadvantaged neighborhoods” in the Netherlands (according to the Ministry of Housing 2007) (GUST_05: 1048). The neighborhood is poorly scored in terms of safety, social cohesion, and housing (according to different municipal indexes). The partners involved in the intervention (see Q.10) “identified and encountered (in the neighborhood) persistent problems in different societal systems (e.g. education, welfare, healthcare and food)” (GUST_05: 1049).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of social justice is implicitly a major motivation behind the intervention. Even though the terms of “social justice” is not mentioned, the “Resilience Lab” explicitly focused on activity related to “poverty reduction, the upbringing of children, and democratic reform for local development programs” (GUST_05: 1049). In addition, the intervention aims to develop non-tokenistic participatory processes that are related to social justice (interview with F.).

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was initiated by a consortium of four project partners including the Rotterdam Vakmanstad, Creatief Beheer, Bureau Frontlijn, and the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions (DRIFT). The first three are local civil society organizations/associations involved in community building projects in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam. The fourth is a “research institute where several action researchers were active in Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1049). This consortium developed the Resilience Lab as a whole and each partner was responsible for one “interactive field” within it, including “improving residents’ home situation”, “education at school” and “greening the public space" (interview with F.).

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The direct benefits of the intervention are the residents of the district. Indeed the “target groups of the Resilience Lab included primarily children (aged 4–12 years), their families, schools (board, teachers, and parents), and residents or volunteers actively involved in community life”. Also included were the networks in Carnisse and Charlois consisting of professionals, civil servants, social workers, and entrepreneurs” (GUST_05: 1050).

Scaling up, the intervention aims to benefit the municipality of Rotterdam because it consists of experimenting with a new form of transition management in an urban regeneration context that can be later transferred to other neighborhoods (upscaling).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
| X
| (initiator/project leaders) DRIFT
researchers and associated

|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| (indicators/project leaders) Bureau Frontlijn, Creatief Beheer, Rotterdam Vakmanstad
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
| X
| a foundation responsible for the ‘re-opened’ community-center.
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The municipality of Rotterdam
different sub-department of the Municipality of Rotterdam

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| (co-funders) the Dutch government
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| Welfare organizations
Housing associations

|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was made possible by the freedom given by the municipality to the consortium to implement the project. In a context of turbulences in local institutional settings (regarding municipal structures and competences), the consortium was given a “carte blanche” for developing and experimenting the Resilience Lab. Whereas most funded projects are predefined and have to follow a pre-established framework, the freedom given to the consortium partners enabled them to progressively develop and adapt their methodology to the local context. This freedom was crucial to the success of the Reliance Lab.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The citizens (i.e. actors including residents as well as other people working or connected to the district) engaged with the intervention by developing a vision or “narrative of place” about transition pathways for the future of the district; by establishing an agenda for transformative and experimental actions (GUST_5: 1053); or by participating directly in the activities of the Resilience Lab.

These two levels of citizens’ engagement i.e. deliberating about the vision of the neighborhood and joining the activities of the Resilience Lab were complementary.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

The consortium partners of the Resilience Lab were the drivers of the project. They first framed the intervention and proposed tools for engaging citizens (i.e. community areas, activities). The citizens engaged in the Resilience Lab by developing the vision of the neighborhood as well as participating in activities. In other words, the four partners were the drivers and facilitators of the projects, while the citizens participated in shaping the intervention and orienting its outcomes. Over time, citizens' roles and responsibilities grew bigger since the project developed according to their wishes and needs. For instance, citizens were the drivers of the creation of the community gardens and the community center (GUST_05: 1054).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

The methodology and activities for the transition management approach were focused on abstract discussion and meta-level questions about the vision of the neighborhood. Thus it targeted people who were more accustomed to such deliberative settings. In addition, the methodology for the visioning aspect of the Resilience Lab works with selective participation and targets 20 to 30 front runners of the neighborhood (interview with F.). In that sense, it was rather exclusive to people who were not familiar with such settings, including people facing language barriers, newcomers, and young people (below 20 years old (GUST_06: 193). Some did try to participate the deliberative arena but attended only in a few workshops and acted mostly as observers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

To balance this exclusivity, the consortium partner tried to engage people in practical activities which proved to be more inclusive than discussing the neighborhood. Indeed people joining the activities in the community center or garden were more diverse in terms of ethnicity, languages, and age difference. This "hands on" mentality proved to be very rewarding for the people who live and work in Carnisse (interview with F.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===
The Carnisse neighborhood had been identified as an area that needed to be regenerated (due to persistent social problems). Whereas typical regeneration strategies include demolishing aged public housing and a top-down re-development approach, the municipality agreed on experimenting new forms of urban regeneration in the neighborhood. The Resilience Lab - suggested by the consortium partners (see Q.10) - was a “test bed for new methodologies and innovative practices” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, overall design of the project (i.e. participatory, involving the local community) matches with the context of a new national neighborhood approach in which “citizens should be more active in addressing and solving problems in their living environment” (GUST_05: 1048). Thus, it was favorably appreciated by the local government to give lots of freedom to the leading partners for implementing the Resilience Lab.

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The current neighborhood approach of the ministry of Internal Affairs in the Netherlands reconceptualizes the role of inhabitants and citizens to be responsible in a far greater extent for addressing issues related to their living environment: “a revised role for the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in the 40-Neighbourhood-Programme. They describe this change as follows: “from active financial commitment linked with targets to a more facilitative role, acting on request in relation to what others do” (Ministerie BZK 2014: 2)” (GUST_06: 1880).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

The Resilience Lab was developed in a context of changing institutional settings including the municipal centralization of sub-municipal departments (which were dismantled) and at the same time the decentralization of national policies of social welfare to local municipalities (interview with F.). It means that the municipality of Rotterdam was in charge of extra tasks related to the welfare and well-being of Rotterdam citizens.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The project material points out that a new trend of the political culture, emphasizing the role of citizens in addressing local issues, influenced the intervention. Indeed, the Resilience Lab took place in the context of withdrawal of the state welfare structures and financial support by redirecting the responsibility to the local inhabitants and citizens. In that sense, the Resilience Lab is a solution given the context of a required “participatory society” (GUST_06: 188).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The main transition management in Carnisse’s neighborhood was funded by the Dutch Ministry under a national program for urban regeneration in Rotterdam-South (GUST_06: 190)n. The development of the transition methodology by DRIFT (one partner) was funded by the EU-project InContext, and the assessment and evaluation of the overall intervention that DRIFT conducted was funded by the EU-project GUST (see Q. 8.a).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

The institutional settings were very turbulent over the course of the intervention and the governmental policies and constitutional settings detailed above(see Q.18 -Q.19) were progressively set-up at that time.

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Turbulences and changes in the institutional settings (i.e. regarding the competences of the municipality and welfare structures) were an obstacle to implementing the intervention (GUST_05: 1050). While the sub-municipality to which Carnisse belonged was dismantled and budget cuts were made to social support, the project partners navigated without grasping these new settings. The consortium did not manage to establish a durable relationship with other actors, from the municipality to housing associations and welfare organizations, because the contact people changed every year (interview with F.)

The constantly changing institutional settings created a lot of ambiguity and insecurity about future processes. It constrained people in engaging in a participatory process while not being sure on how everything would be arranged in the following years (interview with F.).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The intervention faced obstacles prior to its implementation. Before it started, the project faced distrust from some residents towards these kinds of projects which have the “tendency to portray the neighborhood as a disadvantage, an image which frustrated many locals and in which they did not recognize themselves” (GUST_05: 1050).

In addition, another challenge was the relative skepticism from both the residents and the municipality about the “relative openness of both the process and the outcomes” of the living lab. They were doubting the urban living lab could effectively address the problems the neighborhood was facing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

There is high residential mobility and turnover in Carnisse, as it is considered as an “arrival” neighborhood. Many newcomers, especially young and less educated workers, move in as they arrive in the city and move out as soon as they can afford to live in a better district (InContext). As a consequence, the short-term residents are not necessarily aware about the local projects.

*'''d. Finances'''

It was challenging to start the intervention because it took place in a context of “budget cuts” from the municipality and general public subsidies for social intervention (i.e. the context of the erosion of old welfare structure) (GUST_05: 1050).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The participatory and deliberative aspect of the resilience Lab were not very inclusive (see Q. 16).

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Turbulences in institutional settings
| To overcome these turbulences, the consortium partners tried to work qui autonomously from these formal institutions. This found to be quite fruitful for the success of the Resilience Lab, as they could experiment with activities on the ground and really engage with the people of Carnisse free from institutional constraints. However, this autonomy hammered the more durable impact of the Resilience Lab in the municipal agenda (see Q. 36).
|-
| Skepticism of the residents and the municipality
| The project leaders. To address the skepticism of the residents and the municipality about the process and the outcomes of the project (is it worth it or not?), the Resilience Lab had to “prove [...] the benefits from being involved in it”, “this required a deep study of the dynamics of the neighborhood, building networks based on reciprocity and gaining trust over time by showing results that benefited the local community” (GUST_05: 1050).
|-
| Budget cuts in social welfare
| The consortium partner DRIFT used other fundings including two Eu-projects Incontext and Gust.
|-
| Lack of inclusivity
| The “practical” and “hands on” activities of the Resilience Lab allowed more diverse people to engage in the project and made it more inclusive (see Q. 16).
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

The outcomes of the intervention are:
*New social relations established within the neighborhood between citizens and some policy makers, and also between residents themselves. The participatory activities and tools used in the framework of the Resilience Lab increased interaction between different social groups (GUST_05: 1059). It enhanced trust and contributed to community building (although one of the problems in the district was the lack of community).
*Opening of the neighborhood: people living outside of the neighborhood took part in the Resilience Lab, thus increasing its openness and enhancing networks and relationships outside of the administrative boundaries of Carnisse (GUST_05: 1052).
*Citizens empowerment: the narrative “blossoming Carnisse” (GUST_05: 1053) developed in the deliberative workshops and empowered citizens because it gave them the opportunity to express their aspirations (what to they want for their neighborhood) and express their legitimate criticisms to the current dynamic of the place (e.g. the severe budget cuts that let to the closure of public facilities, such as two community centers and an educational garden). Over time, the citizens became almost fully responsible for the community center and the community garden.
*The identification of the residents/citizens with their neighborhood (i.e. the creation of a symbolic “sense of place”) although prior to the Resilience Lab, many did not feel connected to the neighborhood in terms of “shared meaning and experience” (GUST_05: 1053).
*the success of the “collaborative governance” (i.e. between policy makers and citizens). This demonstrates that reciprocity and institutional connection are key for escaping stigmatization of the place and its people (GUST_05: 1053).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The four consortium partners “had been involved and worked in their respective domains (i.e. social work, education) in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam south” (add to GUST: 190). Thus, the partners have brought their own experience and set of approaches and activities to the framework of the Resilience Lab.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Not reportedly. However, one of the consortium partners, DRIFT, had previously experienced some transition management strategies in the sectors of housing and mobility in other urban contexts, which have been translated to the neighborhood scale for Carnisse (interview with F.).

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

The Resilience Lab is is experimental and not explicitly built upon another intervention.
However, the methodology developed for transition management was influenced by previous work carried out by the consortium partners. The project started with a vision translated into a set of principles to be developed in practice (interview with F.). This methodology was the overarching umbrella under which the activities were created. The partners have already experimented some of these activities in other neighborhoods of Rotterdam-South (GUST_05: 1049) but adapted them to the local context e.g. in the sector of education or greening the public space.

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The partner DRIFT had already experienced transition management strategies in the energy or mobility sector. The methodology they had previously developed was translated and adapted to urban regeneration at the scale of a neighborhood (Interview with F.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Since the Resilience Lab was incorporated into other EU-projects on transition management, especially Incontext, some learning may have been disseminated, especially based in the case of the other pilot projects, such as the city of Wolfhagen, Germany, and the village of Finkenstein in Austria.<ref>InContext website. Last view on 06/05/20): : https://www.incontext-fp7.eu/pilots.html.</ref>

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

The intervention started from an abstract vision, a methodology, and a set of activities already experienced in other contexts. The practical dimension of the intervention was not set in stone and developed over the course of the project to make it context specific (i.e. depending on the need, wishes of the residents as well as facing local constraints). To sum up, it is an intervention that learnt from itself in the process of implementing it.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

Overcoming obstacles contributed to the learning process, especially in regards the exclusive dimension of the project. The consortium partner found out that engaging citizens in a deliberation process can be quite exclusive whereas “hands on” and practical activities (i.e. in the community center or the community gardens) are far more inclusive. This learning allowed them to combine these two aspects of the participation (Interview with F.)

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

*Guidance tool for self-organization developed by DRIFT
*In the framework of InContext: “Community Arena” for transition management include the processes of envisioning, backcasting, experimenting, self-reflection, and learning

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The project aims to be transferable. The idea was to identify, “new ways of neighborhood development” (GUST_05: 1055) and reinvent integrative methods for neighborhood redevelopment that could be adapted to different contexts. The overarching umbrella and set of principles for transition management would remain while the different activities within the Resilience Lab would be context specific (interview with F.).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The principles and methodology for neighborhood transition management (i.e. the Resilience Lab as a whole) can be transferred to any other context. However the activities within it should not be pre-determined and have to be adapted to the local context. It means that vision and basic principles of the Resilience Lab can be transferred but the actual implementation would differ in every neighborhood. (interview with F.).

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Researchers and project managers.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

The limit to transferability would not take the Resilience Lab as an integrative project, rather to replicate the different activities within it e.g. related to education, green space etc.. Lacking an overarching and integrated vision of neighborhood transition management would limit the success of such intervention (Interview with F.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The project has been disseminated.

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

The Resilience Lab as a whole has not been replicated in other contexts. However, the different activities developed by the consortium partners (including educational tools for schools or arrangement of the public space) have been transferred and implemented in other districts in Rotterdam and in cities in the Netherlands. The residents also replicated some activities such as the community garden after the first one has been closed by the municipality (interview with F.).

Based on the experience of Carnisse, the notion of "self-sustained community center" is also being replicated by the municipality in some other neighborhoods in Rotterdam under the name "Houses for the neighborhood” (interview with F.) . In 2013-14, a local policy established that every neighborhood should have a community center in which the desires and needs of citizens are central and where the community takes an active role in sustaining the center. These “Houses for the neighborhood” are a sort of replication of the community center in Carnisse, but are mainly led by municipality structures together with welfare organizations. Some are developed elsewhere in the Netherlands.

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

Yes, the project was mainly aimed at restructuring the governance arrangements. Whereas the municipality and other dominant stakeholders like the housing associations or welfare organizations were very dominant in the previous years, the Resilience Lab was explicitly aimed at breaking the dominant structure and actors who governed neighborhood development. The Resilience Lab tried to work instead in more in a co-creative manner and meaningfully involve residents and all kind resident groups in impacting- their neighborhood. Changing the governance arrangements was a really strong ambition of the intervention (interview with F.).

However, this ambition faced two obstacles and turned out to be quite limited. First, in the context of institutional turbulences, the consortium partners decided to develop the project quite autonomously from the municipality (see Q. 24). As a consequence, they could not really connect with the municipality and share the learning from that intervention. Whereas some civil servants learnt from the intervention, they did it at a personal level and not at the structural level of the institution. Second, the fragmented replication of Resilience Lab (see Q.33) rather than its integrated vision rather hampered impact in structurally changing the governance settings (interview with F.).

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

The biggest takeaway from such a Resilience Lab or neighborhood redevelopment is to aim to the autonomy and sovereignty of the residents and the people involved. Such interventions have to be context specific, have a sense of freedom in developing your activities in practices to support learning by doing (interview with F.).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-03-04T13:13:41Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing]]

You read this description and want to hear more about his case? Get in touch! Contact Dr. Oona Morrow for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food that is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints introduced in 2017 (see below), many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of a non-government led intervention based on the members’ self-governance, which works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) that are done collectively. The Sharecity100 database maps food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. Foodsharing.de is a case study for this project, though the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among the local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. Most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and provide space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are thus self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Each position entails specific responsibilities that help maintain trust between activists in the organization and ensure the smooth functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

Registered through the online platform, "food sharers” can take food from public dispensers and through the process get better acquainted with the project and other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It requires the successful completion of an online quiz about food policies, their ideological stance, and organizational rules in addition to attendance at local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport,” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking up food. This status entails a high level of commitment and additional responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators," who manage food savers’ coordination with the partner stores, and “ambassadors,” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It is notable that the rules, including those regarding food safety and sharing, are enforced by the membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation," such as being late for a pick-up, carelessness with sharing food, or poor maintenance of public fridges, are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers' privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. blame or “trust bananas” to reward positive behaviour). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by their online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most public fridges are located in community centers, their access may depend on their stigma or that of their users (e.g. a community center having certain connotations or a specific cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer entails a very exclusive procedure, including a quiz testing your abilities and commitment. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideology (written and detailed in the wiki) and the quiz are only written in German. This quiz thus excludes non-German speakers and greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to Foodsharing's hierarchical structure. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a certain extent (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, etc.) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are sometimes people who have already collected food for the community and are willing to volunteer time or energy that people in need may not be able/willing to commit.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and collection, much of which the quiz already covers (including values and knowledge). If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

Foodsharing and their public fridges were created as a response to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, this community-based initiative developed to find a solution that would alleviate and raise awareness about this issue. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues and the development of other forms of sharing economies, including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility, and energy (interview O.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The intervention has been framed by regulatory legislation (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) that address food risk, safety, and waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the food chain “from farm to fork” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies outline food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and are adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food waste. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterized by a certain continuity and degree of organization. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding the need for compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to facilitate interventions in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space, and to address disfunction in the food system. Citizens are political actors giving themselves agency for political action, indicating a strong democratic culture (interview O.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin, which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA brought the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices in opposition to foodsharing.de. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin must be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This would require food savers to record every single food item which is saved and to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing opposes food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior to and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors such as food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough human resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsharing communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, Foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods” and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). In doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges to Foodsharing members. In addition, Foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community centers hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine. Put at financial risk, many organizations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Regarding their sustainability goals, Foodsharing.de has prevented an enormous amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles posed by the Berlin Senate and the rules enforced by the FSA reduced the impact of public fridges. Their closing and the restricted access of those remaining few jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative, which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

Other kinds of food sharing initiatives developed in Berlin, including community gardens, food banks, and meal saving. Other forms of sharing economies focus on sectors like clothing, services, mobility etc.. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in other sharing initiatives, which informs how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of similar interventions. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing started in Cologne (Germany)and regional branches of the organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin initiated the creation of public fridges. This was spurred from experiences members had had from working in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organization is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Foodsharing and public fridges successfully took hold in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context. Berlin has an active subculture and appropriate urban infrastructure to facilitate strong sharing-based economies.

First, there are a lot of people in Berlin with the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture with a politic attached to it that made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) and the infrastructure to help the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc.) (SHARECITY_14). Because much of the food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected. Thus, short distances and facilitated access matter.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The members of Foodsharing Berlin confronted with these obstacles learned how to navigate political and administrative channels. They got used to making public statements and press releases and participated in meetings with local authorities and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition its movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing are actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands, where some public fridges are now located in Amsterdam and Wageningen (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> originates from the Foodsharing movement and is developing tools and software for enabling other people in multiple contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistics tools to start foodsharing. The idea is to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the original movement (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments), as well as the obstacles to be overcome in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs, making it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space, and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from Berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to adopt liability for donated or saved food, which greatly hampers saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, such as the Good Samaritan Laws in the US, would allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation that requires that someone is always responsible for food, thus creating a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food bank to do this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared meals, shared bread etc.. These initiatives have not been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures.

Since Foodsharing is a loose and open network, everyone has their own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize everyone's aims. Whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less waste. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offers everyone to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing to allow initiatives to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social spheres where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers and tackle food regulations, ICT-mediated food sharing constructs new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices that are established by the interaction – conflicting or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs, and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing should be further inquired (SHARECITY_06).

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fair way.

== l) For more information ==

Want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Send an email to BürgerEnergie Berlin eG at info(at)buerger-energie-berlin.de

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-03-04T13:13:09Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Prof. Dr. Lorreta Lee for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in the Roman district of Trastevere (Italy). The district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification, which applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely by “staying put” (AGAPE_01: 1).
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods by tenants' unions and individual squatters occupying buildings. Anti-eviction platforms voice these claims at the district level in Trastevere. Multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The Trastevere district is facing gentrification resulting from a roll-back of state protection of housing stock and privatized public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased, which led to a severe housing crisis and to police-led evictions. In this context, anti-gentrification resistance emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenants' request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This ongoing process started in the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5). Specifically, the AGAPE project focuses on resistance from 2014 (when the project started) until present.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law), which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy their housing at moderate prices.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions. They are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority and perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent Romany people) are excluded from this intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (recalling the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are thus not represented.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups that frame themselves by neighbourhoods. However, the neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) without being altruistic or supportive of other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fascist pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups (i.e. migrants, Romany) potentially breaks down solidarity among activists. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistance since only long-time local inhabitants who share this “working class” narrative may benefit while neglected social groups are even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity after the 2008 crisis. This reinforced the ongoing housing shortages that began in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neoliberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens' resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, December 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to better provide and manage decent housing for the working-class (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants, protecting them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, September 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of December 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of 50 to 75 percent of public property (AGAPE_02: 12). Incentivized from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

Both citizens and public actors have ambivalent views on the regulatory framework of the intervention. On the one hand, while citizens and local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are responsive to some extent to citizens' claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Narratives from public actors pose obstacles to legitimacy. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts to the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatization of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, even at moderate prices, only middle class tenants can afford to buy their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion breaks down solidarity among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very dubious about the rental-homeownership conversion. As S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso recall, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” in cities (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put") in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detrimental effects of privatizing public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organized in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analyzed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples included “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists, and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them with concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project to “provide the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project, including fieldwork, theoretical research, and practical tools against gentrification processes, addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg

2021-03-04T13:12:46Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Dr. Philipp Späth for more information.
{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The intervention addresses the eco-district of Vauban in the city of Freiburg, Germany, with a particular focus on its co-housing projects. It has been developed at the scale of a neighborhood or city district within a regional hub (Freibrug has 220.000 inhabitants).

The intervention aimed to co-create and design a sustainable neighborhood, which would provide inclusive and affordable housing that was adapted to the needs and the will of the local population.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

This intervention is primarily implemented in the sectors of housing and urban development (i.e. building/establishing a new district).

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The intervention (co-housing in Vauban and Genova’s case) aimed to establish a sustainable, eco-district while implementing participatory planning and cooperative ownership (TRANSIT_01: 5). Social objectives of inclusiveness and affordable housing, as well as ecological goals such as walkable pathways, car-free zones, green areas, and low-energy buildings are embedded in the project (TRANSIT_01: 6).

“social and ecological goals and standards have been set from the beginning as part of the official guidelines by the City of Freiburg: compulsory low energy standard for new buildings, connection to the tram network until 2006, rain infiltration on the very territory, socially mixed inhabitant structure and a priority of giving away land to private builder-owners and collective building projects (Life-Projekt)" (TRANSIT_16).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

The creation of this new district started after the withdrawal of the French military troops from the Vauban military facilities in 1992. In 1994, the city became the owner of the land and launched the project. At the same time, citizens interested in engaging in the project created organizations such as the Forum Vauban and the Independent Housing Project - SUSI. Housing cooperatives began to form in 1997, namely the Genova housing cooperative. The first tenants moved into Genova I in 1999 and in Genova II in 2001 (Table 5.1. Timeline and development of Vauban_TRANSIT_01: 8). Other projects have since developed. In 2009, the construction phases were completed.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

The intervention is characterized by a hybrid-governance mode.

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This intervention provides an interesting example of negotiated governance between a grassroots initiatives and the municipality, thereby reaching across institutional boundaries.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

*TRANSIT_01_cohousing: the eco-district of Vauban and the co-housing project GENOVA (02)
*TRANSIT_02_Social Innovation Research project: http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/
*Interview with A., a project proponent (10.07.20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

Yes, the intervention has been studied in the context of the EU-funded project TRANSIT (2014-2017).<ref>TRANSIT website. Last view on 29/06/20: http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/ .</ref> The project aims to develop a new theory on Transformative Social Innovation (TSI) which refers to “a process of changes in social relations, involving the challenging, altering and/or replacing of dominant institutions and structures”. The project aims to draft a manifesto for TSI that sheds light on initiatives and emerging movements for TSI in hopes of inspiring policy makers, social entrepreneurs, academics, and other stakeholders.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Co-living, co-housing & intentional communities]] approach. The TRANSIT project is explicitly mentioned in the database. In addition, the intervention addresses the [[Governance and participation processes]] approach and the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons]] approach.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes, the project has been coded in the framework of WP4 but not the intervention itself.

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Inequality and exclusion has been problematized both by the (prospective) residents of the district (in the framework of citizens organizations including Forum Vauban, SUSI, other citizen groups or cooperatives...) and by the municipality of Freiburg in view of creating an inclusive and affordable eco-district.

Specifically, to make GENOVA co-housing more inclusive, the cooperative is regulating the pricing structure, reducing house rents for targeted groups i.e. “elderly people and long-term members, as well as persons with the right to social housing, so called Wohnberechtigungsschein” (TRANSIT_01: 36).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention by focusing on affordable housing and citizens' self-planning and management: “(Vauban) is an ecological, sustainable district which has consciously set itself social objectives such as inclusiveness and affordable housing, as well as short distances” (TRANSIT_01: 6) ; “affordable housing, planned and managed by its residents” (TRANSIT_01: 16) ; “the goal of which was to create ecological living space based on the principles of social justice and self-organization” (TRANSIT_01: 24).

In addition, “The City of Freiburg as the owner of the territory of Vauban is responsible for its planning and opening up for development. In the course of this, social and ecological goals and standards have been set from the beginning as part of the official guidelines by the City of Freiburg: compulsory low energy standard for new buildings, connection to the tram network until 2006, rain infiltration on the very territory, socially mixed inhabitant structure and a priority of giving away land to private builder-owners and collective building projects (Life-Projekt)" (TRANSIT_01: 16).

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The intervention was co-initiated by citizens, primarily the citizen-led initiative Forum Vauban and the Independent Housing Projects -SUSI, and the municipality of Freiburg, in order to build a new district:

“After the departure of the military (1992), the Vauban district was designed and rebuilt anew during a unique citizen-involvement process – for which it has been awarded several times – by the City of Freiburg together with the citizen-lead association ‘Forum Vauban’ as a bottom-up actor with a mandate in the Vauban city planning council (TRANSIT_01: 5).

“When the City of Freiburg decided to build the new district in 1993, the citizen-led initiative of Forum Vauban had already been active in setting up their plans and visions about how to build the district in a “green”, sustainable and participatory way” (Transit_01: 24).

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of the intervention are the (prospective) residents of Vauban, especially the owners of housing cooperatives (interview with A.), and more broadly, the residents of Freiburg who could potentially move into affordable and ecological housing. The municipality of Freiburg also benefits from the district's widespread reputation, using it as a “green flag” in urban marketing strategies to enhance the attractiveness of the city (TRANSIT_01: 27).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
|
*Forum Vauban (citizen-led organization)
*Co-housing cooperatives (e.g. SUSI ; Genova e.g. ; Vaubanaise e.g….).
*Baugruppen (e.g. Wohnen&Arbeiten ; Woge e.V. etc…) (Table 5.2: co-housing and other important projects in Vauban_TRANSIT_01: 13)
*Other initiatives, e.g.: Autofreies Wohnen e.V. (organizes car-free mobility in Vauban); Quartierladen e.G. (a cooperative supermarket for local organic food supply); Kinderabenteurh of Freiburg e.V. (an associative kindergarten); Villaban with Restaurant Kantine (a restaurant organizing joint cooking events)
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Freiburg
*The local parliament
*The “Vauban city planning council (GRAG)” is a consultative committee within the city council (including members of the administration, of the local parliament and of Forum Vauban), which was created to plan the new district of Vauban alongside citizen groups (TRANSIT_01: 33).
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
|
|
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The converging vision of the citizens and the municipality for building a new district was crucial. Whereas the municipality intended to plan a new district to meet the extremely high demand for living space in Freiburg, Forum Vauban had envisaged an ecological, socially just, and self-organized city quarter with lots of green space and affordable housing (TRANSIT_01: 16). Specifically, citizens represented by Forum Vauban benefited from direct access to discussion with parliamentarians and municipal actors in the “Vauban City Policy Council” GRAG (see Q.15). The support from local parliamentarians was therefore critical in enabling the citizens' plans and visions to be implemented (interview with A.).

In addition, the city dedicated additional public money to set-up the project in a participatory way and officially mandated Forum Vauban to mediate the process and provide assistance (e.g. with the distribution of building lots) (TRANSIT_01: 23).

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

Citizens, especially Forum Vauban, were the drivers of the co-housing projects. Citizens engaged in visioning and planning the distinct as well as in the physical building it (e.g. with the Baugruppen) (TRANSIT_01: 16).

When the project of rebuilding a new district arose (1992-1994), self-organized citizens were invited to share their vision of the district: “The Forum Vauban (working as an open forum) invited, organized, and coordinated professional expertise around planning, ecological housing, funding and forms of ownership brought in by interested citizens” ; “This could be realized because the city of Freiburg agreed and provided a frame and organizational innovations to cooperate with the citizen-lead Forum Vauban. From this platform emerged various building groups, some of which came up with the idea of cooperative building" (TRANSIT_01: 17).

In addition, students of architecture - on a voluntary basis - initiated and facilitated the process of developing utilization plans. (TRANSIT_01: 17).

Finally, “the citizen-initiative was the driving force in establishing participatory planning and “learning while planning” methods” (TRANSIT_01: 18).

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Both civil-society and governmental actors participated in creating the eco-district of Vauban. “On the one hand, it was built in a bottom-up process through self-organized housing initiatives of cooperatives and privately organized building groups (Baugruppen). On the other hand, the overall planning of the infrastructure, the selling of land property, and the ecological building laws were set-up and coordinated by the government of the City of Freiburg including participatory planning processes with the future residents” (TRANSIT_01: 42). Citizens groups provided visions for the district and participated in the planning and building process, while the administration of the City of Freiburg, as the owner of the land, had the responsibility to decide on planning and selling land slots (TRANSIT_01: 33).

In addition, a mix-consultative council called “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” was established, which included seven parliamentarians, twenty members of the municipality administration and one member of Forum Vauban. This council was responsible for “creating the necessary infrastructure, taking over a coordinating role, doing the marketing of the territories” (TRANSIT_01: 33). The GRAG was separated from the usual municipal hierarchies and was instead assigned to the head of the construction department, which opened up possibilities for the representatives of the citizenry to directly contribute to the work of this group (TRANSIT_01: 18). The council was therefore a forum for discussion between different actors and facilitated the bridging of institutional logics.

The municipality also designed and implemented the principle of “Planning that Learns," meaning that pilot initiatives would be experimented before being widely enforced. A prime example of this principle is the mobility concept of Vauban, which was first operated in one third of the district before being implemented in the whole neighborhood (interview with A.).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Direct exclusion of social groups is not reported. However, indirect exclusions have been controversial. First, the car-free mobility concept of the district was found exclusive and dissuasive for car-owners. Second, housing was primarily accessible to home owners rather than to tenants. Indeed, about 76% of the district is dedicated to home owners (including cooperatives). However, becoming an owner is not accessible to everyone because it entails very high entry costs. Additionally, building one's own house takes a lot of time (at least 5 years), which not everybody can afford (interview with A.).

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

There are not reported indications about the triggers of these indirect exclusions. Concerning the car-free mobility concept, a solution was found by creating dedicated parking lots and establishing a system that meets the needs of both car-owners and of those who do not have a car. In regards to the housing system, the primacy given to home owners is a political decision that has not been amended (interview with A.).

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

The circumstances which have reportedly triggered the interventions are :

*The housing crisis in Freiburg (and co-housing alternative as a response to it).
“Because of its attractiveness (geographical, cultural, economic hub, and university), Freiburg is one of the most expensive cities in Germany in view of the housing price. As a result of the high pressure on the housing market, creative forms of alternative living developed like trailer home communities developed as well as ongoing urban planning activities of the municipality, trying to explore and build new areas and quarters” (TRASIT_01: 7).

*The ecologically-minded citizens and local policy makers.
This is related to the historical background of the city, including its tradition of critical thinkers at the University (e.g. H. Heidegger, H. Arendt), the social movement against the nuclear power plant of Wyhl, and leftwing policy makers (TRANSIT_01: 7).

*The opportunity to build a new district from scratch after the departure of the French troops from Vauban in 1992.
“The well-educated, collegiate and ecological milieu of Freiburg was in need of housing. The expected liberation of the French Vauban barracks at a central location in Freiburg generated desires and creative ideas. The time span until the sale to the Federal Republic was settled could be used for establishing a professional forum, the Forum Vauban, from within the citizenry from 1994 on. This forum started to develop serious urban planning concepts.”(TRANSIT_01: 8).

*The capacities and resources of Forum Vauban to engage in the project.
Forum Vauban included a core group of four people working almost full time on the project (who were being professionalized), along with several working groups. Those working groups were responsible for developing visions and for implementing projects in the sectors of energy, mobility, social cohesion, and social infrastructures (interview with A.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

Regarding the participatory process, the municipality conceptualized a legal framework - namely the “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” and the principle of “Planning that Learns” - which allowed citizens to participate in urban development.

More broadly, cooperative housing in Germany is regulated by the CooperativesAct, first adopted in 1889 and reformed in 2006. It determines the cooperatives’ organizational rules and their business conduct (TRANSIT_01: 6). The Rent Regulation Act outlines the responsibilities of all landlords of rental dwellings, including housing cooperatives, and specifications about rent increases (ICA) (Enkeleda 2011, TRANSIT_01: 6). Cooperatives are framed by regulatory policies from the national level and enforced locally.

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

In Germany, the municipality is responsible for urban planning within the lines of the national regulations (i.e. the urban planning laws and codes). The municipality together with the federal state can thus allow citizens to participate in urban planning; in this case, the Baden-Württemberg Development Agency gave Forum Vauban extended governance and financial responsibilities to mediate the participation process. This means that citizen participation in urban planning depends on specific and local regulatory policies.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

Freiburg has a culture of ecologically and politically engaged citizens, which has manifested in various protests (i.e. against Wyhl nuclear power plant) and broad participation in national and local political issues. Freiburg was the first city in Germany to vote for a green political majority. Self-organized groups have been recognized since squatters successfully built vivid communities (80s).

Concerning the development of Vauban, there were enough people trusting the eco-left millieu to positively influence the district development, thereby invested money in Baugruppen and proving that their trust was justified.

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

The intervention was financially supported by two means:

*Funds raised and gathered by the citizens.
“It consisted first of all in voluntary work for planning the private houses and furthermore working on concepts for the whole district. Furthermore, Forum Vauban could fundraise several projects because of its special model character, sometimes in cooperation with the city or other official institutions” (TRANSIT_01: .40). Between 1996 and 2002, about EUR 200, 000 were received from the German Federal Foundation for the Environment, and from 1997-1999 about EUR 700, 000 from the EU Life Environmental Program. Memberships, donations, and other fees account for the overall budget of Forum Vauban, which was managing a budget of 2 million Euro from 1995-2001 (TRANSIT_01: 40).
In addition, “on the level of private housing subsidies, the house builders and cooperatives could make use of the so-called Eigenheimzulage, a state subsidy for builder-owners” (TRANSIT_01: 40).

*Financial support from the city development budget.
Financial support was provided to for the city administration by the Federal State of Germany or the regular process of building a new district. As an urban development project, the Vauban has a specific status and budget (EUR 85,000,000) according to German building law. The city invested in total 95 million Euros in the district and provided an additional EUR 200, 000 for the participation process (TRANSIT_01: 41).

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Citizen participation was consolidated throughout the project as Forum Vauban earned the trust of institutional actors (interview with A.). The milestones of this progressive recognition are:
*the invitation for Forum Vauban to join the “Vauban City Planning Council (GRAG)” as well as the financial support of 30, 000 marks per year given by the municipality (spring 1995)
*the financial support of the Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt as well as *the participation of Forum Vauban to the United Nations Organization Habitat Conference in Istanbul (summer 1996)
*the implementation of the mobility concept according to the principle of “Planning that Learns” (summer 1996).
*the grant from the Baden-Württemberg Development Agency (Landesentwicklunggesellschaft LEG) to Forum Vauban for participating in the development of the district (1998).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Disputes over the destruction of old military barracks occurred between activists/former squatters and the opposing municipality. For instance, a joint initiative of SUSI- and GENOVA-stakeholders - called Drei5Viertel i.G aimed to renovate three additional barrack buildings but failed because of the regulatory framework. The stakeholders failed to meet the (tight) municipal deadline for proposing a financing concept (TRANSIT_01: 14) and the barracks were demolished.

In addition, the timeframe of the project, due to administrative procedures (about 5 years at least to build the first houses), may have discouraged citizens to engage in the project. Besides, the uncertainty about its outcomes, i.e. whether the project would be accepted by the municipality and a grant given, was also an obstacle to implementing the intervention (interview with A.)

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The collaboration between citizens and the municipality was not always easy because each group had to adapt to the institutional logic of the others. For instance, when the GRAG invited a representative of Forum Vauban to take over a permanent seat in a consulting role, “Forum Vauban welcomed this decision of the city as a step towards them. Nevertheless they were not always satisfied, because the citizens were expected to adapt to the logic of urban planning which already existed in the city bureaucracy” (TRANSIT_01: 25).

From the perspective of many inhabitants of Vauban, an unjust treatment by the City persists throughout the history of the quarter. For instance, the city benefits from tourism in Vauban and from the image of Freiburg being a “Green City," due in large part to Forum Vauban and its civic activities, without the latter being recognized and appreciated sufficiently (TRANSIT_01: 27).

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

The entry cost to become a housing owner is very high and prevents many people from engaging in such projects (interview with A.). The financial obstacle is a driver of exclusion for working-class people.

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

*Contrasting visions of the district development between project proponents.
“While some followed a radical path of squatting houses and initially moved their trailer homes illegally onto the free area left behind by the military. –, others wanted to maintain good contacts with the city council” (TRANSIT_01: 16). Specifically, squatters and trailer home owners had some confrontations with Forum Vauban. Whereas squatters already living in the military barracks were reluctant to plans proposed by Forum Vauban, the latter felt that squatters were jeopardizing the project by undermining citizens' actions toward municipal actors (interview with A.)

*Gradual disengagement of the residents.
“When the majority of the houses were built and residents moved in, as ‘normal’ life started, the engagement for the quarter started to diminish” (TRANSIT_01: 23).

*The liquidation of Forum Vauban
Forum Vauban became bankrupt in 2004 after a lawsuit from the European Commission. It was replaced by the new ‘Stadtteil Verein Vauban e.V.’ (city district association) based on resident members.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Controversies over the destruction of old military barracks by the municipality
|by the activists, occupations of the barracks and protests.
by the municipality, continued the demolitions.
|-
| Liquidation of Forum Vauban
| by the residents/activists, establishment of “Stadtteilverein” district association (as follow-up organization of Forum Vauban).
|-
| Dissensus among project proponents
| by the civil society organizations, “The different groups involved in the design and development of Vauban managed to cooperate in a productive way to realize this district project due to a great balancing act between innovative visions and the reality of existing city planning laws. The diversity of the district map (including housing cooperatives, groups of private house builders and construction companies) mirrors the different interests and groups and their ‘areas’”(TRANSIT_01: 16).
|-
| Gradual disengagement of residents
| after the completion of building the district, residents spread out to a large variety of projects both inside the district (including “hosting space” for supporting refugees with rooms for German lessons), and outside of the district with the creation of various interest groups with relevance for the entire city and beyond (TRANSIT_01:24).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Sustainability challenges addressed in Vauban district include:
*Car-reduced living (including specific external parking lots managed by a “car-free living association”).
*Energy-efficient housing and low-carbon buildings. “The municipality of Freiburg introduced a low energy housing standard for all buildings, namely a maximum of 65kWh/a of the primary energy consumption” (TRANSIT_01: 20).
*Lots of green areas and amenities

Apply to GENOVA cooperative : “One of the accomplishments of GENOVA in view of affordable living space is the fixing of rental prices for 10 apartments supported by GENOVA by means of the social building program for 10 years. However, after some efforts to choose the beneficiaries itself, GENOVA decided that applicants should have an official document proving their eligibility to receive low cost housing issued by city institutions. After 10 years, they can then receive support for paying their rent by a special social fund created by GENOVA” (TRANSIT_01: 28).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The intervention is built upon the development of another district in Freiburg called Rieselfeld. Located on a former leach field, the creation of this new district in 1992 is a pioneer in terms of citizens' participation in urban development projects in Freiburg. Specifically, the “City Planning Council” (see Q.15) that includes parliamentarians, municipal actors and citizen organizations was first established for Rieselfeld. Civil society partners actively involved in the urban development project included, among others the Protestant social welfare organization Diakonie, as well as a car-free living organization that conceptualized a new mobility vision for the district (Interview with A.).

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

The cooperative movement in Germany has inspired the intervention. The movement is rooted in the 19th-century history and the leading figures of Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch. Cooperative models developed in different sectors (housing, farming, energy) and spread across Europe and especially in Germany during the late 19th and 20th centuries. These examples of housing cooperatives in Germany (especially in the the German Federal States of Schleswig-Holstein, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg and Lower Saxony) are traditionally large housing cooperatives more strongly integrated into the urban planning process, and have reportedly been inspirational for the instigators of the intervention (TRANSIT_01: 6).

However, the old housing cooperatives had a rather distinct vision of the social organization of housing (e.g. environmental standards or cooperative rules). Vauban proponents moved away from the old cooperative model to experiment with innovative approaches (e.g. carpooling) (interview with A.).

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

The experience of Rieselfeld was inspirational for Vauban’s proponents, especially for Forum Vauban, which attempted to develop a more comprehensive approach to citizen participation. Forum Vauban lobbied to have a stronger influence on politicians as well as to directly engage in visioning, planning and especially building the district. Whereas welfare or mobility organizations partnered with the municipality for the development of Rieselfeld, local citizens represented by Forum Vauban were the driving forces of the urban development process.

In addition, the car-free living concept of Vauban is reportedly built upon the vision for Rieselfeld (interview with A.).

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The intervention acquired knowledge from other housing cooperative experiences in Germany. Specifically, according to German regulation, every cooperative has to become a member of a cooperative confederation “in order to be advised, supervised and observed” (TRANSIT_01: 37). GENOVA and Quartiersladen are both members of “Prüfungsverband der kleinen und mittelständischen Genossenschaften e.V.“ (PkmG). This unit audits cooperatives, provides support in matters of economy, law and tax policy, and advises on questions of organization management. This audit was deemed very useful for the creation of GENOVA (interview with A.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

On its website, Forum Vauban states: “Learning about participatory planning processes was a key topic in the Vauban process. The principle of “Planning that learns” and the extended citizen participation with Forum Vauban set new standards of communication, interaction and integration” (TRANSIT_01: 37

Through the participatory planning process, the intervention was adapted to manifest houses and infrastructure where some people could spend the rest of their lives. The aspect of community building in the early phase with the future neighbours is seen as centrally important: (TRANSIT_01: 38).

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The conflicts that posed the municipality in opposition to the residents/activists (e.g. over the demolition of old barracks or over the modalities of the citizens participation) were overcome and enhanced transparency and mutual trust between both actors, allowing for further cooperation.

“The sense of responsibility of the citizens had been strengthened and the disenchantment with politics reduced. Despite occasional conflicts the City of Freiburg and the citizenry see the participatory and cooperative approach as a great gain of the quality and further development of the city quarter of Vauban” (TRANSIT_01: 25).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

*for activists (especially at the beginning of the intervention): face-to-face meetings, location where people met (e.g. the student broad office at the university), a print media for information and exchanges, namely the “Vauban actuel” district magazine
*for citizens and municipality cooperation, the “Vauban City Planning Council” and the implementation of the participatory principles like “planning that leans". They included workshops *for co-creating the design of streets and open green spaces as well as excursions mediated by Forum Vauban.
*About 10 events (including district festivals, international conferences “UrbanVisions” as a pre-event of the UN ‘urban 21”) were co-organized with the City of Freiburg, mainly addressing future home owners, architects, craftsmen, the building industry and financial institutes (TRANSIT_01: 37).

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

"Vauban district and the co-housing projects are internationally known and the model “has inspired all over the world in view of sustainable planning especially with regard to citizen involvement” (TRANSIT_01: .6).

“Vauban’s widespread reputation as a model ecodistrict (e.g. through exhibition at World Expo Shanghai) attracts hordes of visitors from all over the world. A number of organizations offer guided tours to Freiburg’s green city with a special part of Vauban. About 25,000 such technical visitors are counted by the municipal Green City Office each year, most of them from South Korea, France and Italy, many of them politicians or (municipal) technical staff, but many also school children" (TRANSIT_01: 38).

“The growing worldwide recognition and dissemination of Vauban as a model-eco district has led to an unexpected phenomenon: more and more interested persons from all over the world have started studying, and visiting Vauban in order to learn more about the details of the district’s development – academia, politicians, technical experts, and even pupils and ordinary persons who just want to add a “green sight” to the standard visiting tour of Freiburg. Admittedly, after digesting first impressions, some of them have also voiced the possibility of “transplanting” the ideas behind the model of Vauban to other places (Interview VB2)" (TRANSIT_01: .30).

The success of the Vauban eco-district offers lessons for urban planners and mayors all over the world to learn from the example of this experimental district (TRANSIT_01: 6).

The experiences made with GENOVA e.G. have inspired the setting up of Vaubanaise e.G., also built in Vauban, and are currently informing the establishment of Esche e.G. (i.Gr.) for building about 70 housing units in another part of Freiburg in the coming years.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The intervention can be possibly transferred to other urban contexts. The Vauban model has been looked at and visited by experts from all over the world.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Activists from Forum Vauban, the municipality which supports the replication of the intervention and promotes it, and researchers from the TRANSIT project.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

“The concept of Vauban was never entirely repeated in any other new district of Freiburg except for the low energy standard for housing which has been introduced as obligatory in Freiburg since then. Unfortunately this regulation has influenced a negative effect on affordable housing, because the standard has increased the prices. In this sense, this case reveals a danger of extracting single innovations from the overall concept or case they are embedded in. If the social innovation of citizen-lead planning and ownership – for instance in the form of housing cooperatives – was combined more often with the technical innovations of ecological building laws, affordable housing in low-energy houses could be realized on a broader basis" (TRANSIT_01: 44).

In Freiburg, the mobility concept of Vauban was never replicated because of some shortcomings that have undermined its legitimacy. While the residents of Vauban who own a car have to declare and pay for it, some free-riders did not declare it and parked in the surrounding neighborhoods. The strong criticism that arose resulted in the municipality rejecting to transfer this mobility concept to the new district of Gutleutmatten district. However, the possibility of implementing a car-free living concept in the district of Dietenbach in Freiburg is currently discussed (interview with A.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The framework of TRANSIT project the learning process related to Vauban’s co-housing project has been record in a reflexive way, giving special attention to the section “5.1.16 Social learning through Vauban” (TRANSIT_01: 37) of a deliverable of the WP4.

There are about 25,000 visits per year in Vauban from people from all over the world, including “academia, politicians, technical experts, pupils and ordinary persons” in order to learn more about the details of the district’s development. This interest was triggered by the exhibition of the Vauban model at the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai.

Facing a growing number of inquiries about the model eco-district, the City’s planning department called for private expert agencies to provide guided tours:, “a network of professional guides hosts tours around the quarter for political and international guests” (TRANSIT_01: 30).

“At the same time, the City of Freiburg intensified its PR work to present Vauban to the interested public: a website with six subpages, online and printed brochures in six different languages, as well as imagery and presentations are available.”

The growing attention to Freiburg as a “Green City” in general and the sustainability awards it has received led the municipality to establish a designated “Green City Office." This is located in the Department of International Relations and coordinates and answers to inquiries. “The office has signed Memorandums of Understanding with four designated “Green City”- agencies to organize study visits and seminars, meeting the visitors’ interests” (TRANSIT_01: 31).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Since its presentation at the HABITAT exhibition in 1996, Vauban has been looked at as an example of urban planning projects involving citizen participation, car-reduction, and sustainable living. Specifically , the creation of living spaces free of cars was inspirational for the development of several laws in Germany. The two options for choosing – either payments for a parking lot or a contribution for the association “Autofreies Wohnen” (car-free living) has “resulted in a legal amendment on the level of the State of Baden-Württemberg allowing more freedom to create diverse forms of parking lots, for instance for bikes instead for cars only” (TRANSIT_01: 29).

“Most of these visitors claim they are taking inspiration from the innovations of Vauban, but there is no monitoring or evaluation and little feedback as to where and how these inspirations have led to real changes in other places. Nevertheless, many examples show the dissemination of Vauban’s experiences. For instance, after several visits and exchanges with Vauban citizens, the nearby rural Municipality of Teningen, with which Vauban has developed a partnership, is now planning to invest in solar installations as well (VB1)” (TRANSIT_01: 39).

In addition, in “December 2015 Vauban started a city partnership with the French town Eybens, which approached Vauban to learn from its experiences as a sustainable city district” (TRANSIT_01: 36).

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

In Freiburg, the co-creation process, the application of the principle of “Planning that learns”, as well as the creation of “City Planning Councils” set new standards for citizens participation (TRANSIT_01: 37). Building on the experience of Vauban, the city has developed a planning method able to react to new developments quickly and flexibly, allowing “enlarged” citizen participation that goes far beyond the usual demands of the construction law (TRANSIT_01: 18). For instance, a “City Planning Council” was implemented for the development of the new Dietenbach district in Freiburg. However, unlike in Vauban, the council for Dietenbach included experts (in mobility, housing), members of the municipality administration, and local parliamentarians rather than a citizen forum.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

n/a

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

“The main aspect of Vaubans’ innovation is the negotiation process between the urban planning office of the municipality and the strong citizen initiative of Forum Vauban with its diverse aims of a socially just, ecological district” (TRANSIT_01: 42).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-03-04T13:10:54Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing]]

You read this description and want to hear more about his case? Get in touch! Contact Dr. Oona Morrow at oona.morrow@wur.nl for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

==='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''===

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

==='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''===

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

==='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''===

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food that is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

==='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''===

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints introduced in 2017 (see below), many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

==='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''===

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

==='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> '''===

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of a non-government led intervention based on the members’ self-governance, which works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

==='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''===

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

==='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''===

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) that are done collectively. The Sharecity100 database maps food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. Foodsharing.de is a case study for this project, though the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

==='''9. Problematization and priority:'''===

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

==='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''===

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

==='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''===

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among the local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

==='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

==='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''===

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. Most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and provide space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

==='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''===

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are thus self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

==='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''===

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Each position entails specific responsibilities that help maintain trust between activists in the organization and ensure the smooth functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

Registered through the online platform, "food sharers” can take food from public dispensers and through the process get better acquainted with the project and other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It requires the successful completion of an online quiz about food policies, their ideological stance, and organizational rules in addition to attendance at local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport,” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking up food. This status entails a high level of commitment and additional responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators," who manage food savers’ coordination with the partner stores, and “ambassadors,” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It is notable that the rules, including those regarding food safety and sharing, are enforced by the membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation," such as being late for a pick-up, carelessness with sharing food, or poor maintenance of public fridges, are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers' privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. blame or “trust bananas” to reward positive behaviour). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by their online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

==='''16. Exclusion:'''===

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most public fridges are located in community centers, their access may depend on their stigma or that of their users (e.g. a community center having certain connotations or a specific cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer entails a very exclusive procedure, including a quiz testing your abilities and commitment. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideology (written and detailed in the wiki) and the quiz are only written in German. This quiz thus excludes non-German speakers and greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to Foodsharing's hierarchical structure. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a certain extent (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, etc.) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are sometimes people who have already collected food for the community and are willing to volunteer time or energy that people in need may not be able/willing to commit.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and collection, much of which the quiz already covers (including values and knowledge). If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

==='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''===

Foodsharing and their public fridges were created as a response to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, this community-based initiative developed to find a solution that would alleviate and raise awareness about this issue. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues and the development of other forms of sharing economies, including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility, and energy (interview O.).

==='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''===

The intervention has been framed by regulatory legislation (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) that address food risk, safety, and waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the food chain “from farm to fork” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies outline food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and are adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food waste. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

==='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''===

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterized by a certain continuity and degree of organization. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding the need for compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

==='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''===

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to facilitate interventions in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space, and to address disfunction in the food system. Citizens are political actors giving themselves agency for political action, indicating a strong democratic culture (interview O.).

==='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''===

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

==='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''===

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

==='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''===

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin, which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA brought the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices in opposition to foodsharing.de. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin must be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This would require food savers to record every single food item which is saved and to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing opposes food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior to and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors such as food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

==='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough human resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsharing communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, Foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods” and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). In doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges to Foodsharing members. In addition, Foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community centers hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine. Put at financial risk, many organizations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

==='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''===

Regarding their sustainability goals, Foodsharing.de has prevented an enormous amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles posed by the Berlin Senate and the rules enforced by the FSA reduced the impact of public fridges. Their closing and the restricted access of those remaining few jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative, which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

==='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''===

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

Other kinds of food sharing initiatives developed in Berlin, including community gardens, food banks, and meal saving. Other forms of sharing economies focus on sectors like clothing, services, mobility etc.. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in other sharing initiatives, which informs how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of similar interventions. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing started in Cologne (Germany)and regional branches of the organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin initiated the creation of public fridges. This was spurred from experiences members had had from working in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

==='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''===

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organization is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

==='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''===

Foodsharing and public fridges successfully took hold in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context. Berlin has an active subculture and appropriate urban infrastructure to facilitate strong sharing-based economies.

First, there are a lot of people in Berlin with the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture with a politic attached to it that made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) and the infrastructure to help the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc.) (SHARECITY_14). Because much of the food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected. Thus, short distances and facilitated access matter.

==='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''===

The members of Foodsharing Berlin confronted with these obstacles learned how to navigate political and administrative channels. They got used to making public statements and press releases and participated in meetings with local authorities and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition its movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

==='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''===

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

==='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''===

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing are actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands, where some public fridges are now located in Amsterdam and Wageningen (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> originates from the Foodsharing movement and is developing tools and software for enabling other people in multiple contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistics tools to start foodsharing. The idea is to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the original movement (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments), as well as the obstacles to be overcome in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs, making it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space, and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from Berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to adopt liability for donated or saved food, which greatly hampers saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, such as the Good Samaritan Laws in the US, would allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation that requires that someone is always responsible for food, thus creating a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food bank to do this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

==='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref> '''===

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

==='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''===

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared meals, shared bread etc.. These initiatives have not been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

==='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''===

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures.

Since Foodsharing is a loose and open network, everyone has their own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize everyone's aims. Whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less waste. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offers everyone to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

==='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''===

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing to allow initiatives to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social spheres where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers and tackle food regulations, ICT-mediated food sharing constructs new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices that are established by the interaction – conflicting or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs, and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing should be further inquired (SHARECITY_06).

==='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''===

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fair way.

== l) For more information ==

Want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Send an email to BürgerEnergie Berlin eG at info(at)buerger-energie-berlin.de

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-03-04T13:07:52Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods]].

You read this description and want to hear more about this case? Get in touch! Contact Prof. Dr. Lorreta Lee at loretta.lees@le.ac.uk for more information.

{{toclimit|limit=2}}
== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in the Roman district of Trastevere (Italy). The district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification, which applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely by “staying put” (AGAPE_01: 1).
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods by tenants' unions and individual squatters occupying buildings. Anti-eviction platforms voice these claims at the district level in Trastevere. Multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The Trastevere district is facing gentrification resulting from a roll-back of state protection of housing stock and privatized public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased, which led to a severe housing crisis and to police-led evictions. In this context, anti-gentrification resistance emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenants' request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This ongoing process started in the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5). Specifically, the AGAPE project focuses on resistance from 2014 (when the project started) until present.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law), which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy their housing at moderate prices.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions. They are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority and perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent Romany people) are excluded from this intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (recalling the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are thus not represented.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups that frame themselves by neighbourhoods. However, the neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) without being altruistic or supportive of other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fascist pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups (i.e. migrants, Romany) potentially breaks down solidarity among activists. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistance since only long-time local inhabitants who share this “working class” narrative may benefit while neglected social groups are even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity after the 2008 crisis. This reinforced the ongoing housing shortages that began in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neoliberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens' resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, December 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to better provide and manage decent housing for the working-class (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants, protecting them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, September 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of December 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of 50 to 75 percent of public property (AGAPE_02: 12). Incentivized from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

Both citizens and public actors have ambivalent views on the regulatory framework of the intervention. On the one hand, while citizens and local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are responsive to some extent to citizens' claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Narratives from public actors pose obstacles to legitimacy. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts to the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatization of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, even at moderate prices, only middle class tenants can afford to buy their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion breaks down solidarity among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very dubious about the rental-homeownership conversion. As S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso recall, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” in cities (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put") in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detrimental effects of privatizing public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organized in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analyzed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples included “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists, and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them with concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project to “provide the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project, including fieldwork, theoretical research, and practical tools against gentrification processes, addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Creating a Sustainable Energy System: a Citizen-Driven Transformation

2021-01-26T12:25:54Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy |real world case]].

[[File:BEB.jpg|500px]]

''Poto: Rupert Richter''

'''Imagine your city where a group of highly motivated citizens with diverse expertise comes together as a cooperative to flag their concerns about unsustainable practices in a metropolitan energy system.'''

'''Can such a citizen-led cooperative challenge the neoliberal growth paradigm in the energy market?'''

It seems that the present energy market has various social and ecological disadvantages that are inflicted by the profit-oriented monopolized private energy market. This has spurred the engagement of citizens who are increasingly aware of their needs, capabilities, and political landscapes. Can they govern local energy systems themselves in ways that are inclusive, accessible, and sustainable in the long run? (Q9)

'''How can financial and human resources be generated for executing a citizen-based initiative?'''

Such citizen-led cooperatives can be extended and strengthened by acquiring financial and in-kind support from businesses, research institutes, NGOs, students and media (Q12). Cooperatives may also profit from inviting experts with experience in establishing similar interventions for guidance, which may be especially important during the early stages of the process (Q13). Furthermore, awareness campaigns with the help of the media can sensitize the general public and help to earn trust and support from political leaders (Q32).

'''What major policies and management approaches can keep an intervention relevant and alive?'''

Supportive EU directives such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive as well as national policies and constitutional rights (for example right to hold plebiscites, right to assembly, and right to form cooperatives) can provide an enabling environment for such interventions (Q19). Moreover, a flexible project management approach (changing with on-the-ground circumstances) without compromising on the fundamental vision and goal of an intervention can keep the intervention relevant and alive.

'''What actor constellations can be crucial for effective participation, governance, and decision-making?'''

Governing energy systems as a cooperative could allow for wide participation among the membership. It can have volunteers and cooperative members working in different capacities. General assemblies of the cooperative can allow for the participation of all members at different levels of the decision-making process. However, to ensure accountability, a supervisory board consisting of founders and highly engaged individuals could develop strategic plans and take action (Q15).

'''How can a citizen-based initiative cope with potential governance, financial, and political challenges?'''

The intervention may be confronted with various challenges, especially those related to financial arrangements, political culture, and regulatory procedures. Financial challenges could be tackled partly with shareholder/membership fees and partly by attracting donors and sponsors. Political and general public’s opinion can be influenced by running awareness campaigns, engaging with the media, and through outreach to individuals (Q23).
Introducing a citizen-driven management partner in the arena of public vs. private management could be highly challenging. However, different paths and approaches can be adopted to realize the overarching goals of an intervention while carefully aligning various stakeholders and securing wide public support (Q32).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

The scenario is based on citizen-driven intervention known as BürgerEnergie Berlin (BEB). It is a cooperative that unites citizens in Berlin - the capital and a city-state of Germany - to work together for a sustainable, climate-friendly, and citizen-owned energy system. The intervention is based at the city level. BEB aims to acquire a share in the energy grid of Berlin and change the energy mix towards renewable energy. It intends to promote and support members economically and build a socially and environmentally compatible, decentralized, inexpensive, and nuclear-free sustainable energy system. If you are interested in how obstacles have been overcome in this case, see Q24. Check out their website to learn more: https://www.buerger-energie-berlin.de/

This scenario relates to some '''enabling governance arrangements''':
*[[2) Make space for adaptation and experimentation|Make space for adaptation and experimentation]]: BEB applied for a Berlin grid concession directly. However, the government decided to provide the license to a city-owned public utility and a court case is pending. Consequently, BEB reinvented its plans for achieving a sustainable energy system in Berlin. They have, for example, started implementing solar power projects.
*[[3) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups|Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]: There have been changes in terms of changing how the energy system can be imagined, who owns it and who participates in it. Political documents, for example, the coalition agreement in Berlin have some changes, particular attention has been given to citizens’ participation in the energy sector.
*[[4) Commit to a meaningful participation process|Commit to a meaningful participation process]]: BEB would not have been able to establish and grow the way it did without the contribution of volunteers. Most are students, mainly graduates from the field of renewable energies, but there are also retirees who want to use their free time to help the cooperative.
*[[5) Tap into existing community networks|Tap into existing community networks]]: BEB is supported by a large number of alliances including cooperatives, ethical banks and renewable energy companies. The cooperative expanded fast in numbers and donations through synergies with the networks established by other energy cooperatives and movements in the field of energy and politics.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Energy and Mobility solutions]]
*[[Governance and participation processes]]
*[[Co-learning and knowledge brokerage]]

It addresses a '''driver of injustice''':
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User: Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

Database of governance arrangements

2021-01-05T12:48:18Z

Romane Joly:

Across Europe there is an inspiring array of experimentation with local governance arrangements for just and sustainable cities.

What is '''governance'''? It can be broadly understood as all formal and informal political processes (involving state and non-state actors) that lead to collective action.

On this database, you will find the summaries of results of a study on fruitful governance interventions for sustainable and just cities.

Would you like to get involved? We've asked some questions in the following sections, and you can share your suggestions with us via email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]]. If you haven't already, please feel free to join the [[UrbanA Community of Practice]].

 '''DISCLAIMER: This page is currently under review! More detail to follow shortly.'''

== Enabling governance arrangements ==

Enabling governance arrangements are combinations of actor constellations and institutional settings that have proven a potential to support urban governance towards just and sustainable cities in several cases of real-world (Governance Interventions)

Looking at a selection of eleven situated governance interventions for sustainable and just cities (as summarized in our scenarios), we asked:

''What key elements of governance arrangements enabled those interventions to come to fruition?''

You can find background information on eleven original, real-world governance interventions, our empirical basis, in our database of rich descriptions (for more information, please refer to the section methodology).

You will see references to these interventions in the form of brief examples to illustrate each enabling governance arrangement. The question numbers accompanying the examples, like ''“(Q18)”'', will lead you to the pertinent section of the respective description of a real world governance intervention.

We assume that the enabling governance arrangements were aimed at sustainable and just outcomes, which makes it likely that they can be useful for interventions with similar goals in other instances as well. However, we do not claim that these enabling arrangements are the sole factors for bringing interventions to fruition, as the latter will always be embedded in local contexts with place-based factors being important as well.

When clicking on one of the enabling governance arrangement A) - D) below, you will learn about the ambition this each enabling governance arrangement as well as about the scenarios and detailed descriptions of governance experiments it relates.

[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]

[[B) Make space for adaptation and experimentation]]

[[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]

[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]

[[E) Tap into existing community networks]]

[[F) Develop resilient, and self-sufficient financing arrangements]]

Which further enabling governance arrangement do you consider crucial on the way towards governance for sustainability AND justice in cities?

== Governance interventions ==

We have selected eleven real-word experiments (mostly within EU-funded projects) and developed '''detailed descriptions''' which detail their governance variables and processes. We have also created a brief '''governance scenario''' per case studied. These scenarios share general insights in a narrative style, and we hope that they pique your interest and provide inspiration about what could be possible in your city!

We stress that the interventions presented below (the detailed descriptions and the corresponding scenarios) - '''are not exemplary “successful interventions”'''. Rather, they are regarded as '''general inspiration''' and real-world cases for testing out how to enable translocal learning.

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center; background-color:#efefef;"
! Detailed governance intervention descriptions
! Brief governance scenarios
|-
| 1.[[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome]]
| 1.[[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]]
|-
| 2.[[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin]]
| 2.[[Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing]]
|-
| 3.[[Community led affordable housing in Brussels]]
| 3.[[Reimagining Affordable Housing from the Ground Up: Community Land Trust Models]]
|-
| 4.[[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]]
| 4.[[Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation]]
|-
| 5.[[Biodiversity protection and social justice in the Barcelona Natural Park]]
| 5.[[Negotiating green space development: balancing long-term sustainability and short-term social needs]]
|-
| 6.[[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg]]
| 6.[[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]]
|-
| 7.[[Inner-city community energy in London]]
| 7.[[From electricity to empowerment: democratizing urban energy systems]]
|-
| 8.[[Holistic neighbourhood development Augustenborg]]
| 8.[[Overcoming Silos in Urban Regeneration Projects: holistic neighbourhood design]]
|-
| 9.[[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]]
| 9.[[Creating a Sustainable Energy System: a citizen-driven transformation]]
|-
| 10.[[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam]]
| 10.[[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]]
|}

'''Example of a partially successful governance intervention'''

In addition to our 10 fruitful governance interventions for sustainability and justice in cities (see above), we developed a [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens| rich description]] and a [[ Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships|scenario]] of a governance intervention that demonstrates possible pitfalls when developing sustainable infrastructure in a public-private partnership. This intervention extracted from a southern-eastern European settings outlines the always partial success of governance intervention and encourages to be caution about the externalities of public-private partnerships, especially in a context of austerity that may increase in post-covid erea.

Template for developing further descriptions: [[Rich description template]]

== Methodology ==

''(Coming soon)''

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T14:04:45Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona | case]]

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

'''How might a city create this future?'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

'''What are the dangers in giving away responsibility to private actors?'''

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

'''What can we learn from this?'''

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

== Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens |'''Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens''']] that has inspired this scenario. In Athens, a public-private partnership was established to create a sustainable infrastructure hosting a cultural center. However, such partnership established in a context of austerity gives a lot of decision-making power to private investors at the expense of public authorities and it at risk of privatization publicly owned space. Check out their website, https://www.snfcc.org/en

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]].

It relates to some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]].
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]].
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]].

Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens

2021-01-04T14:03:11Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take look at [[Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships]]

== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

'''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''

The intervention refers to the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center (SNFCC) and takes place in the city of Athens, Greece. The cultural center is an urban regeneration project established in the framework of a private-public partnership. It hosts two major cultural institutions and includes a park. The overall infrastructure is sustainable and based on nature based solutions.

The intervention has been developed at the scale of a neighborhood in a capital city (Athens).

'''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''

The intervention has been developed for the urban development policy field as well as cultural development.

'''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''

The project addresses both issues of social justice and sustainability. However, social justice is not directly mentioned but is rather framed as broader access to cultural facilities and environmental amenities. The first refers to the access to the two cultural institutions hosted in the center i.e. the Greek National Library and the Greek Opera. In addition, the SNFCC offers a free set of activities such as yoga classes or music workshops: “the project is committed to a range of educational and cultural activities, which have been provided for free” (Naturvation’s webpage). Environmental amenities refers to the large park, which contributes to the health and the well-being of the local population.

From the perspective of the SNFCC, the intervention addresses social justice by being inclusive. Inclusiveness includes the access to the facilities for mobility-reduced visitors and the activities free-of-charge. The intervention also aims at improving the quality of life of the local community “with clean air, exercise facilities and twice as much green space” (Naturvation_04: 2).

Sustainability achievements refer to the sustainable construction and design of the SNFCC, which is LEED (i.e. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certified (an internationally recognized certification). The building has a recycled water system, a green roof, and solar panels. The park is designed in a way that is conservative with water usage and adapted to the local climate (i.e. with Mediterranean plants for instance). The expected impacts include “sustainable consumption and production (SDG 12)” as well as “green space, habitat and biodiversity (SDG 15)" (Naturvation’s webpage). At the scale of the neighborhood, the intervention addresses environmental health issues, as it was built on a formerly degraded area (interview with P.). Scaling up, the intervention is a response major sustainability challenges in Athens, namely high rates of air pollution due to the heat island effect and limited green spaces, as Athens has the lowest per capita green space among the EU cities (Naturvation_05: 2).

'''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''

The project started in 2009 and was finalized in 2016.

'''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''

The intervention is characterized by a co-governance of hybrid governance model (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors), between private actors (i.e. the SNF) and public actors (i.e. the Greek State).

'''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref>

This intervention is interesting because it shows an example of public-private partnership (PPP) adapted to a very particular context i.e. a period of economical crisis and austerity (which obviously raises concerns about sustainability and social justice). This governance intervention was radically shaped by this context.

'''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''

*SNFCC’s case in Naturavtion’s Atlas: https://naturvation.eu/nbs/athens/stavros-niarchos-foundation-cultural-center-snfcc
*Snapshot - Athens: Stavros Niarchos Cultural center. Coded in Zotero (Naturvation_05)
*SNFCC Impact Study (from the SNFCC). Coded in Zotero (Naturvation_04)
*Interview with Panagiota Kotsila (UAB team) on 06/04/20.

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

'''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied in the framework of a EU-funded project called NATURVATION (2016-20).<ref>Naturvation website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://naturvation.eu/.</ref> The project focuses on nature-based solutions (NBS) that are applied and implemented in urban contexts and aims at identifying how NSB governance and innovation can address urban sustainability challenges.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Nature-based solutions | Nature-based solutions]] approach. However, only the overall project (i.e. Naturvation) is mentioned, not the intervention itself.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Some deliverables of Naturvation’s project have been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4. However, none of these deliverables refer to SNFCC’s case.

'''9. Problematization and priority:'''

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

From the perspective of the SNF, inequality and exclusion has been problematized in terms of:
*Inclusion and accessibility . The SNFCC offers very low entry fees (compared to other cultural attractions) and free-of-charge activities (Naturvation_04: 13). The SNFCC is accessible for people with special needs (disabilities).
*Improving the quality of life for the local community. This includes: improving the appearance and attractiveness of the areas, increasing the access to green amenities, enhancing local businesses, providing health benefits (cleaner air and offering opportunities for exercise), making the neighborhood safer (Naturvation_04: 35-41).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

From the perspective of the SNF, justice is understood in terms of citizens’ well-being and welfare. In that sense, it is one motivation among others behind the intervention.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

'''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''

The intervention was initiated by a private actor, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF), who came to the Greek State and proposed to build the cultural center. The SNF is a nonprofit foundation held by a very rich family of ship owners in Greece (the foundation does mainly charity works and operates in Greece and internationally). However, this project has a longer history that involves various actors (see Q. 17)

'''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''

The envisioned benefiters of the intervention are: the public sector institution (e.g. school or hospital); non-government organization/civil society ; private sector/corporate/company; citizens or community groups (based on the list provided in Naturavation webpage).

It seems more generally that the intervention will benefit Athenian visitors, because of the cultural activities offered by the center. To some extent, the intervention also benefits the Greek population. At a time when the country was facing a financial and austerity crisis that deteriorated its international image, the center can be a source of national pride and international recognition (i.e. the cultural center seek to be a “global role model of environmental sustainability and also to contribute to the valorization of Greek culture and heritage).

'''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
|
|
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| The Stravos Niarchos company (SNF CC SA)
the Greek National Opera (public)

|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| Maires of municipalities surrounding the area
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| the Greek State (i.e. represented by the ministries of education, of cultural and of the economy)
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| (nonprofit) the Greek National Library (Public)
(nonprofit) the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) (private)

|}

'''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''

The intervention could emerge successfully because the SNF came to the state with a project already set-up (i.e. the configuration, the design, and also the PPP), to which the Greek State only had to agree. The State - weakened by the crisis at this time - did not call for tender but was offered a predefined project. In that sense, the intervention emerged because it was one-sided. In addition, the SNF benefited from the support of the National Opera and the National Library that requested the foundation for help to relocate. Thus, the SNF came to the Greek State with a strong proposal and offered a lot of money at a time when the Greek state was sorely lacking it.

'''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''

The SNFCC is a top-down intervention since “the conceptualization, design, type of uses and technical execution of the whole SNFCC project were top-down” and driven by the SNF (Naturvation’s webpage). There was no kind of participatory process that included citizens in the decisionmaking. From the SNF’s perspective, a sort of participation was conceptualized ex-ante. Visitors or citizens could individually raise some claims by writing an email to the foundation on a dedicated platform. In addition, information days were organized during the construction where people could come and get informed about what was happening there.

A public committee - composed of the maires representatives of the state as well as the ministers of culture, education and finances - was held from the beginning towards the end of the project to discuss what was happening. However, the role of the committee was only consultative, rather than contributing signficantly to the decision-making.

'''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''

The SNF was the main decision-maker of the project. It conceptualized the whole approach while the Greek State had only to agree on that project and to sign the law that enforced this Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The SNF was responsible for the whole vision and decision-making of the conceptualisation, design, and technical execution of the cultural center. In addition, the SNF pre-decided a list of companies that were to be contracted to build and further maintain the center after its completion. Then, the cultural center was donated to the Greek State which under the supervision of the Ministry of Finances (Naturvation’s webpage) undertook full responsibility.

The cultural center is composed of three organizations. Two of them are hosted there, the National Library and the National Opera, and the third is a management company called the SNFCC SA that was created by the foundation and donated to the State. It belongs now to the Ministry of Finances,
although the executive team (circa 40 employees) works as if it was under private supervision of the SNFCC.

Decision-making power is centralized by the SNF. The State and the two national institutions hosted there lost a significant part of their autonomy because they are bound to the law (i.e. the PPP) that gave great powers to the SNF. They do not have the agency to choose how to manage the place nor to choose the companies they will hire or choose how to spend their money. If the State and the public institution do not comply with these rules, the foundation will legally withdraw the amount of money they donated (under-conditions of compliance with these rules) and the State will have to pay it all back (interview with P.).

It appears that despite the public-private nature of the project (due to the co-ownership between the Greek state and the SNF), the cultural center is rather privately managed, which prevents any kind of “bottom-up or self-managed activities” (Naturvation_05: 4).

'''16. Exclusion:'''

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Exclusion occurred during the conceptualization of the project and after its completion. First, the shaping of the intervention was centralized by the SNF and excluded citizens (there were no participatory process nor public consultation) as well as a set of companies that could have engaged with the project (in the conceptualization phase, the construction, or the maintenance). Since the SNF decided its collaborators in advance, lots of public and private actors (i.e. architecture, construction, maintenance companies) were excluded: “ there has been no active consultation and engagement involving end-users in defining the project and subsequently monitoring service quality” (Naturvation_05: 4).

Second, exclusions occurred after the completion of the center and targets visitors of the center.
*Exclusion in terms of accessibility: because it is not located in the city center of Athens and is not connected to it with a metro line, the center is not so easy to access, especially for people without a vehicle (i.e. students, elderly) (there is a parking lot but not free of charges).
*Class-based/financial exclusion. The Opera had increased the price of its ticket (to cover the cost of the rent due to the foundation). This also raised the question of who is able to pay for going to Opera in Greece at a moment of crisis? The cafés and restaurants of the cultural center have been contracted by the SNF and are a bit pricier than any kind of neighborhood cafés. In addition, a membership card, for which one pays a certain fee, gives members the possibility to have cheaper parking rates, to reserve places for the free activities, and thus to enjoy more activities offered by the center.
*Public/private indirect exclusion. The cultural center and the park are public but are privately managed i.e. private guards are surveilling the park rather than municipal officers. This means that visitors do not know who defines the rules in those premises. This is a form of indirect exclusion (interview with P.)

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

Some measures have been taken to involve more citizens. Since 2013, this included the possibility for citizens “to view the construction site and learn about the SNFCC scope, organization and future plan”. However, this is only information and has not to be mistaken with effective public participation. The document underlines that “public participation and citizen engagement for transparency and promotion of the public interest are hard to achieve in privately initiated NBS” (Naturavation_05: 4).

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

'''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''

The context of the financial crisis, resulting austerity measures, and project development shaped the intervention. First, the project is built on a long history related to the place where it is set-up. The area was formerly a horse racing track, which then hosted the Olympic Games in 2004 and was abandoned afterwards. Local inhabitants asked the municipalities to turn it into a public green space. Before the crisis hit, the State promised that a public park would be created in that area, but after 2008-09 the project failed. At this time, the National Opera and the National Library requested SNF for support for their facilities, even for relocation. Then, the SNF came to the state with a project that would somehow meet both the residents' requests (i.e. to do something with this abandoned place and to provide green amenities) and the request of the two institutions.

In addition, the context of economic crisis, austerity, and environmental challenges (air pollution, degraded area), and with intention to restore the Greek image through cultural valorization (Naturvation’s website), the creation of a sustainable and innovative center hosting two major cultural institutions was positively welcomed by citizens. The project developed under the circumstances in which the Greek State, weakened by the economical crisis and austerity, was not able to pay for any alternative project or even to be proactive to make a call for tenders. The intervention only became possible by the establishment of a public-private partnership (PPP) designed by the SNF.

'''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''

The establishment of a public-private partnership (PPP) made possible the intervention to emerge. The scheme - as a kind of a loop - is the following: "the state provides the land, the private entity makes the construction and the state manages its functioning” (Naturvation_05: 3). This PPP was formalized in a signed agreement - a law - between the Greek State and the SNFCC foundation, which has been ratified by the Greek parliament (Law 3785-2009) (Naturvation’s webpage). The agreement entails that the state has to fulfill the agreed upon terms and conditions (i.e. especially regarding the selected collaborators) or the donor has the right to withdraw its donation. The two institutions hosted by the SNFCC remained autonomous but endorsed new financial responsibilities and did not have the agency to manage the building facilities.

'''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''

The law defining the PPP is a presidential decree that has been ratified by the Greek parliament. Practically, the PPP has been conceptualized by the legal team of the foundation and submitted to the Greek government who accordingly issued a decree.

'''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''

The intervention occurred at a moment of despair, mistrust, and disillusionment from the citizens towards the Greek State. Local inhabitants had been waiting for a long time for something to be done with this degraded area and the State had not had the capacity to do anything. The donors appeared, proposing to pay for building something for the people. It undertook a providential figure, which matches the philanthropic and well-known image of the Niarchos family and foundation: “Ok so the State is not able to do anything so we need some rich man to come and save us.” (Interview with P.)

“I think it can cut people, and the state as well and the government as well, in a weak moment where it's like, somebody is willing to give us money actually when everybody wants to take money away from us. Because at that moment with the debt, everybody was losing their salaries, their retirements. Then a big donator comes and says: 'ok, I'm going to throw millions of euros to make something for you'" (interview with P.).

'''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''

The financial agreement is the following; the state provided the land (public property), the SNFCC foundation covered the all the cost for designing and building the center (private funds) and then donated it (under conditions) to the state, which controls its functioning and management by the complex SNFCC SA (publicly run). However, the viability of the project depends on the capacity of the state to cover the high running cost of the structure. The money comes respectively from “the parking lot and the renting of cafés and restaurants, and of other spaces for events” as well as the fees (rent or/and “management fees") paid to the SNFCC SA by the Greek National Library and the Greek National Opera for being hosted by the center (only the the latter is a profit-organization) (Naturvation_05: 3).

'''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

'''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The potential obstacle could have been the legal framework because this particular PPP is a form of “donation under-condition," which is quite specific and might oppose some juridical principle (regarding State autonomy for instance). However, the legal team of the foundation conceptualized this legal agreement and dealt with any potential obstacles related to its complexity.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

n/a

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

n/a

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

n/a

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

'''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| The complexity of the legal agreement (the PPP)
| The legal team of the foundation established the agreement and submitted ready-made to the State
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

'''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''

The positive outcomes are:
*The new facilities for the National Library and the National Opera
*The park that provides green amenities, especially for local residents
*Overall, the cultural center is quite busy and people come to it

However, the project raised concerns about:
*Lost autonomy of the State and the two institutions that are hosted there. They have no agency to choose how to manage the building and have to comply with the terms set-up by the foundation.
*“Cultural appropriation” (interview with P.). The way that the place is promoted and marketed tends to symbolically privatize public properties and institutions. For instance, many Athenians say that they go to the Niarchos Center or Niarchos Library although the National Library is a cultural heritage that belongs to the State and does not belong to the Niarchos family and foundation.
*Gentrification. Just after the project was announced, speculation started in the area and the prices in the neighboring municipalities have arisen to 20% in the last five years, which is one of the highest percentages in Athens. This gentrification is related to culture and green amenities.
*Financial risk for the state. The State is taking financial risk from the moment it undertook the responsibility of running the center after it's completion. The center was extremely expensive to build (sustainable and innovative design and huge area covered) but is also very expensive to maintain because the selected companies contracted by the SNF are mostly above the market prices. At the same time, the State is bound to the agreement signed with the foundation and is responsible for the financial viability of the project. In case of economic fail or bankruptcy, it would be the State debt and taxpayer money that will pay for it.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

'''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

n/a

=== Learning content ===

'''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

The foundation is an international foundation that has experience in the management of different kinds of PPP. The legal team most likely has some experience in establishing some sorts of PPP.

Concerning the construction of the building, Renzo Piano, the architect hired by the foundation, is one of the top names in sustainable construction. The SNFCC was inspired by other international large-scale certificated LEED Platinum (including the Water+Life Museum, USA; Clinton Presidential Library, USA; Vestas Technology Center, Denmark; Taipei 101, Taiwan; Park Ventures, Thailand) (Naturvation_04: 46). The intervention is then a matter of elite expertise and know-how, though it did happen as a closed process.

Overall, both regarding the PPP procedure and the construction, it seems that the foundation operated on its own with its own resources and knowledge without necessarily involving the municipality: “I don't think there was a lot of back and forth with the local authorities” (Interview with P.).

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

'''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''

Nothing about governance arrangements.

However, regarding sustainable construction, the infrastructure has been adapted to the local context i.e. a Mediterranean environment. For instance, the park is landscaped with plants specifically adapted to the Mediterranean climate (e.g. do not require a lot of water) (interview with p.).

'''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''

There was not really a learning process since the potential obstacle (i.e. the legal complexity of the PPP agreement) was overcome internally by the foundation.

'''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''

Importing knowledge by employing people specifically qualified and recognized in the field (of sustainable construction).

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

'''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The potential of the project is to launch a dynamic of innovation in the area and to pledge local actors to consider the PPP.

From the perspective of the SNF, the SNFCC is “a role model of environmental sustainability across 3 dimensions: environmentally friendly design and construction, environmentally friendly operations, biodiversity & local ecosystem enhancement” and achieved a LEED Platinum certification (i.e. a sustainable label (Naturvation_04: 44). However, nothing is mentioned about transferability of the project. What is a “global role model”? Is that only inspirational?

Replicability however is mentioned in relation with the type of PPP: “SNFCC can serve as a model for future cooperation between public & private initiative in similar projects” (Naturvation_04: 65).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

The context is not specified. This could take place in any major city (capable of hosting such big cultural institutions).

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferring the model of PPP is made by the SNF.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

The prerequisite of establishing such a project (including the use of innovative techniques) is to find private funds (Naturvation_05: 4). However, the document highlights that “this prerequisite (generous funds from a private actor) is however not easily replicated in other projects”.

In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the risks and the loss of autonomy of the Greek State. It seem this kind of governance arrangement will not occur in a city or country having a robust or healthy financial situation because no public actor will accept the terms offered by the foundation: “I think that the fact that it happened in Greece in a moment of crisis was very key to the way things happen” (Interview with P.).

'''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>

n/a

'''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''

“Neighbouring municipalities have started to explore ways of capitalizing on the new project (the SNFCC) to attract development funding” (Naturvation_05: 4).

== j) Structural learning ==

'''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

'''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''

n/a

'''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''

For the researcher that studies the project, it is important to highlight that it is a donation under non-negotiable legal terms. It is a very special form of PPP: “it's like a kind of temporary or a donation but a final outcome of state responsibility” (interview with P.).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bringing sustainable infrastructure to all - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T14:01:57Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Bringing sustainable infrastructure to all - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships to Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

#REDIRECT [[Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships]]

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T14:01:57Z

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona | case]]

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

'''How might a city create this future?'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

'''What are the dangers in giving away responsibility to private actors?'''

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

'''What can we learn from this?'''

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

== Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens |'''Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens''']] that has inspired this scenario. In Athens, a public-private partnership was established to create a sustainable infrastructure hosting a cultural center. However, such partnership established in a context of austerity gives a lot of decision-making power to private investors at the expense of public authorities and it at risk of privatization publicly owned space.

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]].

It relates to some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]].
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]].
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]].

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T14:01:32Z

Romane Joly: /* Do you want to learn more about this scenario? */

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona | case]]

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

'''How might a city create this future?'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

'''What are the dangers in giving away responsibility to private actors?'''

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

'''What can we learn from this?'''

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

== Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens |'''Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens''']] that has inspired this scenario. In Athens, a public-private partnership was established to create a sustainable infrastructure hosting a cultural center. However, such partnership established in a context of austerity gives a lot of decision-making power to private investors at the expense of public authorities and it at risk of privatization publicly owned space.

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]].

It relates to some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]].
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]].
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]].

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T14:01:15Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona | case]]

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

'''How might a city create this future?'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

'''What are the dangers in giving away responsibility to private actors?'''

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

'''What can we learn from this?'''

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

== Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens |'''Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens''']] that has inspired this scenario. In Athens, a public-private partnership was established to create a sustainable infrastructure hosting a cultural center. However, such partnership established in a context of austerity gives a lot of decision-making power to private investors at the expense of public authorities and it at risk of privatization publicly owned space.

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]]. This approach refers to solutions for urban sustainability that are inspired and supported by nature, which are cost-effective, simultaneously provide environmental, social and economic benefits and help build resilience’.

It relates to some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]].
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]].
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]].

Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona

2021-01-04T13:48:43Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation]].

== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

'''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''

This is about the creation of Superblocks in Barcelona, a mobility concept that tries to restructure the city in 503 so-called Superblocks, lowering the amount of cars and returning public functions such as leisure and neighborhood activities to city streets.
Each of the 503 Superblocks will be different in its exact structure as they will be adapted to neighbourhood contexts.

The first Superblock in Barcelona was established in Ciutat Vella (El Born) in 1993 and in Vila de Gràcia in 2003 (SMARTEES_01: A114)
Between 2012 - 2015 the Superblock Programme started with four pilot areas in:
*La Maternitat i Sant Ramón, in Les Corts
*Sants-Hostrafrancs, in Sants-Montjuïc
*DiagonalPoblenou, in Sant Martí,
*Esquerra de l’Eixample, in Eixample (Ajuntament_01: 21)

From 2016 to 2019, the large-scale Municipal Action Plan, “Let's fill the streets with life. The implementation of the Superblock Model in Barcelona” (Ajuntament_01: 1) continued to work on creating and implementing Superblocks. They worked in other areas in the city, piloting the program such in the Poblenou neighborhood.

'''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''

Mobility and transport.

'''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''

The municipality of Barcelona summarizes the strategic goals of the intervention in four points (Ajuntament_01: 25f).:
*Improving the habitability of public spaces
This is about boosting the use of public spaces (e.g for children, meeting, resting etc.) by prioritizing pedestrians, increasing traffic reduced areas, promoting new uses of public spaces, and improving attraction and comfort of those spaces.

*Moving towards more sustainable mobility
The goal is a healthy, low-carbon model of traffic with less noise and exhaust pollution. This is done by reducing motorized vehicles in general, promoting alternative fuels in the transport sector, and switching to more efficient means of transport.

*Increasing and improving urban greenery and biodiversity
This is about generally increasing green areas, creating micro-habitats for birds and other species, ensuring a broad variety of plants, and making the ground permeable for water. Also community managed green areas are promoted to increase public interest and participation.

*Promoting public participation and joint responsibility
The aim is to open up the process as much as possible to ensure participation in city and territory approaches.

As its main goal, the reclamation of public spaces, currently occupied by private cars, for and by residents stands at the core of this intervention. It is about “filling the streets with life again”. (Ajuntament_01: 1f.)

'''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''

The initial Superblock Programme took place from 2012 to 2015. The Municipal Action Plan lasted from 2016 to 2019. The longterm goal is to create up to 503 Superblocks (SMARTEES_01: A114).

'''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''

Government - led.

'''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref>

A) The intervention has been implemented and studied on a district as well as a city-wide level
B) There are EU-funded studies concerning the intervention
C) The intervention aims at sustainable as well as just goals
D) It is very well documented (project materials, research, media)

'''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''

SMARTEES (2019): Deliverable 3.1. Report about profiles of social innovation “in action” for each cluster [https://local-social-innovation.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Deliverables/SMARTEES-D3.1_SI_in_Action_R1.pdf]

Barcelona (2016). Government measure: Let's fill streets with life. Establishing Superblocks in Barcelona. Commission for Ecology, Urban Planning and Mobility, Council of Barcelona. [https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/ecologiaurbana/sites/default/files/en_gb_MESURA%20GOVERN%20SUPERILLES.pdf]

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

'''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

It has been studied by SMARTEES - Social Innovation Modelling Approaches to Realizing Transition to Energy Efficiency and Sustainability - from 2018-2021 [https://local-social-innovation.eu/] as well as GREENLULUS - Green Locally Unwanted Land Uses - from 2016 - 2021 [http://www.bcnuej.org/projects/greenlulus/].

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

Energy and Mobility solutions.
It is also about the ideas concerning rights to the city, as it wants to free up public space currently taken by cars.
It could also fit into Nature-based solutions as some affected spaces are "greened".

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes [https://local-social-innovation.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Deliverables/SMARTEES-D3.1_SI_in_Action_R1.pdf]

'''9. Problematization and priority:'''

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

Exclusion of residents from public spaces and the loss of public spaces in general is the fundamental inequality that the municipality of Barcelona addresses through this intervention (Ajuntament_01: 2).

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is not explicitly mentioned, although it is definitely a driver behind returning the rights to streets to its residents.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

'''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''

The municipality of Barcelona.

'''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''

Residents as well as other citizens visiting the areas who may be looking for public spaces to let their children play safely, relax, etc.. (Ajuntament_01: 1f.).

'''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
| X
| Different universities, other expert institutions.
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
|
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
| X
| Biciclot SCCL - a bicycle workshop in Poblenou which supported the implementation of the Superblock in Poblenou and who have joined the working group.
|-
| Platforms
| X
| There are citizen platforms which are in favor of their particular neighbourhood Superblock e.g “Col·lectiu Superilla Poblenou”<ref>https://superillap9.wordpress.com.</ref> in Poblenou or in Camp d´en Grassot<ref>https://superillagrassot.wordpress.com.</ref> which have argued in favor of Superblocks as a way to reduce private vehicle circulation.

|-
| NGOs
| X
| TaulaEix Pere IV supported the Superblock in Poblenou and have also joined the working group.
|-
| Social movements
| X
| It seems that there are different strong movements in favor and against Superblocks, which are mostly in regards to the effects on the district/neighbourhood level and any perceived positive/negative outcomes of Superblocks (rather than the city plan in general).
The most controversial debate seems to be going on in Poblenou with strong opinions on both sides.
|-
| Political parties
| X
| The pilot projects were initially launched by the conservative party “Convergència i Unió”. After 2015´s election the new left party “Barcelona en Comú” is leading the city in a coalition with other left parties. They are giving the program continuity. Opposition comes from “Partido Popular” who defend the priority of private car use.
There are also opposition parties in favor of the concept.
|-
| Media
| X
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Consultancies provide support in the development of measures for each Superblock as well as guidance with participation processes.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| Municipality initiated the intervention and several city council departments are working on it. Primarily, the mobility and urban design departments of the local administration.
The local government formed a technical secretariat which is leading the program.
Furthermore district administrations are playing a counseling role and members (which can also be members of the local political parties) sometimes are actively part of the district working group providing expertise etc.

Moreover, the Catalan government and the public authorities “Metropolitan Area of Barcelona “and the “Metropolitan Transport Authority” are involved with the formulation of the programme on the city level.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
|
|
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Urban Ecology Agency: a consortium of the City Council of Barcelona, the Municipal Council and Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, and the Barcelona Provincial Council. Its role is to diagnose every neighbourhood where Superblocks are implemented and to aid with technical solutions that could improve the neighbourhoods' sustainability.
|}

'''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''

In several neighbourhoods, multi-stakeholder decision making processes have been formalized in local, regular working groups that are steering the design for their Superblocks. This was a result of the lack of participation processes in Poblenou and the municipality retroactively realizing that individual Superblocks have to be adapted to local peculiarities. The working groups also serve promotional purposes e.g, presenting the Municipal Action Plan to residents and engaging citizens, local associations, and local economy. They also try to find agreements between different voices and stakeholder interests (SMARTEES_01: A121).

'''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''

Citizen participation happens at the neighbourhood level within the city-wide plan to implement Superblocks. There is a standard procedure for involving different stakeholders and citizens that is followed for each Superblock. It can be characterized in nine distinctive steps (SMARTEES_01: A120):
*Definition and analysis of the area
*Internal work by the Technical Secretariat
*Technical work with the districts
*Work with the Promotional Group
*Participation of specific groups
*Participation of local residents
*Approval of Action Plan
*Drafting projects with suitable protocol and participation according to type of initiative
*Implementing the initiatives
The process itself is the same over the different districts, but the approval ratings from citizens and their view on their respective Superblock varies for each context. The implementation of a Superblock itself did not seem to be up for debate, as it was integrated into the Urban Mobility Plan, but rather was more controversial in how it could be implemented.
The municipality defines its general establishment process of Superblocks in two bigger phases: ''add the graphs''

Over the course of the project, participation became increasingly open and informal, as resistance in some neighbourhoods led to adaptations in the process. The Technical Secretariat designed this participatory process in the beginning, but politicians were too eager to start implementing the program and started implementation in Poblenou without any kind of participation process (Interview_6:01). When the city council decided on making the first physical changes in Poblenou, they were met with public outrage. This steered the project in a more participatory direction and was crucial for key learnings of this project. (Interview_6:05)

The meeting minutes and a protocol for the deliberative process and public meetings are published on the website of the municipality for transparency (SMARTEES_01: 45).

'''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''

The city of Barcelona always had leadership over the whole project. The Technical Secretariat (see Q. 22; Q24) is in charge of the Superblock Programme, which includes only three or four public servants (members of the city council) as well as people from urban designing/planning companies (Interview). Therefore, it relies on the help of different consultants, which provide support in defining the measures to be implemented (SMARTEES_01: 44).

The Urban Ecology Agency has a key role in the project because of its charismatic leader Salvador Rueda (SMARTEES_01: A122). In fact, the idea of Superblocks originates from Salvador Rueda (TheGuardian_01). Especially in the beginning, the Urban Ecology Agency was very important in designing the Superblocks, but now they perform ecological diagnoses of the areas for new Superblocks.

Launched by the City Council, local actors, neighbourhood stakeholders, and citizens are involved in a co-designing process to develop the action plan that “should be” approved by the district political body (SMARTEES_01: A122). These processes are formalized in local working groups where different stakeholders can participate and which presents the Local Action Plan to the neighbourhood (SMARTEES_01: A121).

'''16. Exclusion:'''

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Citizens at the earliest stages (see q.14).

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

In Poblenou, politicians wanted to implement changes to the neighbourhood without waiting for a participation process, which was being designed at the time by the Technical Secretariat. The missing participation resulted in local resistance from the neighbourhood. In response, the project participation became increasingly open and informal to accommodate citizens more.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

'''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''

One of the main issues was that streets had lost many of their traditional functions, i.e. as spaces for children's games, local resident gatherings, strolls, resting, financial exchanges, sport, culture, and protests, because they had developed into spaces only used for transit. Additional issues identified over the previous decades included rising air-pollution levels, traffic noise, road-accident rates, a lack of greenery, and overall decline in citizens' quality of life. (Ajuntament_01: 7).
Barcelona had developed different integrated plans to tackle these issues and additionally embedded them into global issues such as climate change and loss of biodiversity. Superblocks are thus one of the measures of a systematic change of Barcelona.
SMARTEES (01: 42) reported that a critical attitude towards the management of environmental issues in their city started with people from the municipality participating in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Summit) in 1992. Environmental awareness and a holistic management strategy for ecological issues in the city were among key drivers of the Superblock Programme.

'''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''

Very important for the implementation of the Superblocks is the so called “Citizen Commitment for Sustainability,” which was first signed in 2002 by over 800 organizations (large and small enterprises, community groups, professional associations, political parties and educational institutions). It was evaluated and renewed in 2012, leading to the “Citizen Commitment for Sustainability 2012-2022”. (SMARTEES_01: A123).
The goal of this commitment is to improve people's life in the city, in the process improving participation and implementing small-scale interventions. Superblocks are one of several actions that are defined in the document and thereby receive additional support.
In general, Superblocks are connected to different policies besides the Municipal Action Plan e.g. the Barcelona Mobility Pact (1998), which over 30 mobility-linked organizations have formalized and to which over 100 have signed to improve sustainable mobility (SMARTEES_01: A121); the Urban Mobility Plan of Barcelona (2013-2018); the Green Infrastructure and Biodiversity Plan (until 2020); and the Barcelona Commitment to Climate (Ajuntament_01: 22f.), which adopts a common strategy to move toward a unified vision for comprehensive change.

Superblocks are therefore embedded in holistic city-wide changes as well as municipal policies (regulatory, informative, and voluntary frameworks) (See Appendix 1).

'''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''

Spain is a decentralized state that comprises of three levels of governance: central, regional, and local, and is divided into Provinces and Municipalities (Art. 137 of the Constitution).

Provinces and Municipalities (and Autonomous Communities) run their respective affairs autonomously, which is ensured by Art. 137

Municipalities have considerable authority and decision - making power that is important for the implementation of Superblocks. For example, municipalities with over 50.000 inhabitants are in charge of “Collective urban transportation” and “Urban environmental protection” (CorSpain).

'''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''

The eagerness to start “constructing” Superblocks without talking to residents about any of the changes in Poblenou led to a fundamental change of their implementation in other areas of the city and in the general participatory process.

'''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''

The total budget for the Superblock Programme between 2016 and 2019 (“Let´s fill streets with life. Establishing Superblocks in Barcelona”) was 11 million Euros (Ajuntament_01: 40). The cost of the Superblock project in Sant Antoni is 7 million Euros. It is estimated that the implementation of all Superblocks in Barcelona would cost less than 100 million euros (SMARTEES_01: A117).

'''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''

As mentioned, the Technical Secretariat that was formed because of resistance in Poblenou (see Q.24) is now in charge of the project. This improved communication between residents and the government, and assisted in reorganizing the whole process in a better way.

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

'''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

Most issues are about legitimacy and public awareness and not so much about regulatory framework issues.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Fears of gentrification have arisen, as the process might transform neighbourhoods into “trendy places” (SMARTEES_01: 47).
Perceived safety issues were also raised, especially during late night hours when Superblocks become “deserted” and are frequented by young people drinking on the streets.
In addition, the project in Poblenou apparently led to a sharp drop in merchant sales in the neighbourhood (SMARTEES_01: A128).
Finally, because of unchanged habits in personal vehicle use, traffic on perimeter streets has remained the same. This also relates to insufficient public transport for commuters (ebd.).

*'''c. Public awareness'''

The Superblock in Poblenou was started without any kind of participatory process: the first physical changes in the neighbourhood were done “on a weekend”, which led to a lot of neighbourhood resistance (Interview_7:51)

Groups that emerged in 2016 from different neighbourhoods called the Superblocks unrealistic in a city the size of Barcelona. They warned of a widespread collapse of the city if Superblocks continued to be built, and referred to the then (from their perspective) increasing pollution levels.
In Sant Marti, resistance groups also criticized missing information and the mobility chaos of the Superblock perimeter. It has also been criticized that the urban configuration itself has not changed at all and only feels provisional (SMARTEES_01:46)

Of 1739 residents who voted in May 2017 in a consultation promoted by the Plataforma d'Afectats of the Superilla de Poblenou (a platform against the Superblock in Poblenou), 87% voted against its implementation in their district (SMARTEES_01: 46).

*'''d. Finances'''

The project in general is deemed a low-cost solution. However investment was more substantial for some Superblocks, such as that in Saint-Antoni, because some roads and sidewalks had to be newly constructed.
Some critique called for more investment by the city councils, as they were skeptical that low-cost solutions could be truly beneficial (SMARTEES_01: 47).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The implementation of Superblocks is taking far longer than expected and it still only involves small parts of the city . This is partially due to the participatory processes that were adapted by the municipality after facing resistance in Poblenou. These processes involve multiple stakeholders operating in local working groups to co-design Superblocks in each neighbourhood (see Q. 24). According to one technician, there are “about 100 areas already pacified, where Superblocks could be created quickly and without social contestation.” (SMARTEES_01: A127).

In a few cases, the local district council acted against the implementation of their Superblock, thus strengthening project resistance (SMARTEES_01: A129).

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

'''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Citizen resistance in Poblenou
| Municipality adopted a post-intervention participatory process and engaged in dialogue with resident associations and institutions (e.g schools, kindergartens) in order to improve their plans (getting insights from residents about which streets to reopen for traffic etc.) (Interview)
|-
| Citizen resistance in Poblenou
| Local working groups were created to steer the process for each neighborhood, wheich would co-design with residents and local actors to improve legitimacy in other areas and give residents more agency. (Interview)
|-
| Different fears of negative consequences of Superblocks by residents (e.g. unsafety at night ..)
| The municipality is conducting Measurements/Surveys and empirical research in existing Superblocks to gain insights about the interventions' impact, the results of which they can present to residents of other potential Superblocks. This can help in breaking misperceptions about negative consequences. The SMARTEES team is currently conducting research on the topic of safety at night in Poblenou, along with general perceptions about Superblocks elsewhere (Interview)
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

'''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''

This programme proves that is not always necessary to implement huge changes nor invest large sums of money in order to improve the quality of life in a city. Small-scale or low-cost actions are sometimes just as effective and far easier to implement.

Observed outcomes include (SMARTEES_01: A125):
*Habitability: 25,129 m2 of new public space without cars have been gained, 349 benches have been installed, 2,483 m2 of playgrounds for children have been created.
*Mobility: The number of cars that access the streets on a daily basis has gone down from 2,218 to 932 vehicles / day. The area for pedestrians has increased by 80%, and the area for cars reduced by 48%. Unregulated car parking spaces have decreased (from 401 to 74) while cyclist meters have increased.
*Green spaces and biodiversity: The green area has increased by 91% from 9,722 m2 to 18,632 m2. 176 units of trees have been planted.
*Economic activity: The number of economic activities on the ground floor has gone up from 65 to 85.
*Public housing: A public housing building is being constructed in the central area of the Superblock by the Municipal Housing Trust.

Equally as important are observed changes in the lifestyles of residents (SMARTEES_01: A126). Several residents have reported an increase in the personal use of bikes while reducing use of private cars/motorbikes. Biking has become a trend as it is perceived safer with the lower numbers of cars around.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

'''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

The municipality mentions that the implementation of Superblocks builds on several city-wide plans from the past such as the:
*Cerdà Plan
*County Plan (1953)
*The General Metropolitan Plan (1977) - the “current framework”
*The Street Plan (1986)
*Re-developments of Portal de l’Àngel and Plaça de la Catedral
*The Mobility Plan for Vila de Gràcia (2003) (Ajuntament_01: 8f.)

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

The municipality reports that taming the passage of cars based on blocks is not a new idea. Other examples can be seen in:
*proposals for neighbourhood units
*ideas for environmental areas and traffic management published by English engineer Colin Buchanan<ref>Bianconi M., Tewdwr-Jones M. (2013): The form and organisation of urban areas: Colin Buchanan and Traffic in Towns 50 years on. In: The Town planning review 84(3):313-336.</ref>.
*the woonerfs in the Netherlands<ref>https://www.naturespath.com/en-us/blog/woonerf-the-dutch-solution-to-city-planning/.</ref>.

Barcelona was the first city to implement Superblocks, but today the idea is very common across Spain. There is a lot of exchange about the implementation of Superblocks between cities. Barcelona has an especially strong inter-city partnership with Vitoria-Gasteiz, which has a Superblock Programme (SUMP - Sustainable Mobility Plan) that is reorganizing the city in 77 Superblocks. This plan started after Barcelona's, in 2008 and will end in 2023 (SMARTEES_01: A95).
Both cities are continuing to support each other through ii) legitimacy, iii) knowledge sharing, learning and peer support. Barcelona profits from the experiences learned in Vitoria-Gasteiz (SMARTEES_01: A109).

=== Learning content ===

'''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

Technical knowledge about how to physically change the existing structure of blocks was originally implemented in the Cerdà Plan (19th century).

Numerous experiences on how to reclaim space for pedestrians have been reported useful to the intervention, especially those based on developments from the Street Plan of 1986 (Ajuntament_01: 10). Much like the current debates surrounding Superblocks, during the first re-developments of Portal de l’Àngel and Plaça de la Catedral, merchants were worried that making streets only accessible to pedestrians would lead to a drop in sales (Ajuntament_01:10).
Learning to respond to resistance against implementation with process adaptation instead of halting the project was critical.

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

It is difficult to measure the exact content and learnings from partnerships with other cities, as exchanges are rather informal but steadily happening.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

From the implementation of the intervention itself:
The municipality had to learn the importance of providing enough, place-specific and reliable data about the proposals for each neighbourhood. This is important to break any misperceptions and better communicate the benefits of the project.
In addition, it is crucial to connect the Superblock proposal with the overall ambitions to tackle specific issues on a city-wide scale (SMARTEES_01: 48).

Furthermore the ability to adapt certain parts of the Superblock invtervention in cooperation with stakeholders from different fields and local residents has been one of the key learnings for the municipality (Interview_31:05).

Best practices about participatory processes have been developed based on experiences (especially in coping with resistances) include:
*engaging people in deliberative processes
*information and communication strategies and channels
*the use of ICT technologies (e.g., GIS maps) for illustrating main changes proposed at the neighbourhood level
*maintaining a coherent discourse and practice
*building trust to accomplish goals while being open to peoples proposals (SMARTEES_01: A123).

Janet Sanz, a city councillor and today's “Deputy Mayor for Ecology, Urban Planning and Mobility” stressed that "listening to the neighbourhood has been the main learning of this project” (El Periodico).

=== Learning process ===

'''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''

In order to reduce conflict and resistance, the Technical Secretariat (in Poblenou):
*Created new channels for communication
*Improved participatory process (citizens were invited to formulate improvements in the design of the Superblocks)
*Entered into a negotiation process between supporters and critics of the intervention

This lead to the implementation of certain changes, such as preventing private vehicles and public transport from entering Superblocks.

The Technical Secretariat also became important in communicating with other cities, as it reportedly gave advice and shared knowledge with representatives from New York and Copenhagen (SMARTEES_01: 50).

'''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''

The resistance in Poblenou fundamentally changed the way in which Superblocks are implemented. As a critical point, newly created local working groups give residents and other stakeholders the platform to express issues and co-create their neighbourhood (Interview). Speculatively, this might also change the way other projects in Barcelona could be designed in the future, although it is still too early to measure this (Interview).

'''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''

*Face-to-Face meetings (all actors)
*Field visits / meeting the locals (Workshops organized by city council with city technicians, politicians and residents) (SMARTEES_01: A119).

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

'''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

Barcelona's Superblock program recognized internationally; many other cities are in contact with Barcelona to learn from their experience.
Barcelona has received a lot of media attention over the last couple of years from e.g The New York Times (2016)<ref>http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/nyregion/what-new-york-can-learn-from-barcelonas-superblocks.html?_r=1.</ref>, The Guardian (2019<ref>https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/sep/10/barcelonas-car-free-superblocks-could-save-hundreds-of-lives.</ref>), El Pais (2018)<ref>https://elpais.com/ccaa/2018/09/29/catalunya/1538246791_684437.html .</ref>, Deutschlandfunk (2016)<ref>https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/superblocks-in-barcelona.</ref>, Die Zeit (2018<ref> https://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/2018-04/barcelona-verkehr-problem-autofahrer-smart-data.</ref>) or very extensively from VOX<ref>https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/9/18300797/barcelona-spain-superblocks-urban-plan.</ref>.

The New York Times and Vox are suggesting possibilities to replicate the Superblock idea, the New York Times article is called “What New York Can Learn From Barcelona’s ‘Superblocks’” (NewYorkTimes_01). Similarly, VOX is suggesting the possible replicability of the Superblock idea in Portland, Oregon. An interviewee from Bloomberg Associates sees potential in Washington, DC, New York City, San Francisco, and Chicago as they already have grid patterns, walkable blocks, and suffer from air and noise pollution. She also sees potential in several smaller cities, as “just about every city or town has some central area with remnants of a block pattern”(VOX_02).

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Districts and city-wide plans, dense cities.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

Media, urban planners, researchers.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

VOX mentions different limits to transferability, especially in regards to US cities:
*Cities tend to be too wide and focused around interstates and freeways
*Missing density and walkability
*Missing short, regular blocks, orthogonal streets, and mixed-use zoning
*Missing familiarity with urban transformations and civic pride (VOX_02). Americans are so accustomed to the absence of walkable and accessible public spaces they barely can express what they are missing.

These factors are especially prominent in the US but can be applied to a lot of European cities, as well.

Also interesting is the relationship between the suburbs and hurdles to reduce cars on the roads:
Suburbs with clear property borders and separated dwellings means less density, less walkability, and slower and less frequent public transport. This leads to a dependance on private vehicles as a predominant form of mobility.

The idea of vibrant, public spaces then does not really work if there is not sufficient density around them: “They become internal tourist destinations, places residents drive to visit” (VOX_02).

'''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>

SMARTEES has a large report on all kinds of issues related to the implementation of Superblocks. There is specific section on “Critical issues and How Critical issues have been overcome” (SMARTEES_01: 45f); as well as specific stories (an extra info box) that show how exactly certain project processes developed e.g resistance in Poblenou (SMARTEES_01: A129f.).
As mentioned, there is also a lot of media coverage around Barcelona's implementation of Superblocks, which have reported how other cities could learn from the challenges Barcelona faced (NewYorkTimes_01).

SMARTEES is actively trying to build networks between Barcelona and other Spanish cities and thereby creating ways to formalize learning and sharing. SMARTEES wants to develop policy scenario workshops where cities can discuss next steps for future Superblock interventions (Vitoria-Gasteiz and Barcelona will be part of these workshops). The goal is to bring researchers and actors from the cities together to discuss lessons learned, strategize on alternative approaches, and find best practices to transfer that knowledge to future implementations.

'''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''

Within Spain, the idea of Superblocks is spreading to other topologically diverse cities such as A Coruña, Ferrol,Viladecans and El Prat (SMARTEES_01: A49).

SMARTEES report that representatives of New York and Copenhagen have already visited Barcelona and are advised by the Technical Secretariat (SMARTEES_01: 50).

Other cities in the world such as Melbourne, Toronto, Lisbon, Quito, Buenos Aires are also interested in the Superblock Programme and are in contact with the Agencia de Ecologia Urbana. Seattle is also reportedly considering implementing its first Superblock, which was brought to the table by Seattle Councilwoman Teresa Mosqueda (CapitolHill_01).

A lot of other cities in the world (from Japan, China, India, South Korea, Canada, Ecuador, Mexico and Moscow) have requested information on Superblocks (SMARTEES_01: 50).

== j) Structural learning ==

'''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The Superblock model developed a new strategy to facilitate public participation, pursuing co-responsibility as one of the core strategies of the programme (SMARTEES_01: 43). Other long-term consequences are not yet foreseeable, as this project only started relatively recently and will be ongoing for several years.
It will be interesting to see if there are going to be institutional changes because of the Superblocks Programme. SMARTEES is trying to evaluate these as part of their project.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

'''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''

Barcelona has a long history public engagement and has formal structures for participation in place, such as the Conseils de Barri (SMARTEES_01: 43) (VOX_02).

'''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''

This intervention shows how important it is to be able to adapt existing plans to local contexts.
There could possibly be long-term changes in the way the municipality interacts with residents for different programmes beyond Superblocks. Therefore, the lessons learned from the Superblock intervention could be a critical moment of change for the city (Interview).

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Database of governance arrangements

2021-01-04T13:47:48Z

Romane Joly: /* Governance interventions */

Across Europe there is an inspiring array of experimentation with local governance arrangements for just and sustainable cities.

What is '''governance'''? It can be broadly understood as all formal and informal political processes (involving state and non-state actors) that lead to collective action.

On this database, you will find the summaries of results of a study on fruitful governance interventions for sustainable and just cities.

Would you like to get involved? We've asked some questions in the following sections, and you can share your suggestions with us via email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]]. If you haven't already, please feel free to join the [[UrbanA Community of Practice]].

 '''DISCLAIMER: This page is currently under review! More detail to follow shortly.'''

== Enabling governance arrangements ==

Enabling governance arrangements are combinations of actor constellations and institutional settings that have proven a potential to support urban governance towards just and sustainable cities in several cases of real-world (Governance Interventions)

Looking at a selection of eleven situated governance interventions for sustainable and just cities (as summarized in our scenarios), we asked:

''What key elements of governance arrangements enabled those interventions to come to fruition?''

You can find background information on eleven original, real-world governance interventions, our empirical basis, in our database of rich descriptions (for more information, please refer to the section methodology).

You will see references to these interventions in the form of brief examples to illustrate each enabling governance arrangement. The question numbers accompanying the examples, like ''“(Q18)”'', will lead you to the pertinent section of the respective description of a real world governance intervention.

We assume that the enabling governance arrangements were aimed at sustainable and just outcomes, which makes it likely that they can be useful for interventions with similar goals in other instances as well. However, we do not claim that these enabling arrangements are the sole factors for bringing interventions to fruition, as the latter will always be embedded in local contexts with place-based factors being important as well.

When clicking on one of the enabling governance arrangement A) - D) below, you will learn about the ambition this each enabling governance arrangement as well as about the scenarios and detailed descriptions of governance experiments it relates.

[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]

[[B) Make space for adaptation and experimentation]]

[[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]

[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]

[[E) Tap into existing community networks]]

[[F) Develop resilient, and self-sufficient financing arrangements]]

Which further enabling governance arrangement do you consider crucial on the way towards governance for sustainability AND justice in cities?

== Governance interventions ==

We have selected eleven real-word experiments (mostly within EU-funded projects) and developed '''detailed descriptions''' which detail their governance variables and processes. We have also created a brief '''governance scenario''' per case studied. These scenarios share general insights in a narrative style, and we hope that they pique your interest and provide inspiration about what could be possible in your city!

We stress that the interventions presented below (the detailed descriptions and the corresponding scenarios) - '''are not exemplary “successful interventions”'''. Rather, they are regarded as '''general inspiration''' and real-world cases for testing out how to enable translocal learning.

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center; background-color:#efefef;"
! Detailed governance intervention descriptions
! Brief governance scenarios
|-
| 1.[[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome]]
| 1.[[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]]
|-
| 2.[[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin]]
| 2.[[Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing]]
|-
| 3.[[Community led affordable housing in Brussels]]
| 3.[[A new take on affordable housing through community owned and developed dwellings]]
|-
| 4.[[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]]
| 4.[[Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation]]
|-
| 5.[[Biodiversity protection and social justice in the Barcelona Natural Park]]
| 5.[[Negotiating green space development: balancing long-term sustainability and short-term social needs]]
|-
| 6.[[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg]]
| 6.[[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]]
|-
| 7.[[Inner-city community energy in London]]
| 7.[[From electricity to empowerment, community energy growing out of the inner-city]]
|-
| 8.[[Holistic neighbourhood development Augustenborg]]
| 8.[[Overcoming compartmentalization in urban regeneration projects for inclusive sustainability and resilience]]
|-
| 9.[[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]]
| 9.[[Creating a sustainable energy system - a citizen-driven transformation]]
|-
| 10.[[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam]]
| 10.[[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]]
|}

=== Example of a partially successful governance intervention ===

In addition to our 10 fruitful governance interventions for sustainability and justice in cities (see above), we developed a [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens| rich description]] and a [[ Bringing sustainable infrastructure to all - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships|scenario]] of a governance intervention that demonstrates possible pitfalls when developing sustainable infrastructure in a public-private partnership. This intervention outlines the always partial success of governance intervention and encourages to be caution about the externalities of public-private partnerships, especially in a context of austerity affecting southern-estern European countries.

Template for developing further descriptions: [[Rich description template]]

== Methodology ==

''(Coming soon)''

Inviting citizens to a transformation of street space - flexibly dealing with resistance

2021-01-04T13:47:16Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Inviting citizens to a transformation of street space - flexibly dealing with resistance to Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation

#REDIRECT [[Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation]]

Reclaiming Street Space: Cooperation for Neighbourhood Transformation

2021-01-04T13:47:15Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Inviting citizens to a transformation of street space - flexibly dealing with resistance to Reclaiming street space: cooperation for neighbourhood transformation

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world case: [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]]

[[File:Superblock picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine your city's streets not being dominated by cars but by people. Streets are a place of social gatherings, a place where children play and neighbours meet, a place of interaction, where they are urban hotspots!'''

How can we get there?

Reaching this reality would mean to largely rethink our transport and mobility system (Q3). In many places, cars are the dominating mode of transport, which is leading to air and noise pollution, accelerating climate change and making urban life less healthy. Combatting these issues is also a matter of justice as poorer people are generally more affected by environmental degradation, pollution and the effects of climate change. Additionally, streets right now mainly serve as transport routes, but have lost social functions that they have once had (Q9).. Giving streets their old functions back also means targeting injustices created by urban intensification and the unjust effects of a weak civil society such as the exclusion of marginalized groups in urban governance.

How could a municipality address these problems?. Who would municipal actors need to work with, who would they have to include?

It seems like a complete overhaul of such a deep-rooted problem would necessitate working together with all kinds of local stakeholders be it local businesses, NGOs or academia (Q12) but especially crucial seems to have local residents on board (Q13) . Such a city-wide transformation would also have to adapt to local particularities. Formalised local working groups that regularly meet and are responsible for designing the process in each neighbourhood could give citizens responsibility and power over their neighbourhood while also including a variety of other actors that want to participate (Q13, Q15). For this to work, it is necessary that municipalities safeguard their power to govern their local transport system (Q19). Additionally, connecting the process to other local level sustainable development policies and agreements in different sectors can give the project legitimacy and help develop holistic visions for comprehensive change (Q18). The better integrated specific solutions are into bigger developments of change, the easier it is to believe in grand opportunities of change and the power of a shared vision! (Q19) If this happens, sustainable developments may be achievable even with comparatively little extra spending (Q21).

In what ways can municipalities deal with and learn from potential local resistance?

As this process hinges upon working together with citizens, it is crucial that citizens feel they are an integral part of it. Still, municipality-led processes might encounter local resistance, potentially because residents do not believe in the effectiveness of the process and its ability to change the current situation or because they fear potential negative consequences (Q23). For example, some may question whether public transport can provide enough capacity to cushion the reduction of private car usage or worry that commuting to work would take too long (Q23). To address such concerns, it may be important to tackle the substance of such problems, but it could also be important to change the process, especially how participation is organised (Q24).

Why should municipalities look at similar projects in the past to ensure more just participation in the future?

Looking at learning outcomes from past projects in your own city can further help the process in overcoming obstacles. This might mean that experiences from past policies in similar sectors, for example making streets more pedestrian-friendly can prove vital here (Q27). It might even be the case that resistance in the past against other municipality-led projects have voiced the same concerns. This might help in finding solutions for overcoming those obstacles as well as encouraging project proponents to not give up if things do not go as originally planned (Q27). In the end, this general flexibility in how the project has to develop could lead to improved methods of communication and participation in the future (Q28).
Finally, communicating with media about ideas within the project can help pique the interest of other cities and spread knowledge to other urban areas (Q33).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]] that has inspired this scenario.
This intervention is about the municipality in Barcelona

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Energy and Mobility solutions]].
*[[Right to the city (YOU ARE WELCOME TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PAGE!)| Right to the city]].
*[[Nature-based solutions]].

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]].
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]].
*[[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities]]
*[[Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
*[[Weak(ened) civil society]]

Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin

2021-01-04T13:45:41Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing]]

== a) Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

'''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''

The selected intervention is called Foodsharing and specifically focuses on the installation of public fridges in Berlin, Germany. These fridges - or “Fair-Teiler” (derived from the German words “fair” and “verteilen”, “to distribute”) - are dispersed around the city and give people access to free and anonymously shared food. In 2018, the city of Berlin counted around 25 fridges (SHARECITY_02: 202).

The intervention specifically takes place at the capital city level. However, it includes different scales of governance. At the local level, such as a neighbourhood or a city district, public fridges are managed by a local community of food savers. Scaling-up, Foodsharing.de as an organization is structured at national and regional levels and relies on an online platform to connect food-donors to food-recipients.

'''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''

The intervention is implemented in the sector of food. Specifically, it addresses food waste, food security, and food safety issues.

'''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? [If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference]'''

The creation of the public fridges addresses sustainability issues by preventing food waste. By collecting food and sharing it with others, foodsharing attempts to reduce the amount of edible food which is wasted every day. The aim is also to raise awareness about the amount of waste that is generated by our food system. As a food saver in Berlin pointed out during an interview: “of course part of food-sharing is educational” (SHARECITY_02: 209). Demonstrating how perfectly good food is continuously thrown away contributes to politicizing the food issue.

The public fridges also address questions related to justice because they provide relief for food insecurity. In this context, food is understood as a “common good." This refers to resources which are “jointly governed, stewarded and shared by their users” (Ostrom and al. 1999, in SHARECITY 02: 203).

'''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''

Foodsharing.de was created in 2012 and the public fridges were introduced two years later in 2014 (SHARECITY_02: 202). However, due to institutional and organizational constraints (see below) introduced in 2017, many public fridges in Berlin were closed and the access of the remaining ones is restricted.

'''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''

Foodsharing.de is led by non-government actors. Specifically, Foodsharing.de is self-governed by members and based on a hierarchical and distributed governance structure shaped by “trust, sharing and food safety” (SHARECITY_02: 202).

'''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref>

This governance intervention is worthwhile to study and share because it meets the four criteria (mentioned in the footnote). Specifically, it provides an interesting example of non-government led intervention - based on the members’ self-governance - that works quite effectively in itself but faces obstacles related to regulatory framework.

'''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''

Mostly:
*SHARECITY_(01)_Q&A with Anna Davies.Project lead for the *Sharecity project_DANCOX_2019
*SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019
*https://foodsharing.de
*https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Hauptseite
*interview with O. (researcher) (12/06/20)

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

'''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been studied as part of an EU-funded project called SHARECITY (2015-2021). The project aims at identifying and examining practices of city-based food sharing economies, referring to new forms of exchanges which entail, in most cases, environmental and social commitments.

Specifically, food sharing refers to a set of practices that includes eating (consuming), giving food (redistributing), or experiencing activities (eating together) which are done collectively. A database - called Sharecity100 database - maps the food sharing initiatives all around the world (SHARECITY_11). From it, nine cities have been selected for conducting in-depth ethnographic analyses. The intervention of foodsharing.de is a part of the project findings and case study but the organization itself was not created within the framework of SHARECITY.

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention fits under the [[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]. Sharecity project is explicitly mentioned in the database as it shows the transformative potential of food sharing initiatives for sustainable cities.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: SHARECITY_(02)_Sharing food_Berlin case_MORROW 2019

'''9. Problematization and priority:'''

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

The question of inequality and exclusion has been addressed by the founders of foodsharing.de with their intentions to establish food as a “common good”, accessible to everyone, and free from monetary transactions (Fellmer 2014, in SHARECITY_02: 204).

Public fridges also breakdown the boundaries between donors, recipients, and providers. Hence, the aim is to to reduce the stigma of free food and deconstruct power relations and the perpetuation of inequalities often seen in food aid organizations. Indeed, donors and recipients do not need to meet social criteria (i.e. precarity, low incomes…) to share or receive food anonymously. This differs from other food aid organizations such as food banks or the German TAFEL. With the blurring identification of donors and recipients, public fridges step out of the scheme of assistantship and refuse the relation of power and the domination it implies.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

Justice is explicitly pointed out as a major motivation behind the creation of public fridges. Established two years after the creation of foodsharing.de, public fridges address exclusionary issues and make food available to everyone. Both food savers and external recipients can access these public fridges. This is highly valued among food savers (SHARECITY_02: 205).

In addition, public fridges provide opportunities for gathering and reduce social isolation. Indeed, located in public and/or open places (e.g. at the entrance of buildings, often next to community centres), public fridges are suitable for regular encounters. As a food saver recalls: “It (a public fridge) also has a social aspect. Because you often meet people there [...] then you stand there and chat for a bit and it’s totally nice” (SHARECITY_02: 205). Therefore, public fridges contribute to enhance urban sociability and community-building and de-stigmatize free food at the same time.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
| X
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
| X
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

'''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''

The public fridges were initiated by members of Foodsharing.de in Berlin. This community-based intervention is an innovation within the social movement of Foodsharing.de.

It was initiated without institutional support (i.e. urban policies or public food programs) and foodsharing aims to remain outside such institutional framework. <ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20:https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis
</ref>

'''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''

The envisioned benefiters of public fridges are food savers/sharers themselves and any recipients among local inhabitants of Berlin. Public fridges provide access to free food and contribute to community-building among their users. In addition, food companies or retailers also benefit from the intervention because less food they handle is wasted (i.e. ethical dimension) and the costs related to waste disposal are exempted (i.e. economical dimension).

'''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| The members of foodsharing who are responsible for maintaining public fridges.
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
| X
| Food companies and retailers that give unsellable food to food savers.
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
| The Food Safety Authority of Berlin that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.
The Berlin Senate that locally enforces (food safety) regulations.

|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| The German legislator that translates into the national law the European food safety regulations.
|-
| Supranational government
| X
| (To some extent) The European Union that defines the food safety regulation.

|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
|
|
|}

'''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''

The intervention was triggered by the existing Foodsharing network along with other community organizations that were involved in similar social and cultural interventions.

Foodsharing.de provides social resources (i.e. experienced activists in food saving) as well as organizational resources (i.e. the online platform that connects donors to recipients) for establishing public fridges. On the other hand, most public fridges are hosted by other community organizations collaborating with foodsharing and providing space for the fridges (e.g. plugging them into electricity). This network of relationships supports activists eager to set up new public fridges and facilitate the operating of existing ones.

'''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''

The public fridges have been established by the volunteer members of foodsharing.de. Thus, public fridges are a community-based, grassroots initiative. Not only have citizens created foodsharing and installed public fridges, but they also regulate them and are responsible for keeping them running. Public fridges are self-managed systems to share food and are operated without public intervention.

'''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''

Foodsharing.de is hierarchically structured. Specific tasks are attributed to members depending on their position in the structure. These positions entail specific responsibilities that enable to maintain trust within the organization and between the activists as well as to ensure the functioning of foodsharing.de (SHARECITY_13: 66).

The “food sharers”, registered in the platforme, can take food from public dispensers and get acquainted with the project as well as with other activists. As Foodsharing.de aims at being open to everyone, this first level of commitment has a very low threshold.

However, becoming a “food saver” is more exclusive. It entails to have successfully achieved an online questionnaire or quiz about the policy, the ideological stance and the rules of the organization as well as to have attended local meetings. Food saver “applicants” have to take part in several food rescue operations to receive a “FoodSaver passport” which allows them to visit partner companies for picking food. This status entails a high lee of commitment and more responsibilities (SHARECITY_13: 67).

Further hierarchical levels include the “store coordinators” managing food savers’ picking slots and coordinating them with the partner stores as well as “ambassadors” who are responsible for accrediting new food savers and for creating new partnerships with food retailers (SHARECITY_13). The “orgateam” coordinate and decide the national policy of foodsharing.de (Yunity, 2017, in SHARECITY_02: 203).

It can be pointed out that the set of rules, including food safety and rules for sharing, is enforced by membership through self-monitoring and peer surveillance (SHARECITY_02: 208). Every “violation” – such as being late for a pick-up or not being cautious with sharing food or maintaining public fridges - are reported by other members. Excessive infractions are sanctioned by ambassadors and lead to the loss of food savers privileges or even to exclusion. On the contrary, good practices are rewarded by co-savers. All violations and rewards are reported in an ICT platform (e.g. such as blames as well as “trust bananas” rewarding positive behaviours). Specifically, Foodsharing.de is based on reputational economy mediated by an online platform (SHARECITY_02: 208).

'''16. Exclusion:'''

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Public fridges are meant to be accessible to everyone. Whereas most of the public fridges are located in community centers, the access to them may depend on the connotation as well as on the others users of these places (e.g. a community center having stigma or a special cultural/political identity). In that sense, some people could exclude themselves from certain places (interview with O.). However, the exclusive dimension related to public fridges is not really about accessing food but rather about actively engaging in the organization of food sharing. As mentioned above, becoming a foodsharer that can collect food to grocery stores entails to have been through a very exclusive procedure, including a quizz testing your abilities and commitment towards the organization. In addition, foodsharing rules and ideological stands (written and detailed in the wiki) as well as the quiz are only written in German language. This quiz greatly reduces the scope of members who are eligible/able to become food savers and excludes non-german speakers as well as people who do not want to take on too much responsibilities.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

This exclusionary dimension is related to the hierarchical structuration of Foodsharing. Food is made available for everyone but only those who are willing to commit themselves to a great level (including picking food on a regular basis, redistributing it, not being late) can take responsibility for collecting food. Food sharers are often people who were already dumpster divers or collecting food for the community and they accept a level of responsibility and work that people in need are probably not able/willing to commit to.

The exclusionary dimension of the quiz is an ongoing discussion within foodsharing. It has been created with the idea to filter people who could create problems (including being too greedy or giving the organization a bad reputation). As Foodsharing becomes more popular and has many applicants, the organization does not have the capacity to train so many people about food safety and food collection and the quiz that covers a lot different things (including values and knowledge) is a filter. If revising the quiz has been discussed within the organisation, the ability to do it seems beyond most of the food sharers (interview with O.)

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

'''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''

The public fridges and Foodsharing as an organization has been created as a response to food waste and to the gridlock of a food system that generates too much waste. Whereas food regulations do not effectively address this problem, a community-based initiative has been developed to alleviate this issue and find a solution to reduce food wastes. Foodsharing developed in a context of growing public awareness about food issues as well as the development of other forms of sharing economies including initiatives in the sector of clothing, mobility or energy (interview O.).

'''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''

The intervention has been framed by regulatory policies (i.e. administrative, command-and-control) such directives, legislations and laws addressing food risk and safety policies and food waste policies.

Food risk policies regulate the risk of the food chain or “from farm to work” (i.e. production, proceeding, storage, transportation, distribution and redistribution) and food hygiene policies concern food safety best practices (i.e. the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, the cold chain as well as the Codex Alimenarius standards). Those regulations are mainly set up at the European level and adapted nationally and locally.

Public fridges tackle and challenge the legal framework regulating food risk and food wastes. This legal framework includes three levels of regulation - European, national and local - and only applies to food businesses (i.e. entrepreneurs handling food). At the European level, it includes EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk. This law enforces responsibility for those dealing with food and mandates the total traceability of the food chain (i.e. from one step backward and one step forward). In addition, EU 852/2004, Food Hygiene Law regulates food safety best practices and identifies food which is safe or non-injurious to health. EU 852 regulation is particularly responsive to local contexts and gives national and/or local authorities the competence to determine in which circumstances this regulation is to be applied (i.e. to determine whether an organization is a business or not) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

'''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''

According to the hierarchy of norms, European laws (described above) are transposed into the German federal law. At the national level, the European laws are enforced and supported by the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL). The latter is responsible for food monitoring through the Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL) and the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR). However, the responsibility for food control lays on the federal states (Länder). At the local level, each state has a Food Safety Authority (FSA) that ensures compliance with the food safety laws.<ref>Website of the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture. Last view on 24/01/20 https://www.bmel.de/EN/Food/Safe-Food/safe-food_node.html.</ref>The FSA is competent to determine whether an organization is a food business or not and thus, whether it has to comply with EU regulations or not. In addition, food safety entails to look at the German civil code for consumer protection (i.e. § 13 BGB) stating that businesses are liable for the goods and services they provide (including food) (SHARECITY 02: 206).

However, foodsharing.de is assumed to be uncovered by food law, despite being framed in response to it. Public fridges aim to remain outside of this food legislation. Theoretically, European as well as national food safety regulations apply to businesses and not domestic users. Specifically, businesses are characterised by a certain continuity and degree of organisation. In contrast, public fridges seek to remain in the realm of domestic use. This is justified by the non-continuity of the activity (i.e. the relationship between users of public fridges are uncertain as there is no supervision of who exchanges food with whom) and the low degree of organization (i.e. the small quantity of food gathered in public fridges refers to domestic and not to business uses).<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> In doing so, foodsharing aims at avoiding to ensure compliance with the guidelines of a food business.

'''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''

The local political culture has influenced the character of the intervention. Foodsharing members established themselves as actors of the food system. It means that a civil society organization feels entitled to make intervention in the city, to redesign and occupy the public space as well as to address dysfonctionnements in the food systeem. Citizens are political actors giving themselves space for political action which tend to indicate a democratic culture (interview O.).

'''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''

Foodsharing.de is self-financed through donations. In 2012, the organization started with a capital collected through crowdfunding (i.e. via the platform Stratnext). Today, a small circle of supporting members as well as single donations provide funding. The organization seeks to minimize its expenses (i.e. foodsharing motto is “as little money as possible should be used”). These expenses include the Foodsharing-Festival, costs for accounting, traveling costs and the salary of one single employee in a mini-job.<ref> Foodsharing.de Wiki .Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Foodsharing_e.V._und_dessen_Vorstand.</ref>

Foodsharing.de is run on a voluntary basis and is based on unpaid commitment. Voluntary work includes the creation of the online platform, the webhosting (sponsored), the support from lawyers and other tasks such as the maintenance of the online platform and mediation of regional groups. Drawing from an ideological perspective, foodsharing.de aims to be as free from financial support as possible (there are some exceptions where money is used) and work with committed people without money transactions.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on24/01/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Umgang_mit_Geld_bei_foodsharing.</ref>

Foodsharing.de does not receive any public subsidies and is run without support from public authorities.

'''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''

Yes, changes in the understanding of which organizations are food-businesses or not have influenced the intervention in a negative way. Foodsharing.de Berlin has been recognized by the FSA as a food business and thus, has been asked to comply with the food safety regulation (see below Q.23 “obstacles”).

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

'''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The public fridges monitored by foodsharing.de in Berlin were targeted by the FSA of Berlin which has a narrow understanding of business and considers that foodsharing falls into this category. Thus, the FSA opposes fooshering.de the EU 178/2002 General Food Law regulating food risk and the EU 852/2004 Food Hygiene Law regulating food safety practices applied to businesses. Consequently, foodsharing in Berlin turns to be responsible for the content of the fridges and for the traceability of the food one step backward (i.e. before entering the fridges) and one step forward (i.e. who is taking it). This entailed for food savers to record every single food item which is saved and shared as well as to designate an individual (i.e. a member of foodsharing) who is responsible for it.

In January 2017, the Berlin Senate enforced a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations. It required foodsharing.de to follow the safety rules such as a business and to name an individual “responsible for the contents of each fridge and their traceability” (SHARECITY 02: 207).

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

The self-governance practices of foodsharing oppose food governance practices built upon the EU and national regulations (SHARECITY_02: 203). Indeed, food governance at the level of the European Union is built upon risks and responsibilities. Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s theory of risk, food safety regulations understand risk at a global level rather than at the individual one. Thus, preventing food risk entails scientific processes of risk assessment which rely on technological methods applied by experts rather than by people (SHARECITY_02: 204). On the contrary, food savers understand risk at a local scale, from the point of collection (food stores) to recipients. Hence, the conflict opposing foodsharing and the FSA about the food safety issue over public fridges depends on different scales of governance and understanding of risk.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

Foodsharing is run by (unpaid) volunteers and does not have the capacity (i.e. not enough human resources) to record the circulation of the food prior and after the fridges (in contrast to organizations that employ people such as food banks) (SHARECITY_02: 209).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The obstacles related to the regulatory framework as a cultural aspect. The European food safety legislation applies everywhere. However, in many countries, there is often a grey area, such as community initiatives, which is tolerated by the public actors including food safety authorities. In Germany and specifically in Berlin, the FSA does not leave room for this grey area and establishes a strict separation between the private and the public realms. Collectively dealing with food outside of households is under the responsibility of the FSA (interview with O.)

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

'''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Call for Foodsharing to endorse liability for the content of the fridges.

Limited handling capacities
| Foodsharing refuses to comply with this call on practical and ideological grounds. First, no members would accept to endorse the liability for a fridge which is not possible to be fully controlled. In contrast to organizations that employ people to record the circulation of the food (such as food-banks), a volunteer-based organization does not have enough (human) resources to do this work. On the other hand, the EU regulations contrast with some founding principles of the public fudges such as the anonymity of donors/recipients. Recording the circulation of food would indeed lapse this anonymity (SHARECITY_02: 207).

Instead of designating someone responsible for a fridge, Foodsahring communicated the names and contact details of their entire Foodsharing group. In doing so, not only they refuse that one individual undertakes the liability for public fridges, but also, they stand for the collective management of these fridges (SHARECITY_02: 210).
|-
| The enforcement by the Berlin Senate of a new set of rules governing public fridges in line with the EU 178 and 852 regulations.
| In response to the Berlin Senate enforcement, foodsharing Berlin intended to reframe public fridges as private “club goods”and not businesses (SHARECITY_02: 210). For doing so, they have restricted access to public fridges, especially to Foodsharing members. In addition, foodsharing Berlin publicly stated that Foodsharing is not a business and that the food inside the fridges is not regulated. This statement was issued with a view to discharge the organization from its liability towards food.
The FSA started to pressure the community center hosting public fridges by threatening them with a fine in case they continue to do so. Put at financial risk, many organisations have stopped to host public fridges.
|-
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

'''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''

Regarding sustainability impact, Foodsharing.de achieved to prevent a large amount of food from being wasted. Since 2012, Foodsharing.de has “rescued” about 12,796,298 kg of food.<ref>Foodsharing.de Wiki. Last view on 04/02/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Kontext_und_Selbstverst%C3%A4ndnis.</ref> Specifically in Berlin, foodsavers rescued nearly a metric ton of food in Berlin alone.<ref>Last view on 04/02/20: https://www.dw.com/en/food-sharing-initiative-battles-berlin-authorities-over-closed-community-fridges/a-19042114
.</ref>This includes the food which has been saved before (from 2012 to 2014) and after the introduction of public fridges.

The public fridges established in Berlin were an attempt to address sustainability and social justice. However, the obstacles opposed by the FSA and the rules enforced by the Berlin senate reduced the impact of public fridges. The closing of many of them and the restricted access of the remaining (still are some active) jeopardizes the core objective of the initiative which was to make food available to everyone and to destigmatize free food. It has also hampered anti-food actions.

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

'''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

In Berlin, There are many kinds of sharing initiatives related to food developed including community gardens, food banks or meal saving as well as other forms of sharing economies in other sectors such as clothing, services, mobility etc. Foodsharing members tend to be involved in lots of other sharing initiatives which informs about how a context of social innovation can be a fertile ground for the development of such an intervention. Building on a network and having experience in engaging collectively may have been crucial for the creation of public fridges.

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Foodsharing as an organization started in Cologne (Germany) and other regional branches of the national organization developed in other German cities. However, Foodsharing in Berlin has initiated the creation of public fridges which are built on the experiences its members may have acquired elsewhere and in other sectors. There are no explicit evidences of this inter-city learning.

=== Learning content ===

'''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

Knowledge has been acquired from other regional food sharing groups in Germany, especially Cologne where the headquarter of the organisation is located. Specifically, food sharing Berlin can compare how other regional groups deal with the food safety legislation. Hence, Foodsharing Berlin can advocate that the organization is not recognized as a business in the other Federal States of Germany and use this argument to oppose the local legislation.

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

n/a

=== Learning process ===

'''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''

Public fridges and more generally Foodsharing successfully developed in Berlin because it is adapted to the local context including a strong subculture and live style of sharing as well as urban infrastructures facilitating sharing operations.

First, there are in Berlin a lot of people having the time and the enthusiasm to engage in this type of action. This is a part of the local subculture and a politic attached to it which made the intervention possible to emerge (interview with O.).

Second, foodsharing can develop in a context where a lot of food is available (mostly urban context) as well as infrastructures helping at the logistics of food collection and distribution (such as bicycles, public transport etc…) (SHARECITY_14). Insofar food is perishable, donors and recipients must be quickly connected and short distances matter and facilitated access matter.

'''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''

The members of Foodsharing Berlin who were confronted with these obstacles learn how to navigate political and administrative channels and to get the point across. They got used to making public statements, press releases and participating in meetings with local authorities, politicians and elected officials. In that sense, facing these obstacles has contributed to the politicization of the Foodsharing members (interview with O.).

In addition, by refusing to comply with the requisite food traceability and individual liability (see Q. 24), the organization has reframed and strengthened its political line and clarified the ambition the movement (inferred from SHARECITY_02: 210).

'''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''

The tools that enable the learning process include:
*the ICT- platform that gives information about Foodsharing.de’s actions and food saving and distribution.
*the mentorship between prospective food savers and initiated food savers.
*the use wiki that compiles the political line and all the practical information that enable prospective food sharer/saver to enter the organization.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

'''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The members of Foodsharing were actively making sure that the initiative is spread. Active members have tried to expand Foodsharing outside of Germany. For instance, Foodsharing developed in the Netherlands (some public fridges are located in Amsterdam or Wageningen) (interview with O.).

Specifically, the group Yunity<ref>Yunity website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://yunity.org/en.</ref> that originate from the Foodsharing movement is developing tools and softwares for enabling other people in other contexts to start their own food sharing network. There are going all across the world doing Akaton to create community-based software and logistic tools to start foodsharing. The idea to share this technology that supports foodsharing beyond the Foodsharing movement itself (Interview with O.).

In addition, the replicability of food sharing initiatives such as Foodsharing.de has been pointed out in the project SHARECITY and its toolkit for food sharing called “SHARE IT toolkit” (SHARECITY_09).<ref>Sharecity website. Last view on 04/02/20: https://sharecity.ie/getting-started-with-the-share-it-toolkit/.</ref> The case of Foodsharing in Berlin demonstrates food governance arrangements and issues stressing food sharing regulations (i.e. social rules and legal instruments) and the obstacles to be overcomed in order to replicate and transfer sharing initiatives.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Public fridges can be transferred to many different urban contexts. However, a set of prerequisites have been identified (interview with O.).
*a political subculture and enthusiasm from people to engage in sharing activities
*the feeling of the right to the city. This means that people feel that the city is theirs which makes it possible to redesign it, to appropriate the space and make interventions.
For example, in a city like New York City, inhabitants do not necessarily feel this right to the city as the tight to use public space is different from berlin. Community fridges just developed in the context of the covid-19 pandemic, because so many people could not access grocery stores or food banks.
*political structures offering space for such initiatives to develop.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim about replicability as been made by the intervention’s proponent i.e. Foodsharing members.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

On top of the prerequisites detailed in Q.31 b), uncertainty about the legal aspect of Foosharing is a limit to transferability. Many people including activists or food retailers do not want to endorse liability for donated or saved food which hammered to a great extent for saving and sharing. Legal framework that removes liability for donated food, as the Good samaritan glass in the US will allow such initiatives to develop. However, such a regulation would come into tension with the EU regulation which requires that someone is always responsible for food and would create a free zone.

In addition, limits to transferability also depends on how people get food and how it is delivered. It is attached to the political culture and to what people see as the role of citizens and of the state. If people are used to a food blank doing this work, they might not engage themselves because it is the responsibility of government and social structures to make sure that the people have enough money to afford food (interview with O.).

'''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>

The obstacles faced by Foodsharing.de Berlin have been recorded in the wiki of Foodsharing.de<ref>Foodsharing website. Fair-Teiler-Problem in Berlin. Last view on 26/06/20: https://wiki.foodsharing.de/Fair-Teiler_und_Abgabestellen.</ref> as well as the response of Foodsharing Berlin (i.e. refusal to comply with the injunction).

'''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''

Foodsharing is actively expanding to other cities and sharing tools to create Foodsharing networks. The Foodsharing group is expanding in other countries with the support of German activists.

On top of the Yunity groups (see Q. 31 a), other collaborations have been reported. For example in London, a non-profit app connecting food donors to recipients called Olio<ref>Olio website. Last view on 26/06/20: https://olioex.com/.</ref> has been created with the support of Foodsharing members. These people have been hired by Olio to help them to develop this application. Other types of applications such as Too Good To Go try to monetize the relationships that food savers have built with restaurants and food retailers but also contribute to expanding ITC mediated food sharing. There are many other initiatives that are directly or indirectly connected to Foodsharing (interview with O.).

In addition, the SHARECITY1000 database<ref> Sharecity database. Last view on 26/06/20: https://sharecity.ie/research/sharecity100-database/.</ref> lists 124 kinds of food sharing initiatives in Berlin (including Foodsharing.de) from a range of activities including community gardens, shared means, shared bread etc… These initiatives have net been reportedly inspired from Foodsharing.de

== j) Structural learning ==

'''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

The intervention does not seem to have really changed governance arrangements in a more structural way. Some People in foodsharing are also involved in local food policy councils and assimilated structures but not necessarily.

Since Foodsharinf is a loose and open network, everyone has its own motivations to commit and it is not possible to generalize the aims of everybody. whereas some members have a radical political view and aim at changing the food system and the whole economy, other people just want to have less food waste and have a food system that generates less wastes. Foodsharing works to some degree because there is space for these different motivations (more or less radical) and offer people to join the movement.

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

'''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''

It seems important to stress the potential of ICT-mediated sharing for sharing initiative to develop in the future. These new forms of food sharing extend the spaces and the social sphere where sharing takes place. As they involve diverse actors such as the civil society and policy makers, tackle food regulations and ICT-mediated food sharing entail new governance arrangements. It implies a set of rules and practices being established by the interaction – conflictual or not - between citizens, entrepreneurs and policy makers to regulate food sharing. The disruptive potential of ICT-mediated sharing is also to be more inquired (SHARECITY_06).

'''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''

Foodsharing.de is based on a reputational economy mediated by an online platform. This study case highlights the potential of the reputational economy of ICT-mediated sharing to promote self-governance in common initiatives (SHARECITY 02: 208). Foodsharing governance arrangements offer an alternative to the current legal framework for regulating food in a more sustainable and fairer way.

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome

2021-01-04T13:44:58Z

Romane Joly:

This intervention has been translated into a brief governance scenario. Take a look at [[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]].

== Basic characteristics and ambitions of the intervention ==

===='''1. What is the name and the urban context (e.g. city/district) of the intervention? Please also indicate the geographical scale of the intervention (e.g. neighborhood, district, small/medium/ capital city, metropolitan area ...). [Example: “Brixton Energy in Brixton, London (neighborhood in capital city)”]'''====

The selected intervention refers to anti-gentrification resistances in Rome (Italy) with a particular focus on a district called Trastevere. Located at the heart of the city, the district is going through a long-lasting process of gentrification which also applies to the whole city centre of Rome. As a result of the increasing evictions, citizens have started to resist displacement, namely to “stay put” (AGAPE_01: 1)
The intervention has been primarily developed at the local level but tackles different scales. Organized resistances started in neighbourhoods (i.e. by tenant’s union, individual squatters occupying buildings). Anti-eviction platforms voice and convey these claims at the level of the district ( Trastevere district). These multiple pressures on public authorities (from the public housing authority, the municipality of Rome, the Lazio region) result in the implementation of regulatory policies at the municipal or the regional level (e.g. sanatoria to regularize squatters).

===='''2. What sector(s) (alias domain/ policy field) is the intervention primarily implemented in ? [e.g. housing, mobility, energy, water, health, local economy, biodiversity, CC adaptation, etc.]'''====

This intervention is implemented in the fields of housing policies and urban social policies, specifically in a context of austerity policies.

===='''3. What is the intervention (i.e. situated experiment) aiming to achieve in terms of sustainability and justice? If possible, please copy from a project website and give a reference'''====

The district Trastevere is facing a gentrification process resulting from a roll-back of the state which does not protect the housing stock anymore and privatizes public housing. As a result, the prices of tenancies dramatically increased leading to a severe housing crisis and to the evictions of dwellers by the police forces. In this context, anti-gentrification resistances emerged from the civil society as a call for the right of local residents to remain in the district. The resistances address social justice in the following terms:
*Call for regularizing informal housing such as squatting in public housing estates.
*Tenant’s request of becoming owners of the public housing.
*Call to freeze and stabilize the prices of tenancies in public housing.

The sustainability issue is not directly addressed by the residents of the district. AGAPE addresses sustainability with respect to social justice in terms of “social sustainability”. The latter refers to the fight of low income and marginalized people struggling to survive day to day and to their right to “stay put” i.e. to remain in their homes.

===='''4. What is the interventions’ timeframe?'''====

In Rome, anti-gentrification resistance progressively emerged in line with the gentrification process. This latter started from the 1990’s with a national law abolishing the rent control (i.e. guaranteeing moderate price rental) (AGAPE_01: 5) up to now. Specifically, AGAPE project focuses on ongoing resistances from 2014 (when the project started) up to now.

===='''5. By what governance mode is the intervention characterized primarily? (see [[#Appendix 1: Three modes of governance | Appendix 1: Three modes of governance]])'''====

The intervention is firstly characterized by non-government led governance mode and progressively turned to a co-governed or hybrid governance mode as soon as public actors engaged in the intervention.

===='''6. Why do you consider it worthwhile to study and share experiences made in the context of this governance intervention for sustainable and just cities?'''<ref>Background to this question: Our four main criteria for selecting particular governance interventions and develop rich descriptions of them were: A) The intervention has been studied in a specific urban context (e.g. city), B) this context is located in Europe (and, preferably, the study was EU-funded), C) the intervention considers to a large extent sustainability AND justice (at least implicitly), and D) it is well-documented, ideally including assumptions or even critical reflections on enablers and barriers to implementation and on transferability (i.e. ‘de-contextualizability’). Additionally, we aimed at a diverse portfolio of domains (see Q2.) and governance modes (see Q5): https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1nCPcUd-COIQ1MsBjir20_F1CBbnSu6HqKH9nNLshiVQ/edit?usp=sharing.</ref> ====

The case of Trastevere district is interesting because it specifically focuses on urban social (in)justices (i.e. participation, exclusion). It sheds light on the governance arrangements emerging from anti-gentrification practices in a specific context of crisis and austerity in southern European countries (SECs).

===='''7. In which project deliverable(s) or other documents can information be found on this situated (i.e. place specific) governance intervention?'''====

Primarily:
*AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_02_Garbatella. Heritage, Gentrification, and Public Policies in Rome, Italy_ANNUNZIATA_2019
*AGAPE_03_Resisting ‘Austerity Gentrification’ and Displacement in Southern Europe_ANNUZIATE_et_LEES_2016
*AGAPE_05_Philipp Katsinas reviews anti-gentrification workshop, ‘Staying Put’_KATSINAS_2017

== b) Additional basic characteristics, links to earlier UrbanA work ==

===='''8. EU Project-context of the intervention:'''====

*'''a. Has the intervention been developed or studied in the context of an (EU-funded?) project? (please name the project, its duration and include a link to the project website here).'''

The intervention has been developed in the framework of the EU-funded project AGAPE (2014-16).<ref>AGAPE project on the Cordis portal. Last view on: 10/02/20: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/625691.</ref> The project aims at exploring the development of anti-gentrification practices in three Southern European cities (SECs) (i.e. Rome, Madrid and Athens) in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. Specifically, the project seeks to determine the repertoire of collective actions to “stay put” (AGAPE_01) and to resist displacement as well as to contribute to gentrification resistance theories.

Gentrification refers to “a process involving a change in the population of land users such that the new users are of a higher socioeconomic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital” (Clark 2005: 263, in AGAPE 01: 3).

*'''b. According to WP3’s database of approaches, which approach(es) does the intervention best fit under? Where applicable, please indicate if the intervention is found in a project that has been explicitly mentioned in the database.'''

The intervention best fits under the [[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]] and the [[Right to housing]]approaches. The project is explicitly mentioned in the database under these two approaches.

*'''c. Have some project deliverables been coded in the context of UrbanA’s WP4?'''

Yes: AGAPE_01_Everyday resistances in gentrifying contexts_ANNUNZIATA_2019

===='''9. Problematization and priority:'''====

*'''a. How exactly has inequality and exclusion been problematized (by whom) in the context of this intervention?'''

In the case of the gentrification process in Trastevere, inequality and exclusion have been problematized by local inhabitants as well as researchers (from AGAPE project). They refer to the exclusions of lower income residents from Rome’s city center due to the privatization of public housing and the correlated gentrification process. Here, gentrification consists in a subtle transformation of the residential tenures and retails oriented to tourism and the eviction of the former working-class dwellers.

*'''b. Has the achievement of justice explicitly been named as a major motivation behind the intervention?'''

The achievement of justice has been named as a major motivation behind the intervention. The project AGAPE seeks to draw attention to anti-gentrification practices in Southern European cities (SECs) “with a particular focus on their incorporation into - and capabilities to inform - local policy makings”. Hence, the goal is to support and voice anti-gentrification practices and policies in order to counter “urban inequality” as well as to set up a “post-crisis urban agenda aimed at achieving social justice”. The intervention in Trastevere district in Rome has been selected because it sheds on social injustices but also because the intervention has a potential for informing about resistances and “alternative narratives” on counter-gentrification practices.

*'''c. Which drivers of injustice does the intervention address? (see [[Database of drivers of injustice | Database of drivers of injustice]])'''

{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:center;"
|- style="font-weight:bold;"
! Drivers of injustices
! Based on WP4 coding
! Based on own assessment
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 1. [[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure| Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 2. [[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 3. [[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 4. [[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 5. [[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns|Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 6. [[Unfit institutional structures | Unfit institutional structures]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 7. [[Limited citizen participation in urban planning | Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 8. [[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities | Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities ]]
|
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 9. [[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism ]]
| X
|
|-
| style="text-align:left;" | 10. [[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society]]
|
|
|}

== c) Actor constellations ==

===='''10. Who initiated the intervention?'''====

The intervention was initiated by some citizens in Rome, especially the local inhabitants directly targeted by the gentrification process and the evictions. Resisting gentrification includes a set of practices from “everyday” and individual to “collectively organized” actions i.e. within groups created for this purpose such as neighborhood organizations, community groups and tenants’ unions (e.g. The Comitato di Lotta per la casa del Centro Storico or the Network of San Saba) (AGAPE_01: 7). It is primarily a bottom-up intervention.

===='''11. Who are the envisioned benefiters of the intervention? (both at a local level and higher, if applicable)'''====

The benefiters of the intervention are the local residents themselves (i.e. people used to live in Trastevere district) who “stay put” and might have a chance to remain in the district. Scaling up, the intervention also benefits other low income and marginalized residents of Rome potentially targeted by gentrification and austerity and housing policies. Generally, counter this process will benefit everyone concerned by social justice.

===='''12. Who else is (going to be) involved in the intervention, and what was/is their main role?'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Actor types<ref>Actor types according to TRANSIT’s Critical Turning Point Database, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/about-ctps-in-tsi-processes.</ref>
! Yes
! Actor name and role<ref>If easily possible mention sources for your association of roles.</ref>
|-
| Academic organizations
|
|
|-
| Religious organizations
|
|
|-
| Civil society organizations
| X
| Organized anti-eviction platforms (i.e. platforms are citizens’ organizations including local tenants’ unions as well as anti-gentrification activists). They support and help targeted residents and voice their claim to fight evictions. They also advocate for social justice and housing solutions as well as pressure the Housing Authority and the municipality (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Hybrid/ 3rd sector organizations
|
|
|-
| Platforms
|
|
|-
| NGOs
|
|
|-
| Social movements
|
|
|-
| Political parties
|
|
|-
| Media
|
|
|-
| Unions
|
|
|-
| Social entreprises
|
|
|-
| For profit entreprises
|
|
|-
| Local/regional government
| X
|
*The municipality of Rome. Its role is ambivalent. At first, it launched policies of public housing privatisation including the abolishment of rent control. Then, as a result of citizens’ protests, it started to mitigate the effect of gentrification by securing some public housing from privatisation.
*The Lazio region. Same as the municipality. After it had launched privatisation policies (e.g. allowing the municipality of Rome to sell 70% of its public housing), it started to mitigate those effects and regularised some informal housing.
|-
| Regional organizations
|
|
|-
| National government
| X
| National government enforced in the 1990s the right-to-buy legislation that regulates the alienation of and the privatization of public properties (AGAPE_02: 6).
|-
| Supranational government
|
|
|-
| International networks
|
|
|-
| Other initiatives
| X
| The Housing Authority of Rome. It is responsible for allocating and administering social housing. It enforced the rental-homeownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy national law) which consists in offering tenants of public housing to buy (at moderate price) their housing.
|}

===='''13. Which particular interactions among various stakeholders (stakeholder configurations) were crucial in enabling the intervention to emerge successfully? This could include direct or indirect impacts on interventions.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The residents organize themselves locally, especially within anti-eviction platforms that are responsible for helping residents in distress but also voicing their claim to the public authorities. Anti-eviction platforms are crucial mediators because they convey the claims of the most deprived inhabitants (e.g. isolated persons, squatters) as well as of the neighbourhood groups or tenant’s unions and are the identified interlocutors of the municipality and the Housing Authority. They perform this back-and-forth work.''

===='''14. To what extent, in what form and at what stages have citizens participated in the shaping of the intervention?'''====

This intervention is based on and driven by citizens. The anti-eviction platforms as well as the community groups (e.g. of squatters) are the results of grassroot initiatives. The intervention of public actors (i.e. the housing authority and the municipality) to alleviate evictions or of external supporters (i.e. activists or researchers in the framework of AGAPE project) voicing the claims add to the already existing grassroot resistances.

===='''15. How are responsibilities and/or decision-making power distributed among actors?'''====
n/a

===='''16. Exclusion:'''====

*'''a. Which stakeholders or social groups were excluded (at which stages)?'''

Migrants (and to some extent gipsies) are excluded from the intervention. Although many are living in informal housing and are more likely to be targeted by evictions (as recalls the example of a massive and brutal eviction in the via Curatone which took place in August 2017) (AGAPE_01: 12), they are not included in resistance groups and are not voiced.

*'''b. Is there any indication why this may have happened? With what outcomes? Has anything been done to overcome such exclusions?'''

The intervention is mainly implemented by community groups framed as neighbourhoods. The neighbourliness as understood and mobilized by local inhabitants is ambiguous. It recalls the idea of “‘popular’ neighbourhood” (AGAPE_01: 7) but without being really altruistic and supportive towards other social groups. As a consequence, neighbourliness might be exclusive in particular towards migrants who are not parts of this “historical working-class narrative” (which in this context is also related to collective memories of solidarity and resistance during the German occupation and to anti-fasciste pride) (AGAPE_01: 7).

The exclusion of some social groups remaining voiceless (i.e. migrants, gypsies) potentially breaks down solidarity among resistants. It also weakens and reduces the impact of anti-gentrification resistances since they only benefit (i.e. long-time local inhabitants sharing this “working class” narrative) and neglect specific social groups even more likely to face evictions.

== d) Enabling conditions for the implementation of the intervention ==

===='''17. What circumstances or events are reported to have triggered the intervention? (In what ways?)'''====

The intervention takes place in a context of economic crisis and austerity (post 2008 crisis) that reinforced the running process of housing shortages that started in the 1990's. The gentrification process fostered by the enforcement of neo-liberal housing policies (e.g. the abolishment of the rent control) and the multiplication of the evictions were the catalysts of the citizens resistances.

===='''18. Are particular substantive (multi-level) governmental policies considered to be highly influential in the genesis and shaping of the intervention? (If easily possible, please specify the policy, the policy field and the governance level mainly addressed, and characterize it along [[#Appendix 2: Policy typology | Appendix 2: Policy typology]])'''====

The intervention is framed by urban social policies and housing policies. It addresses regulatory policies enforced both at the local level, specifically the abolishment of rent control (1992-1998) (i.e. referring to the abolishment of a housing price ceiling guarantee by the municipality), and at the national level, specifically the sale at moderate price of publicly owned residential stock (i.e. the right-to-buy national law, december 21, 1993, no. 560) (AGAPE_01, AGAPE_02: 1). In the framework of the right-to-buy national legislation, the local government established the rental-home ownership conversion that offers a cheaper buying price than the normal market and only applies to tenants.

These refer to economic policies because they provide favorable economic conditions for targeted actors (i.e. tourists, multinational companies and wealthy people) while they are economically detrimental for others (i.e. low income inhabitants).

Before the enforcement of the right-to-buy legislation, public housing was nationally administered by a public autonomous body called the Istituto Case Popolari (ICP)<ref>The ICP was created in 1903 to provide decent housing to the working-class and with a view to better control it (AGAPE_ 02).</ref>(AGAPE_02: 1). Entitlement to public housing was conferred in perpetuity to tenants which prevented them from being evicted. This system of tenure prevented the sell of units for profits (Annunziata 2019_AGAPE 02).

However, the privatization of public estates started in 1993 and was enforced in a national law. The denationalization of public assets was fostered in 2001 to solve the public debt (decreto Legislativo, september 25, 2001, no.351). “In 2006 the Lazio region, in charge of Rome’s building and planning regulations, approved legislation requiring that the city sell up to 70 percent of its public housing” and in 2007 a list of public properties to be sold was issued by the municipality (AGAPE_02: 7).

===='''19. What constitutional responsibilities and rules does the intervention build upon? In other words, what rights, powers, and/or responsibilities, does the country's constitution (in a broad sense) award municipalities, states, utilities, NGOs, citizens etc. and how does this impact the intervention?'''====

The privatisation of public residential property since 1993 was established in accordance with constitutional norms, in particular the art. 47 of the constitution. The national law of december 24, 1993, no. 560 defines the framework of the privatization of public estate. It gives regional governments the power to administer the alienation of parts of the public property (between 50 and 75 percent of it) (AGAPE_02: 12). Starting from a national impulse, the privatization of public housing is enforced in the regional (i.e. Lazio region) and municipal (i.e. Rome) legislation.

===='''20. According to project material/and or interviews, in what ways have particularities of (local) political culture influenced the character and success of the intervention? (i.e. trust in political institutions, citizens’ will to interact with policy makers and vice versa, traditions of cooperation etc.)'''====

The views of actors on the framework regulating the intervention is ambivalent from both sides (i.e. citizens and public actors). On the one hand, while citizens/ local inhabitants strongly denounce privatisation policies, some of those who can afford to buy (at moderate price) their (public) housing are likely to do it. On the other hand, although the municipality and the Housing Authorities implement privatisation policies, they are to some extent responsive to citizens claims and negotiate some sort of rental tenure (e.g. the regularization of informal housing or the re-housing of evicted inhabitants). These formal/ informal negotiations and mutual pressures between public actors and citizens result in a nexus of ordinary and collective resistances (AGAPE_01: 5).

===='''21. What are financial arrangements that support the intervention?'''====

n/a

===='''22. Have any of the above conditions changed within the intervention’s timeframe, which have (significantly) influenced it in a positive or negative way?'''====

n/a

'''''Note: Certain contexts, which provide opportunities to learn from other relevant experiences, may also be a supportive framework condition. Please see section h, questions 26 + 30 on learning context.'''''

== e) Obstacles to successful intervention implementation ==

===='''23. What obstacles to implementing the intervention (both generally, and in this particular context) have been identified, relating to:'''====

*'''a. Regulatory framework'''

The above mentioned (Q.18) regulatory framework of privatization of public housing is detrimental for those who resist gentrification. In addition, the negotiated agreements between public actors and citizens can also hinder the resistance. For instance, the rental-home ownership conversion accepted by some tenants creates disagreement between citizens (between those who accept and those who decline) and contributes to weaken civil society resistances to gentrification.

*'''b. Legitimacy'''

Legitimacy obstacles arise from public actors narratives. Moralizing and criminalizing illegal housing (AGAPE_01: 6) are the counterparts of the spatial cleansing (i.e. privatization and eviction) they perform. The stigmatisation of squatting practices is used to justify the eviction of illegal occupants of public housing.

*'''c. Public awareness'''

n/a

*'''d. Finances'''

For some inhabitants, staying put and anti-gentrification resistance consists in accepting the rental-home ownership conversion (i.e. according to the right-to-buy legislation) offered by the Housing Authority. However, only middle class tenants can afford to buy (even at moderate price) their own housing while people of lower means cannot even afford it (AGAPE_01: 8).

*'''e. Others (please name)'''

The rental-home ownership conversion creates a solidarity break down among community groups. Buying their own housing represents a “deep cultural aspiration” (AGAPE_01: 11) for some tenants and will also prevent them from being evicted. A large number of them stand for it, especially middle class people who can afford to buy it. However, this standpoint is not shared by everyone. Specifically, those who cannot afford to buy - even at moderate price - their housing (i.e. people of lower means) or are not offered it by the Housing Authority (tenders are rather arbitrary) are very reluctant to the rental-homeownership conversion. As recalls S. Annunziata and C. Rivas Alonso, the right-to-buy at moderate price in prestigious locations (the city center of Rome) reduces the stock of housing available as well as “reduces future allocation and results in an individual appropriation of the value gap produced by de-commodified assets now solving social needs”(AGAPE_01: 11). The right-to-buy legislation is controversial because it breaks down solidarity among social groups and fosters gentrification rather than resolves it.

== f) (Institutional) Work done to overcome obstacles ==

===='''24. What has been done by each central actor group to overcome which particular obstacles in the way of successfully implementing the intervention? (this may include institutional Work - maintaining, disrupting, and creating new rules, applying to both formal laws/regulations and informal norms and expectations.)'''====

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Name of obstacle
! What work was/is being done to overcome this obstacle and by what actor groups?
|-
| Displacement and eviction of some illegal occupiers of the public housing.
| To (partly) curb the gentrification process and react to citizens' claims, public actors negotiated with community groups to find solutions against displacement. This includes the re-location of former residents in public housing or the regularization of illegal occupiers (i.e. in the framework of a sanatoria). The latter results from the call for anti-eviction moratoria issued by the anti-eviction platform as a way “to recognize the chronic housing deficit and the inadequacy of the public housing authority to act promptly in case of housing deprivation” (AGAPE_01: 9).
|-
| Eviction and public narrative criminalizing squatting practices.
| To fight eviction and pressure public authorities, anti-eviction platforms and other organized groups try to draw public attention to the housing issue. Inviting more actors to join the resistance and make it visible increases the critical mass and puts a greater pressure on public authorities. As an example, one anti-eviction platform (one of the most influential in Rome) asked the informal squatter to participate in a strike and to be actively a part of the collective struggle for housing. As a result, the request for housing is also voiced by those directly concerned as well as “ scandalize the housing authority for not being capable of providing responses” (AGAPE_0: 91).
|
|}

== g) Reported outcomes ==

===='''25. What are reported outcomes of the intervention? This may include economic outcomes, political outcomes, ability to reach sustainability and justice targets, etc.'''====

'''''(Please, note that italicized sections are speculative)'''''

''The asserted economic outcomes (not observed up to now ) are to stabilize and freeze the prices of tenancies in public housing in the city center of Rome, especially in public housing and to protect the latter from being privatized.''

The intervention aims at setting “social sustainability” (i.e. the right for local inhabitants to “stay put’) in cities in the policy agenda and at drawing attention to the detriment effects of the privatization of the public housing stock on low income communities. In Rome, it seems that negotiations started between anti-gentrification resistants/ activists and public authorities. However, no tangible outcomes are so far accessed (this is also related to the fact that AGAPE project is not yet disseminated to policy makers. Due to some constraints, the project is not yet over).

== h) Learning involved in establishing the intervention ==

''Please fill in any information on social learning that has occured in this intervention (conceptualized here as “Learning context, content, and process” in line with the FOODLINKS project)<ref>Deliverable 7.1 Synthesis Report on results from Monitoring and Evaluation (p.14) : http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf .</ref>. Where possible, please differentiate your response into learning done by specific actor groups.''

=== Learning context ===
''(i.e. the configuration and social environment enabling the learning process)''

===='''26. According to the TRANSIT project’s four mechanisms for empowerment – i. funding; ii. legitimacy; iii. knowledge sharing, learning, and peer support; or iv. visibility and identity – please briefly describe the following, and indicate where the intervention has been developed or supported as part of which formal collaborations, networks or projects:'''====

*'''a. any previous experiences in the same urban context (e.g. city…) that the intervention is (reportedly) building upon? This could include any relevant experiences in the same or another sector.'''

n/a

*'''b. any inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere that have (reportedly) been important in the emergence of this intervention?'''

Anti-gentrification resistors in Rome did not reportedly learn from experiences elsewhere. However, researchers from the AGAPE project learnt from the cases of anti-gentrification resistances in the cities of Rome, Madrid and Athens (AGAPE_05).

=== Learning content ===

===='''27. Has any acquired knowledge (e.g. technical knowledge, awareness of local political procedures etc.) been reported as particularly helpful to this intervention?'''====

*'''a. from previous experiences in the same urban context'''

n/a

*'''b. from inter-city partnerships, or transfers from experiences elsewhere'''

n/a

*'''c. from other knowledge gathering/research'''

Yes, knowledge was acquired during a workshop organised in the framework of AGAPE. Held at Roma Tre University in Italy in October 2017, the gathering enabled activists from different resistances groups from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece to meet and to exchange about their local experiences of gentrification and their ways to resist it: “activist groups analysed their campaigns, illustrating the varied experience of evictions and struggles in different states and the potential for cross-border synergies” (AGAPE_05).

Examples include among others “principles of assembly-ism, horizontalism, and non-party politics ” in resistance groups in Spain as well as “their campaign of escraches putting pressure on politicians, and their popular legislative initiatives to change the law regarding evictions by collecting signatures” ; or the “anti-eviction activism through the physical blockade of court proceedings” in Greece(AGAPE_05).

=== Learning process ===

===='''28. In what ways has the intervention been adapted to specific circumstances of the targeted urban context based on the learned content reported in question 27?'''====

n/a

===='''29. Based on your answers to question 24, how has overcoming obstacles (reportedly) contributed to the learning process?'''====

The obstacles (which were not really overcome) contributed to raise awareness especially among policy makers and public actors about the issue of gentrification and its consequences on the local population. This awareness allowed countervailing legal measures to be taken (as mentioned in Q.24).

===='''30. Please list any tools that enabled the learning process (e.g. various Knowledge Brokerage Activities from pg. 24 of FOODLINK’s Deliverable 7.1 - linked in footnote)<ref>http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/publications/karner-etal-d-7-1.pdf
.</ref> and the actors involved in using them.'''====

*Workshops organized in the framework of AGAPE
*Mediated discussions between citizens and policy makers.

== i) Learning involved in establishing interventions elsewhere (transferability)==

===='''31. Suggestions regarding transferability.'''====

*'''a. Have any suggestions been made about a replicability, scaleability or transferability of the intervention? [e.g. in the documentation of the intervention in a project or the press? Links would be perfect]'''

The transferability of the intervention in a core element of AGAPE project. Indeed, the latter aims at issuing an “Anti-gentrification Toolkit for Southern European cities” (AGAPE_05) based on the fieldwork conducted in the three case study cities (including Rome’s experience). The toolkit consists of a framework of prevention, mitigation and civil disobedience experiences which occurred elsewhere. It provides tools and examples of good practices for local communities, activists and collectives to fight evictions and gentrification. It also addresses policy makers by providing them concrete ideas. Thus, transferability is central to the project but does not consist in transferring the “same” intervervention but rather to “providing the basic tools that local communities can draw on to fight gentrification and concrete ideas for policy makers” depending on local contexts.

*'''b. Transferability to what kind of contexts has been suggested?'''

Transferability is primarily suggested in Southern European cities context because it is what the project is about. There is a form of unity in the gentrification process in SECs which is exacerbated by the debt crisis and the consequential austerity behaviors of nation states. Thus, the framework of AGAPE project including fieldwork and theoretical research as well as practical tools against gentrification process addresses primarily this particular kind of context. However, according to Prof. Loretta Lees, these learning experiences can apply to any urban context.

*'''c. Who has made the claims?'''

The claim of transferability is included in the project call and has also been pointed out by the project leader.

*'''d. What limits to transferability to broader contexts have been discussed?'''

n/a

===='''32. In what forms has the learning process, including stories of overcoming obstacles, been recorded for, and/or made accessible to city makers also from elsewhere?<ref>Feel free to include learning that has been made available through EU project documentation, intervention initiatives, or other channels. In addition to the forms in which the learning process has been shared with others, please indicate whether the learning process that’s being shared has been recorded in a self-critical/reflexive way.</ref>'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

===='''33. Have any signs of collaboration, support, or inspiration already been reported between actors involved in this intervention and others that follow its example? (e.g. in “follower cities”?)'''====

n/a

== j) Structural learning ==

===='''34. Has the intervention influenced higher-level governance arrangements such that sustainability and justice are considered (together) in a more durable, structural way? In other words, are there any observations about more structural, long-term changes as a result of the intervention?'''====

*For example: new programs run by local councils, new modes of citizen participation, new mediating bodies
*Is there other evidence that the project has contributed to enhancing sustainable and just governance in cities in a general sense?

n/a

== k) Reflections on important governance concepts ==

===='''35. What other aspects of governance, that were not covered above, are important to highlight, too?'''====

n/a

===='''36. From your perspective as a researcher, which word or phrase characterizes this governance intervention most concisely? (Please attach your name to the characterization) In other words, what is the biggest takeaway from this intervention about governance arrangements?'''====

The findings and knowledge resulting from the project will be disseminated to city makers in the form of the Anti-gentrification toolkit.

== Appendix 1: Three modes of governance ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

NATURVATION's [https://naturvation.eu/atlas| NBS-Atlas ] distinguishes three categories of governance arrangements (dubbed "management set-ups":

* '''Government-led''' (Gov)
* '''Co-governance or hybrid governance''' (mix of responsibilities between government and non-government actors) (c/h)
* '''Led by non-government actors''' (NGO)

Alternatively or additionally, the following four modes of governing (as distinguished also by Bulkeley/Kern 2006 and Zvolska et al. 2019) could be used as a typology:
Castan Broto/ Bulkeley 2013:95

# '''Self-governing''', intervening in the management of local authority operations to ‘‘lead by example’’;
# '''Provision''', greening infrastructure and consumer services provided by different authorities;
# '''Regulations''', enforcing new laws, planning regulations, building codes, etc.; and
# '''Enabling''', supporting initiatives led by other actors through information and resource provision and partnerships”

== Appendix 2: Policy typology ==
''(from NATURVATION project)''

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center;"
! Policy typology
! Description
! Examples
|-
| '''Regulatory (administrative, command-and-control)'''
| Mandatory fulfillment of certain requirements by targeted actors
| Legislations, regulations, laws, directives, etc.
|-
| '''Economic (financial, market-based)'''
| Financial (dis)incentives to trigger change by providing (new) favourable (or unfavourable) economic conditions for targeted actors
| Positive incentive include subsidies, soft loans, tax allowance and procurments. Negative incentives are taxes, fees and charges.
|-
| '''Informative (educational)'''
| They aim at providing information or knowledge to target actors in order to increase awareness and support informed decision-making accomplish or prevent social change
| Information and awareness raising campaigns, informative leaflets, advertisements in different media.
|-
| '''Voluntary'''
| Commitment and/or actions beyond legal requirements, undertaken by private actors and/or non-governmental organisations.
| Voluntary actions and agreements.
|}

[[test tableau]]

Database of governance arrangements

2021-01-04T13:41:42Z

Romane Joly: /* Governance interventions */

Across Europe there is an inspiring array of experimentation with local governance arrangements for just and sustainable cities.

What is '''governance'''? It can be broadly understood as all formal and informal political processes (involving state and non-state actors) that lead to collective action.

On this database, you will find the summaries of results of a study on fruitful governance interventions for sustainable and just cities.

Would you like to get involved? We've asked some questions in the following sections, and you can share your suggestions with us via email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]]. If you haven't already, please feel free to join the [[UrbanA Community of Practice]].

 '''DISCLAIMER: This page is currently under review! More detail to follow shortly.'''

== Enabling governance arrangements ==

Enabling governance arrangements are combinations of actor constellations and institutional settings that have proven a potential to support urban governance towards just and sustainable cities in several cases of real-world (Governance Interventions)

Looking at a selection of eleven situated governance interventions for sustainable and just cities (as summarized in our scenarios), we asked:

''What key elements of governance arrangements enabled those interventions to come to fruition?''

You can find background information on eleven original, real-world governance interventions, our empirical basis, in our database of rich descriptions (for more information, please refer to the section methodology).

You will see references to these interventions in the form of brief examples to illustrate each enabling governance arrangement. The question numbers accompanying the examples, like ''“(Q18)”'', will lead you to the pertinent section of the respective description of a real world governance intervention.

We assume that the enabling governance arrangements were aimed at sustainable and just outcomes, which makes it likely that they can be useful for interventions with similar goals in other instances as well. However, we do not claim that these enabling arrangements are the sole factors for bringing interventions to fruition, as the latter will always be embedded in local contexts with place-based factors being important as well.

When clicking on one of the enabling governance arrangement A) - D) below, you will learn about the ambition this each enabling governance arrangement as well as about the scenarios and detailed descriptions of governance experiments it relates.

[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]

[[B) Make space for adaptation and experimentation]]

[[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]

[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]

[[E) Tap into existing community networks]]

[[F) Develop resilient, and self-sufficient financing arrangements]]

Which further enabling governance arrangement do you consider crucial on the way towards governance for sustainability AND justice in cities?

== Governance interventions ==

We have selected eleven real-word experiments (mostly within EU-funded projects) and developed '''detailed descriptions''' which detail their governance variables and processes. We have also created a brief '''governance scenario''' per case studied. These scenarios share general insights in a narrative style, and we hope that they pique your interest and provide inspiration about what could be possible in your city!

We stress that the interventions presented below (the detailed descriptions and the corresponding scenarios) - '''are not exemplary “successful interventions”'''. Rather, they are regarded as '''general inspiration''' and real-world cases for testing out how to enable translocal learning.

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center; background-color:#efefef;"
! Detailed governance intervention descriptions
! Brief governance scenarios
|-
| 1.[[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome]]
| 1.[[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]]
|-
| 2.[[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin]]
| 2.[[Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing]]
|-
| 3.[[Community led affordable housing in Brussels]]
| 3.[[A new take on affordable housing through community owned and developed dwellings]]
|-
| 4.[[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]]
| 4.[[Inviting citizens to a transformation of street space - flexibly dealing with resistance]]
|-
| 5.[[Biodiversity protection and social justice in the Barcelona Natural Park]]
| 5.[[Negotiating green space development: balancing long-term sustainability and short-term social needs]]
|-
| 6.[[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg]]
| 6.[[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]]
|-
| 7.[[Inner-city community energy in London]]
| 7.[[From electricity to empowerment, community energy growing out of the inner-city]]
|-
| 8.[[Holistic neighbourhood development Augustenborg]]
| 8.[[Overcoming compartmentalization in urban regeneration projects for inclusive sustainability and resilience]]
|-
| 9.[[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]]
| 9.[[Creating a sustainable energy system - a citizen-driven transformation]]
|-
| 10.[[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam]]
| 10.[[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]]
|}

=== Example of a partially successful governance intervention ===

In addition to our 10 fruitful governance interventions for sustainability and justice in cities (see above), we developed a [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens| rich description]] and a [[ Bringing sustainable infrastructure to all - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships|scenario]] of a governance intervention that demonstrates possible pitfalls when developing sustainable infrastructure in a public-private partnership. This intervention outlines the always partial success of governance intervention and encourages to be caution about the externalities of public-private partnerships, especially in a context of austerity affecting southern-estern European countries.

Template for developing further descriptions: [[Rich description template]]

== Methodology ==

''(Coming soon)''

Expanding effective practices for food rescuing and sharing among cities

2021-01-04T13:41:14Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Expanding effective practices for food rescuing and sharing among cities to Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing

#REDIRECT [[Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing]]

Tackling Waste: Community Practices for Food Rescuing and Sharing

2021-01-04T13:41:14Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Expanding effective practices for food rescuing and sharing among cities to Tackling waste: community practices for food rescuing and sharing

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin | real-world case]]

[[File:Pic_sharing_point_Freiburg_.JPG|300px]]

'''Imagine your city where surplus-food is not being wasted and is instead rescued and shared among (poorer) communities.'''

'''Where from and how to get there?'''

For this to happen, citizens could have the leading role, having identified a social problem in the food sector, i.e. food waste and food insecurity. Whereas these issues are often regulated by governmental policies (e.g. food waste management and food itself), community-based actions could be undertaken by citizens to complement them.

'''How can such citizens' initiatives thrive?'''

Such interventions require social resources to develop. For example, relying on a wider-community network could be of great support. Indeed, networks provide social movements with resources (human, material) and legitimacy (in the public opinion and political sphere). In addition, community-based initiatives likely have better chances of success while relying on an established organizational structure, including a well-defined distribution of responsibilities, roles and powers among community members, as well as some operating tools.

'''What legal obstacles food rescuers may face? And how to cope with them? '''

Such a project would entail taking actions outside/ at the side of the regulatory framework on the sector of food and as a response to it. However, this legal framework could possibly be an obstacle. Eventually, a problem may arise when community initiatives are asked to comply with regulatory policies, and they often do not have the capacity i.e. handling, financial, to meet these requirements. In that sense, strict regulations primarily designed for bigger interventions i.e. for businesses or big institutions, can hinder or even prevent citizens’ initiatives.

Eventually, facing these kinds of obstacles could reinforce opposition between the intervention proponents and governing bodies. A positive effect may be the strengthening of the political line of the movement and its establishment as an oppositional power challenging (dysfunctional) governmental policy. However, legal pressures to comply with the pre-existing framework reduces to some extent the potential impact of such projects.

'''How can we learn from such an intervention?'''

The different processes featured here could be recorded and shared within community networks (Q.29). Thus, similar setups may be likely to spread and develop, facilitated by the local bodies of wider community-networks. Additionally, activists could actively engage in sharing their knowledge and tools for facilitating the replication of the intervention in other urban contexts. Thus, similar initiatives would be likely to develop elsewhere, either by sticking to the organizational structure of the movement or by inventing different ways of operating.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin |'''Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin''']] that has inspired this scenario. Foodsharing is a grassroots initiative that thrives to rescue and share surplus food among citizens. Its proponent consider food as a "common good" which has to be exempted from monetary transaction. Check out their website (only in German), https://foodsharing.de/

This scenario relates to some '''enabling governance arrangements''':
* [[E) Tap into existing community networks]] - Foodsharing groups tapped into the resources of the national network to develop locally, especially they used the same online platform as well as the same principles and organizational structure.
* [[F) Develop resilient, and self-sufficient financing arrangements]] - Foodsharing is run by unpaid volunteers, including developers, foodshares and foodsavers and refuses any public funding or subsidies..

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons| Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons approach]]

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
*[[Unfit institutional structures]]
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]
*[[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society ]]

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

Database of governance arrangements

2021-01-04T13:40:33Z

Romane Joly: /* Governance interventions */

Across Europe there is an inspiring array of experimentation with local governance arrangements for just and sustainable cities.

What is '''governance'''? It can be broadly understood as all formal and informal political processes (involving state and non-state actors) that lead to collective action.

On this database, you will find the summaries of results of a study on fruitful governance interventions for sustainable and just cities.

Would you like to get involved? We've asked some questions in the following sections, and you can share your suggestions with us via email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]]. If you haven't already, please feel free to join the [[UrbanA Community of Practice]].

 '''DISCLAIMER: This page is currently under review! More detail to follow shortly.'''

== Enabling governance arrangements ==

Enabling governance arrangements are combinations of actor constellations and institutional settings that have proven a potential to support urban governance towards just and sustainable cities in several cases of real-world (Governance Interventions)

Looking at a selection of eleven situated governance interventions for sustainable and just cities (as summarized in our scenarios), we asked:

''What key elements of governance arrangements enabled those interventions to come to fruition?''

You can find background information on eleven original, real-world governance interventions, our empirical basis, in our database of rich descriptions (for more information, please refer to the section methodology).

You will see references to these interventions in the form of brief examples to illustrate each enabling governance arrangement. The question numbers accompanying the examples, like ''“(Q18)”'', will lead you to the pertinent section of the respective description of a real world governance intervention.

We assume that the enabling governance arrangements were aimed at sustainable and just outcomes, which makes it likely that they can be useful for interventions with similar goals in other instances as well. However, we do not claim that these enabling arrangements are the sole factors for bringing interventions to fruition, as the latter will always be embedded in local contexts with place-based factors being important as well.

When clicking on one of the enabling governance arrangement A) - D) below, you will learn about the ambition this each enabling governance arrangement as well as about the scenarios and detailed descriptions of governance experiments it relates.

[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]

[[B) Make space for adaptation and experimentation]]

[[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]

[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]

[[E) Tap into existing community networks]]

[[F) Develop resilient, and self-sufficient financing arrangements]]

Which further enabling governance arrangement do you consider crucial on the way towards governance for sustainability AND justice in cities?

== Governance interventions ==

We have selected eleven real-word experiments (mostly within EU-funded projects) and developed '''detailed descriptions''' which detail their governance variables and processes. We have also created a brief '''governance scenario''' per case studied. These scenarios share general insights in a narrative style, and we hope that they pique your interest and provide inspiration about what could be possible in your city!

We stress that the interventions presented below (the detailed descriptions and the corresponding scenarios) - '''are not exemplary “successful interventions”'''. Rather, they are regarded as '''general inspiration''' and real-world cases for testing out how to enable translocal learning.

{| class="wikitable"
|- style="font-weight:bold; text-align:center; background-color:#efefef;"
! Detailed governance intervention descriptions
! Brief governance scenarios
|-
| 1.[[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome]]
| 1.[[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]]
|-
| 2.[[Citizens rescuing and sharing food in Berlin]]
| 2.[[Expanding effective practices for food rescuing and sharing among cities]]
|-
| 3.[[Community led affordable housing in Brussels]]
| 3.[[A new take on affordable housing through community owned and developed dwellings]]
|-
| 4.[[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona]]
| 4.[[Inviting citizens to a transformation of street space - flexibly dealing with resistance]]
|-
| 5.[[Biodiversity protection and social justice in the Barcelona Natural Park]]
| 5.[[Negotiating green space development: balancing long-term sustainability and short-term social needs]]
|-
| 6.[[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg]]
| 6.[[Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods]]
|-
| 7.[[Inner-city community energy in London]]
| 7.[[From electricity to empowerment, community energy growing out of the inner-city]]
|-
| 8.[[Holistic neighbourhood development Augustenborg]]
| 8.[[Overcoming compartmentalization in urban regeneration projects for inclusive sustainability and resilience]]
|-
| 9.[[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]]
| 9.[[Creating a sustainable energy system - a citizen-driven transformation]]
|-
| 10.[[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam]]
| 10.[[Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty]]
|}

=== Example of a partially successful governance intervention ===

In addition to our 10 fruitful governance interventions for sustainability and justice in cities (see above), we developed a [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens| rich description]] and a [[ Bringing sustainable infrastructure to all - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships|scenario]] of a governance intervention that demonstrates possible pitfalls when developing sustainable infrastructure in a public-private partnership. This intervention outlines the always partial success of governance intervention and encourages to be caution about the externalities of public-private partnerships, especially in a context of austerity affecting southern-estern European countries.

Template for developing further descriptions: [[Rich description template]]

== Methodology ==

''(Coming soon)''

Learning from successful community-based actions against gentrification

2021-01-04T13:39:59Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Learning from successful community-based actions against gentrification to Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods

#REDIRECT [[Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods]]

Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods

2021-01-04T13:39:59Z

Romane Joly: Romane Joly moved page Learning from successful community-based actions against gentrification to Countering gentrification: community based and collaborative methods

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome |real-world case]].

[[File:romepicture.jpg|500px]]

'''Imagine your city where residents of limited means could live in affordable social housing located in the city-center and peacefully enjoy their neighborhood for years to come.'''

'''Where from and how do we get there ?'''

This intervention may result from the collective engagement of citizens to resist the gentrification process that occurs in many city centers. Especially in a context of economic crisis, new urban development projects led by and attracting wealthy residents and businesses may be carried at the expense of selling public real estate and privatizing social housing. Consequently, the social structure of the neighborhood is likely to change towards more affluent people. As a response, (former) residents, especially from working-class or ethnic minority backgrounds, could initiate a resistance to displacement. Such resistance may grow bigger and become more visible, eventually reaching to other actors including community organizations as well as local public authorities.

'''How do governments come (or not) into play in this struggle?'''

In such an intervention, the role of public authorities is quite central because privatization in the housing sector is often closely related to governmental regulatory frameworks. Indeed, as national and local governments are running out of public money because of an economic crisis, they may have enforced a set of privatization policies in the sector of housing. Such austerity policies lead to the eviction of working-class dwellers and eventually, could launch resistance against it.

'''What are the actions taken by citizens to resist displacement?'''

To resist against the privatization of social housing and evictions, citizens could voice their right to “stay put” and engage in different actions including occupying housing. Opening the dialogue between resistance fighters and public actors may be central to the success of the intervention. For this purpose, the creation of a citizen platform voicing the claim of citizens to the municipality may be quite a handy tool. Indeed, it could raise awareness among local authorities on the detrimental impacts of privatization policies, and possibly lead to the creation of a set of new policies, including re-housing or the regularization of informal housing.

'''What are the challenges in implementing anti-gentrification policies?'''

Although a public response would be welcomed, it may not equally benefit residents, depending on their wealth or social status (e.g. migrants), and as a consequence, create dissensus among them. Eventually, community resistance could be undermined. If governmental policies are not consistent i.e. do not equally protect endangered residents, they could reinforce the social problem initially addressed.

'''What can we learn from this case?'''

These governance arrangements between citizens and public actors against gentrification aims at being inspirational. The processes it features may be replicated in other urban settings in a similar context i.e. where the public sector is weakened by an economic crisis. Sharing and discussing these processes between community organizations as well as local and national governments from different countries may be quite effective to create some learning about effective tools for resisting gentrification.

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome |'''Bottom-up resistance against gentrification in Rome''']] that has inspired this scenario. In Rome, resistance fighters thrive to impeach the displacement of working class dwellers from the city center, a gentrification process which is fostered by pernicious and neoliberal regulations on public housing stock.

This scenario relates to an '''enabling governance arrangement''':
* [[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]] - The role of anti-eviction platforms was crucial as they contributed to voice the claim and to represent the interests of evicted/targeted citizens.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability| Reconceptualising urban justice and sustainability]]
*[[Right to housing | Right to housing]]

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration | Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
*[[Material and livelihood inequalities | Material and livelihood inequalities]]
*[[Racialized or ethnically exclusionary urbanization | Racialized or Ethnically Exclusionary Urbanization]]
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism | Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]
*[[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure | Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
*[[Weak(ened) civil society | Weak(ened) civil society ]]

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T13:38:52Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real-world [[Dealing flexibly with and learning from resistance in Barcelona | case]]

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens]] that has inspired this scenario.

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]]. This approach refers to solutions for urban sustainability that are inspired and supported by nature, which are cost-effective, simultaneously provide environmental, social and economic benefits and help build resilience’.

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]. This driver refers to the ways in which territory, identity, education, knowledge, and information are used to draw lines, privileges, and hierarchies between social groups, and especially to how this leads to an uneven distribution of benefits from urban sustainability efforts.
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]. This driver refers to unequal exposure to harmful and health-impairing pollutants, conditions and urban environments and/or unequal access to safe and healthy environments.
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]. This driver refers to processes of privatization, commercialization, budget cuts and state withdrawal from various sectors and how they can undermine urban sustainability, guided by an ideology of unfettered economic growth which often aligns with austerity policies.

Bringing sustainable infrastructure - carefully engaging in public-private partnerships

2021-01-04T13:37:50Z

Romane Joly:

[[File:SNFCC picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where sustainable urban infrastructure is brought by private actors to degraded neighborhoods, for local residents to enjoy green spaces and cultural activities.'''

This intervention could develop even in a context of economic crisis. In such a situation, the municipality, close to bankruptcy, may not have the capacity to address the social problems associated with a degraded neighborhood. Yet, a private actor may be motivated by these problems to support weakened public authorities. In this case, such an actor could engage in urban regeneration by conceptualizing an urban renewal project and offering to develop it in the framework of a public-private partnership with the public authorities still owning the land.

The cornerstone of such a partnership may be its financial arrangements. Whereas public actors would be weakened by the crisis, the private actor may be able to cover all project costs and donate it to public authorities after completion. In return, the donor could have the leading role in operating the project. It could take over the responsibility for decision making whereas public governmental and non-governmental actors would only have a limited agency.
To facilitate the process, the legal agreement linking the public to the private actor may be submitted ready-made to the public authorities. However, letting one actor operate on its own may centralize knowledge and resources and would not necessarily provide learning for other actors involved in the project, including municipal agents.

More crucial, a public-private partnership likely entails a high dependency of public authorities on the private actor. Unscrupulous donors could be expecting a financial guarantee for their operation, including reimbursement of some costs if the project is not financially viable once it starts operating. In this case, public authorities may be at risk of sliding even further into debt. Such an example highlights the need to agree on fair terms between private and public partners.

Some public-private partnerships are inspirational while others are informative on what to avoid. However, the emergence of such a partnership may be closely related to a specific context of economic crisis and austerity. In all cases, such partnerships should be clearly beneficial, e.g. as the only possible way of bringing essential services to those in need. The possibility of unintended (long-term) consequences need to be considered, though, e.g. that democratically elected authorities may lose a significant part of their autonomy.

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Public-private partnerships for sustainability infrastructure in Athens]] that has inspired this scenario.

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Nature-based solutions]]. This approach refers to solutions for urban sustainability that are inspired and supported by nature, which are cost-effective, simultaneously provide environmental, social and economic benefits and help build resilience’.

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[ Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]. This driver refers to the ways in which territory, identity, education, knowledge, and information are used to draw lines, privileges, and hierarchies between social groups, and especially to how this leads to an uneven distribution of benefits from urban sustainability efforts.
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]. This driver refers to unequal exposure to harmful and health-impairing pollutants, conditions and urban environments and/or unequal access to safe and healthy environments.
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]. This driver refers to processes of privatization, commercialization, budget cuts and state withdrawal from various sectors and how they can undermine urban sustainability, guided by an ideology of unfettered economic growth which often aligns with austerity policies.

File:SNFCC picture.jpg

2021-01-04T13:36:42Z

Romane Joly:

Reclaiming Street Space: Cooperation for Neighbourhood Transformation

2021-01-04T13:32:42Z

Romane Joly:

Countering Gentrification: Community Based and Collaborative Methods

2021-01-04T13:31:17Z

Romane Joly:

Nurturing Trust in Community-Driven Regeneration: Continuity amidst Institutional Uncertainty

2021-01-04T13:24:58Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a real world [[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam|case]].

[[File:Carnisse picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine a city where residents of moderate means can fully enjoy the neighborhood where they are living and collectively engage in community projects that strengthen social relations and improve urban infrastructure.'''

'''Which actors can effectively initiate such an intervention?'''

In this case, persistent social problems related to health, living conditions and education are likely to have been identified early on by local residents, social workers as well as municipal actors (Q.9a). But what can be done to address poverty and lack of equity? A response may be initiated by civil society organizations. Especially those already engaged in local community projects and who are familiar with the context may call on municipal support to address these issues (Q.10). Consequently, an urban regeneration project may be conceptualized by the civil society organizations and supported by the municipality. The good cooperation and a common interest between those two bodies would be crucial (Q.13).

'''What do community-driven participatory processes look like? What role does a municipality play in such an intervention?'''

The project is especially likely to be facilitated if it aligns with municipal orientations. Indeed, to counter decreasing public subsidies for social intervention, local public authorities tend to rely on the engagement of local dwellers to conduct urban regeneration projects (Q.17 & 18). In such a set up, much freedom is likely to be granted by the municipality to local project proponents, which could trigger the experimentation of innovative participatory methods (Q.15). It may include workshops enabling residents to collectively envision a desired neighborhood, reflect and discuss on options, and learn about self-organization (Q.30). Within these deliberative settings, citizens could be invited to engage in hands-on activities, such as planning a community center, shared garden, or other inclusive projects.

'''What happens in the face of institutional uncertainty?'''

Such an innovative intervention might face obstacles as it emerges. For instance, changes in institutional and political settings, for example budget cuts or the dismantlement of previous social welfare structures may generate ambiguity and insecurity about project development. In this context, project proponents may be confronted with mistrust and scepticism in the outcomes from participatory processes. As previous regeneration projects implemented without regard of the local community may have undermined the residents’ trust in such interventions, shifting municipal actors could generate additional suspicion about the effective outcomes of participatory methods (Q.23.b).

'''How can community leaders respond to these obstacles?'''

To keep out of institutional turbulences, project proponents could decide to operate quite autonomously, at risk of loosening relationships with institutional actors. Other obstacles may be overcome by means of the institutional work done within a community to build trust between project proponents and community members, including gaining a better understanding of its local history, context, and dynamics(Q.24). When successfully developed, such an intervention should enhance community building, empower citizens as well as establish new relationships based on cooperation and mutual trust between citizens, community-organizations, and public actors (Q.25).

'''What are the implications for this scenario?'''

These governance arrangements being successfully developed and experimented by the project proponents, including the municipality, could be replicated in other neighborhoods. Eventually, this may be the basis for a new participatory and inclusive approach to local urban governance (Q.31).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

This scenario is inspired by the intervention, [[Regeneration of a deprived neighborhood in Rotterdam]] . It was facilitated by an Urban Resilience Lab in the neighborhood of Carnisse, who engaged with residents, municipal actors, and professionals to collectively address the social problems in the neighborhood. To learn more about how this intervention addressed the project obstacles, see Q24 in the detailed description. Learn more about the Carnisse Resilience Lab at their website: https://www.veerkrachtcarnisse.nl/

This scenario relates to some ‘’’enabling governance arrangements’’’:
*[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]: In workshops organized by local organizations, residents were invited to develop a shared vision of the district redevelopment and establish an agenda for transformative and experimental actions e.g. create a community center, a shared garden etc.
*[[B) Embrace flexibility in project design and implementation]]: Project proponents (mostly local organizations) had an overall vision of the project development but it was not set in stone. The idea was to translate an existing methodology about transition management and to make it custom fit to the local context. For instance, the creation of a community center was not planned in advance and was envisioned and initiated by local stakeholders.
*[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]: To make the project more inclusive, project proponents developed two types of participation methods and invited residents to engage in a more deliberative one (e.g. visioning the district) and more practical one (e.g. developing activities in the community center and community garden).

This scenario fits under the '''approach''':
*[[Experimentation labs]]

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
*[[Material and livelihood inequalities]]
*[[ Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
*[[Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]
*[[Lack of effective knowledge brokerage and stewardship opportunities]]
*[[Weak(ened) civil society]]

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

File:Carnisse picture.jpg

2021-01-04T13:24:12Z

Romane Joly:

Creating a Sustainable Energy System: a Citizen-Driven Transformation

2021-01-04T13:16:44Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy |real-world case]].

[[File:BBerlin picture.jpg | 500px]]

'''Imagine your city where a group of highly motivated citizens with diverse expertise come together as a cooperative to flag their concerns about unsustainable practices in a metropolitan energy system.'''

'''Can such a citizen-led cooperative challenge the neoliberal growth paradigm in the energy market?'''

It seems that the present energy market has various social and ecological disadvantages that are inflicted by the profit-oriented monopolized private energy market. This has spurred the engagement of citizens who are increasingly aware their needs, capabilities, and political landscapes. Can they govern local energy systems themselves in ways that are inclusive, accessible and sustainable in the long run? (Q9).

'''How financial and human resources can be generated for executing a citizen-based initiative?'''

Such citizen-led cooperatives can be extended and strengthened by acquiring financial and in-kind support from businesses, research institutes, NGOs, students and media (Q12). Cooperatives may also profit from inviting experts with experience in establishing similar interventions for guidance, which may be especially important during the early stages of the process (Q13). Furthermore, awareness campaigns with the help of the media can sensitize the general public and help earning trust and support from political leaders (Q32).

'''What major policies and management approaches can keep an intervention relevant and alive?'''

Supportive EU directives such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive and national policies and constitutional rights (for example right to hold plebiscites, right to assembly, and right to form cooperatives) can provide an enabling environment for such interventions (Q19). Moreover, a flexible project management approach (changing with on-the-ground circumstances) without compromising on the fundamental vision and goal of an intervention can keep the intervention relevant and alive.

'''What actor constellations can be crucial for effective participation and good governance and decision-making?'''

Governing energy systems as a cooperative could allow for wide participation among the membership. It can have volunteers and cooperative members working in different capacities. General assemblies of the cooperative can allow for the participation of all members at different levels of the decision-making process. However, to ensure accountability, a supervisory board consisting of founders and highly engaged individuals could develop strategic plans and take action (Q15).

'''How a citizen-based initiative can cope with potential governance, financial, and political challenges?'''

The intervention may be confronted with various challenges, especially those related to financial arrangements, political culture, and regulatory procedures. Financial challenges could be tackled partly with shareholder/membership fees and partly by attracting donors and sponsors. Political and general public’s opinion can be influenced by running awareness campaigns, engaging with the media and reaching out to individuals (Q23).
Introducing a citizen-driven management partner in the arena of public vs. private management could be highly challenging. However, different paths and approaches can be adopted to realize the overarching goals of an intervention while carefully aligning various stakeholders and securing wide public support (Q32).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]] that has inspired this scenario.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Civil disobedience (YOU ARE WELCOME TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PAGE!)| Civil disobedience]]. This approach refers to a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies.
*[[Energy and Mobility solutions]]. This approach cluster addresses technological interventions that can support the transition to a low-carbon society.

It addresses a '''driver of injustice''':
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]. This driver refers to processes of privatization, commercialization, budget cuts and state withdrawal from various sectors and how they can undermine urban sustainability, guided by an ideology of unfettered economic growth which often aligns with austerity policies.

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User: Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

File:BBerlin picture.jpg

2021-01-04T13:16:22Z

Romane Joly:

Creating a Sustainable Energy System: a Citizen-Driven Transformation

2021-01-04T13:14:02Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy |real-world case]].

[[File:BBB picture.jpg | 300px]]

'''Imagine your city where a group of highly motivated citizens with diverse expertise come together as a cooperative to flag their concerns about unsustainable practices in a metropolitan energy system.'''

'''Can such a citizen-led cooperative challenge the neoliberal growth paradigm in the energy market?'''

It seems that the present energy market has various social and ecological disadvantages that are inflicted by the profit-oriented monopolized private energy market. This has spurred the engagement of citizens who are increasingly aware their needs, capabilities, and political landscapes. Can they govern local energy systems themselves in ways that are inclusive, accessible and sustainable in the long run? (Q9).

'''How financial and human resources can be generated for executing a citizen-based initiative?'''

Such citizen-led cooperatives can be extended and strengthened by acquiring financial and in-kind support from businesses, research institutes, NGOs, students and media (Q12). Cooperatives may also profit from inviting experts with experience in establishing similar interventions for guidance, which may be especially important during the early stages of the process (Q13). Furthermore, awareness campaigns with the help of the media can sensitize the general public and help earning trust and support from political leaders (Q32).

'''What major policies and management approaches can keep an intervention relevant and alive?'''

Supportive EU directives such as the EU Renewable Energy Directive and national policies and constitutional rights (for example right to hold plebiscites, right to assembly, and right to form cooperatives) can provide an enabling environment for such interventions (Q19). Moreover, a flexible project management approach (changing with on-the-ground circumstances) without compromising on the fundamental vision and goal of an intervention can keep the intervention relevant and alive.

'''What actor constellations can be crucial for effective participation and good governance and decision-making?'''

Governing energy systems as a cooperative could allow for wide participation among the membership. It can have volunteers and cooperative members working in different capacities. General assemblies of the cooperative can allow for the participation of all members at different levels of the decision-making process. However, to ensure accountability, a supervisory board consisting of founders and highly engaged individuals could develop strategic plans and take action (Q15).

'''How a citizen-based initiative can cope with potential governance, financial, and political challenges?'''

The intervention may be confronted with various challenges, especially those related to financial arrangements, political culture, and regulatory procedures. Financial challenges could be tackled partly with shareholder/membership fees and partly by attracting donors and sponsors. Political and general public’s opinion can be influenced by running awareness campaigns, engaging with the media and reaching out to individuals (Q23).
Introducing a citizen-driven management partner in the arena of public vs. private management could be highly challenging. However, different paths and approaches can be adopted to realize the overarching goals of an intervention while carefully aligning various stakeholders and securing wide public support (Q32).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Citizens share in Berlin Energy Grid for sustainable energy]] that has inspired this scenario.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Civil disobedience (YOU ARE WELCOME TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PAGE!)| Civil disobedience]]. This approach refers to a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies.
*[[Energy and Mobility solutions]]. This approach cluster addresses technological interventions that can support the transition to a low-carbon society.

It addresses a '''driver of injustice''':
*[[Unquestioned Neoliberal growth and austerity urbanism]]. This driver refers to processes of privatization, commercialization, budget cuts and state withdrawal from various sectors and how they can undermine urban sustainability, guided by an ideology of unfettered economic growth which often aligns with austerity policies.

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User: Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].

File:BBB picture.jpg

2021-01-04T13:12:58Z

Romane Joly:

Overcoming Silos in Urban Regeneration Projects: Holistic Neighbourhood Design

2021-01-04T13:06:54Z

Romane Joly:

[[File:Augustenborg picture.jpg |500px]]

'''Imagine a city consisting of ecologically sustainable urban neighbourhoods that are inclusive for its residents and resilient towards climate change.
How can we create these neighbourhoods?'''

Creating truly sustainable neighbourhoods from a holistic perspective is often hindered by compartmentalized administrations and specialized, inconsistent policies. The ‘breaking down of silos’ could mean, for example, that different departments of a municipality would have to work together and with different local stakeholders in creating comprehensively sustainable areas taking into consideration a variety of issues (e.g biodiversity, health, inclusivity, climate) at once. What needs to change is also how specific topics are addressed: reducing the energy consumption in a neighbourhood might not just call for the technical improvement of buildings, but may also involve dedicated campaigns for changing energy related behaviour of residents.

When pushing sustainable district and neighbourhood developments in your own city, being truly enthusiastic about the projects can be hugely important to get others on board. Individuals can play a very important role here. An area that has a bad reputation where there is an already existing urge that something has to be done might be a good area to start a sustainable neighbourhood campaign. This can for example apply to neighbourhoods that could have very diverse issues such as high rates of unemployment, low interest in politics or even something really specific like missing resilience to floods. A typical story of such a sustainable neighbourhood campaign could start with the municipality as an initiator. If this is supposed to be an integrated effort, however, the municipality would have to involve different local stakeholders, e.g the municipal housing company, local schools and most importantly local residents.

Developments that try to tackle issues in single sectors (like, mobility or energy) will most likely take a long time to be implemented which could lead to a decline in public interest over the course of the project. Shifting responsibilities and making residents more and more responsible over the duration of the project might help with such issues. If projects aim to address different justice related issues, especially procedural justice, it would be crucial to carefully design participation processes. Such projects should engage residents as well as comprehend their needs and wishes.

A sustainable neighbourhood will only exist if residents feel as integral parts of it. Trying to push best practices onto the neighbourhood will most likely not work if residents do not understand why these developments are necessary or if they are opposed to such ideas.Still, organising workshops that convey experiences from other areas might spark ideas for your own neighbourhood. As a municipality, taking up a perspective that provides guidance in what could be done to improve situations might sometimes be more feasible than telling residents what has to be done. Embracing such an open perspective as well as overcoming compartmentalized policies might be key in creating sustainable as well as resilient neighbourhoods.

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

Take a look at the detailed description of [[Holistic neighbourhood development Augustenborg]] that has inspired this scenario.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Governance and participation processes]]. This approach geared toward urban sustainability emphasise defining and addressing environmental problems as well as envisioning the future of cities, mainly based on the co-production of knowledge through innovative, diverse and strategic partnerships.
*[[Governance for urban climate mitigation and adaptation]]. This approach refers to the effort of public institutions to engage the civil society in policy making processes.

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Material and livelihood inequalities]]. This driver refers to the ways that the underlying distribution of economic resources gets expressed within urban sustainability efforts, reinforcing or exacerbating unjust outcomes.
*[[Uneven environmental health and pollution patterns]]. This driver refers to the ways in which new urban developments might force trade-offs between the social and environmental goals of urban sustainability projects. It involves public efforts to improve a neighbourhood’s physical structure and boost its economy by attracting investment, usually in the sectors of real estate and tourism.
*[[Weak(ened) civil society]]. This driver refers to the ways in which collective civic groups that share common interests (other than the state, the market, or the family) are either not constituted and impactful enough to influence and benefit from sustainability efforts or are indeed constrained by interventions that carry sustainability objectives.

File:Augustenborg picture.jpg

2021-01-04T13:05:41Z

Romane Joly:

Collaborating Across Institutional Boundaries: Co-Creating Sustainable Neighborhoods

2021-01-04T12:58:37Z

Romane Joly:

This scenario has been developed on the basis of a [[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg|real-world case]].

[[File:Vauban Freiburg picture.jpg |500px]]

'''Imagine a green and pedestrianized city district where residents have participated in creating affordable and sustainable housing (Q.2 & 3).'''

'''How can we create this reality?'''
This intervention may be initiated by citizens wishing to live in more sustainable ways. With a common understanding of what a sustainable neighbourhood could look like (i.e. affordable and low-energy housing, green areas, and gentle mobility), citizens from diverse backgrounds could engage in formal urban development processes to bring their vision to life. More specifically, these plans should converge with the municipality’s interest in establishing a new district, in so doing experimenting with innovative measures such as participatory planning and the integration of citizens’ housing cooperatives (Q.10). Success would depend on the collaboration between citizen organizations, which would be progressively professionalized, and the municipality working in partnership to implement the project (Q.13). Indeed, a real co-creation process can only result from the well-defined and (relatively) horizontal distribution of responsibilities between each group (Q.15).

Building on the experiences of previous community projects could facilitate citizens’ participation. Indeed, such background may provide legitimacy to citizen-led interventions and build trust among municipal actors in the capacity of citizen groups to successfully implement projects (Q.20). Additionally, the organizational and human resources from other community networks may be of great support for the project’s proponents (Q.27).

'''Which problems could arise for such a project?'''
Undoubtedly, such innovative collaboration may not work smoothly right out of the gate, and some obstacles could be encountered on the way. For example, bureaucratic frameworks usually used by municipalities in urban development projects may not be adapted for such co-creation projects. Eventually, it could constrain citizen participation who may feel unjustly treated or disregarded by the municipality (Q.23). Dissensus may also arise between grassroot project proponents that have contrasting visions about the district development (e.g. more libertarian or more institutionalized ambitions).

'''How can we deal with these obstacles?'''
Since such obstacles are often related to misunderstandings or a lack of communication, most important would be to openly discuss any frustrations (e.g. about procedures and visions) and appreciating the mutual expectations of the different citizen groups and the municipality. A mediator or the creation of a special council with representatives from both groups could facilitate dialogue and be of great support (Q.24). As roles and expectations are necessarily adjusted and transparency and mutual trust between actors is reestablished (Q.29), the project could be successfully implemented.
This intervention on governance arrangements for urban development projects aims at being inspirational for citizens and urban policy makers (Q.31). Eventually, key governance arrangements featured in this scenario may be replicated elsewhere, including in different sectors at the municipal level or/and to other urban contexts (Q.33).

'''How could this reality be created in your city? What obstacles would have to be overcome?'''

==Do you want to learn more about this scenario?==

This scenario was based on the development of the [[Co-creation of a sustainable neighborhood in Freiburg|Vauban Eco-District]] in Freiburg, Germany, where the municipality created a special representative council (Vauban City Planning Council) and collaborated with citizen’s groups (namely the Forum Vauban and co-housing initiatives) to co-create the sustainable neighborhood project. If you are interested in how obstacles have been overcome in this case, see Q24. Check out their website to learn more: http://quartiersarbeit-vauban.de/das-quartier-vauban/

This scenario relates to some '''enabling governance arrangements''':
*[[A) Create a comprehensive vision of change]]: Vauban’s prospective residents as well as project proponents developed a shared vision on how to live in a more sustainable way i.e. parking free areas, sustainable mobility, affordable and inclusive housing etc.
*[[C) Build bridges between separate stakeholder groups]]: The “Vauban city planning council” was a consultative committee consisting of municipal actors, local parliamentarians and citizens. It can be considered as an intermediary as it was a place for discussion and mediation between stakeholders.
*[[D) Commit to a meaningful participation process]]: The citizen-led Vauban Forum was invited to participate in the “Vauban city planning council” (a consultative committee within the city council) which indicates that the municipality recognizes citizens as legitimate partners in the project development.
*[[E) Tap into existing community networks]]: Housing Cooperative Networks in Germany inspired to some extent project proponents. Specifically, they benefited from the expertise of the cooperative confederation regarding economy, law and tax policy.

This scenario fits under the '''approaches''':
*[[Co-living, co-housing & intentional communities]]
*[[Governance and participation processes]]
*[[Sharing and cooperatives for urban commons]]

It addresses some '''drivers of injustice''':
*[[Uneven and exclusionary urban intensification and regeneration]]
*[[Exclusive access to the benefits of sustainability infrastructure]]
*[[Limited citizen participation in urban planning]]

What do you think about this scenario? Was it helpful to you? Do you find our approach problematic? Send us an email to [[User:Philipp Spaeth|Philipp Spaeth]].